Hegel, Idealism, + Analytic Philosophy

Tom Rockmore

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Introduction

The nascent analytic turn to Hegel calls attention to his often unsuspected contribution to the problem of knowledge while highlighting deep differences limiting most, perhaps all, effort to appropriate Hegel for traditional analytic purposes. Hegel's interest for the contemporary debate on knowledge is not often recognized since even today his difficult position is still not well understood. He was refuted as part of the emergence of Anglo-American analytic philosophy in England a century ago. He is widely thought to be out of step with our historical moment, and even to have been "overcome," for instance, by the results of modern science.[1]

Martin Heidegger, who insists on the crucial importance of coming to grips with Hegel,[2] was not well informed about contemporary philosophy, other than that of a few twentieth-century German thinkers. He seems not to have understood the extent to which the discussion of his time was deeply dependent on his idealist predecessor.[3] Almost thirty years ago Richard Bernstein made a strong case for Hegel as the central figure against whom the main contemporary philosophical movements react. Bernstein had in mind Hegel's influence on philosophies of action or activity, including the Marxist interest in praxis.[4]

A different way of making a similar claim would be by examining Hegel's influence on three philosophical tendencies which emerged around the beginning of the last century, and which later came to dominate philosophical debate: American pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and the so-called phenomenological movement.[5] Paradoxically, analytic philosophy, which devotes

the most attention to idealism, including Hegel, is also the most critical of it.

In its own way, each of these tendencies reacts against Hegel. C. S. Peirce, the founding figure of American pragmatism, was influenced by Hegel throughout his career, initially negatively, and later to an increasing extent positively, claiming finally that his own view is a nonstandard form of Hegel's.[6] William James and John Dewey, the other main American pragmatists of the first generation, were also influenced by Hegel, James mainly negatively but Dewey more positively. What has come to be called the phenomenological movement is in fact the large-scale debate set in motion, not by phenomenology, nor even by Hegel, but rather by Edmund Husserl.[7] Sartre, who knew enough about the history of philosophy to know better, even goes so far as to claim that Husserl invented phenomenology.[8] Yet before Husserl, Hegel and many others, including J. H. Lambert and even Immanuel Kant, understood themselves as phenomenologists, or exhibited phenomenological tendencies. Husserlian and post-Husserlian forms of phenomenology represent at most variations on a preexisting theme. They have clearly invented new kinds of phenomenology, but not a wholly new type of philosophy.

The most complex interaction between Hegel and later philosophy is found in the current tendency that is least directly concerned with his theories: analytic philosophy. In considering Hegel's relation to analytic philosophy, Bernstein mainly focuses on action, especially action theory. He points out the utter disdain, even contempt, for Hegel that runs like a red thread through Anglo-American analytic philosophy since it emerged in England at the turn of the twentieth century. He further notes that, for reasons concerned with the internal dialectic of the analytic discussion, the possibility of a rapprochement with Hegel now exists.[9]

Bernstein correctly senses a hidden continuity between the founding fathers of analytic philosophy in England, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, and the British idealism against which they rebelled.[10] Bernstein correctly regards analytic philosophers as (like Hegel) also concerned to describe human action,[11] but he notes neither the distortion inherent in the analytic reaction to Hegel, nor the way in which, through Wilfrid Sellars, analytic philosophy was already returning to Hegel.[12] And he does not discuss what is philosophically significant in the interaction between Hegel and analytic philosophy.

This book will focus on the complex relation between Hegel, idealism in general, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. In considering the relation of analytic philosophy and idealism, the book will counter three myths which have long shaped and still shape this encounter: First, there is the approach to idealism as the view that everything is "spiritual," which is widely but uncritically accepted by uninformed observers including many analytic thinkers, but also by more informed observers such as Peirce. Second, there is the erroneous conviction that the founding members of analytic philosophy were ever idealists in any recognizable sense, despite what they themselves may have believed. Third, there is the widely accepted notion that the founders of analytic philosophy decisively refuted idealism.

The relation between Hegel, idealism, and analytic philosophy is not well known, even to historians of philosophy. Yet Hegel is a key figure in at least three ways for analytic philosophy and analytic concerns: He is a thinker from whom Anglo-American analytic philosophy departs, to whom it is currently making a selective return, and whom it has arguably twice misunderstood. Furthermore, when he is understood in a different way than has so far been the case in analytic philosophy, he turns out to be key to the main theme that he and analytic philosophy share: an interest in the problem of knowledge.

The complex analytic reaction to Hegel includes two main phases. The first is a turn away from British idealism, and idealism of any kind, hence Hegel, which for many analytic philosophers persists to this day, and which concerns the problem of the existence of the external world. The turn was part of the complex process of working out the distinctive analytic approach, encompassing a large number of different positions. This initial misunderstanding was highly productive in the rise of analytic philosophy. The second, currently nascent turn is toward Hegel, among some analytic writers who are concerned with the problem of knowledge in the wake of the analytic critique of classical empiricism. It remains to be seen whether the second misunderstanding, which is only now taking shape, will prove as productive as the first in the further evolution of analytic philosophy.

Discussion of the relation of analytic philosophy and Hegel encompasses three main dimensions: the analytic critique of idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century and its later consequences, the nascent analytic turn (or return) to Hegel for analytic purposes, and consideration of Hegel's theories as such. I have no intention of questioning the importance of analytical contributions to Hegel scholarship.[13] Though it would be interesting to survey analytic treatments of Hegel, that falls outside the scope of this essay. The present discussion will concentrate on analytic efforts to react to, come to grips with, and appropriate specific Hegelian doctrines by well-known analytic thinkers including Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, and other, lesser-known analytic figures such as Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer. The overall aim is to evaluate aspects of the specific analytic interaction with Hegel (and idealism) as part of the further unfolding of the distinctive analytic philosophical perspective.

The detailed nature of my reconstruction of the analytic encounter with Hegel and idealism is justified by its importance

and intrinsic difficulty. As one of the most interesting philosophical developments at the beginning of the new century, this encounter should be handled with some care—in any case with more care than Hegel is often accorded by his critics.

My account of the analytic encounter with Hegel will be critical. It is hardly surprising that analytic readings of Hegel arise out of analytic doctrinal commitments. My critique of such readings will be based on a reading of Hegel incompatible with these commitments, hence incompatible with mainstream analytic philosophy. This alternative reading of Hegel will be developed in the third chapter. Nonetheless, it may be useful to anticipate some of its main points here in order to avoid the impression that the different objections to be raised below are unrelated, arbitrary, or motivated by a gross misunderstanding of or a simple animus against analytic ways of thought.

Analytic observers sometimes attribute the division between analytic philosophy and so-called continental philosophy to the latter's negative relation to science. Michael Friedman, who scrutinizes this division through the lens of the debate, which Rudolf Carnap attended, between Ernst Cassirer and Heidegger at Davos in 1929, regards the division as a divergence between forms of German neo-Kantianism turning finally on different attitudes toward science. According to Friedman, Carnap defends science as a cognitive source against cognitive essentialism enshrined in continental metaphysics, especially post-Kantian German idealism.[14]

Friedman's observation, which is arguably correct for some continental figures like Heidegger, is not correct for idealism in general, nor for post-Kantian German idealism, nor again for Hegel. Yet it would be an error to conclude that the differences between analytic and continental philosophy are merely apparent or unreal. Arguably the main difference between them does not lie in respect for science, which is preserved in continental

philosophy, by post-Kantian German idealists like Schelling and Hegel, as well as by more recent figures like Cassirer and Husserl. It is rather situated more deeply with respect to the general problem of knowledge.

Hegel and analytic philosophers share a continuing concern with a rigorous theory of knowledge, but part company with respect to realism. The term "realism" is understood in many different, incompatible ways. A very short list might include metaphysical, scientific, and empirical variations on the general realist theme. Ordinary realism is the naïve, unreflective view, a view which is almost instinctively held by most nonphilosophers, that there is a real world which we know. Metaphysical realism is the more sophisticated, philosophical formulation of this naïve view, associated with Parmenides, Plato (in the *Republic*), René Descartes, and many others, according to which to know is to know an independent cognitive object as it is. Scientific realism is the view linked to scientism, advanced by Carnap, Sellars, and others, according to which any and all knowledge worthy of the name emerges within the framework of natural science, which provides knowledge of what is as it is. Empirical realism is the view worked out by Kant according to which we know only what is given in experience and cannot make any cognitive claim about what is not given in experience.

There is an important distinction between metaphysical and empirical forms of realism. A metaphysical realist claims to know what is as it is in virtue of three assumptions. First, there is a way things are. Second, what we know in no sense depends on the knower or on a link of any kind between knower and known. Third, external objects and more generally the world can be known as they are and not merely as they might appear. This view is often contested. Peirce, for instance, who called it "ontological metaphysics," declared it "meaningless gibberish."[15] Un-

like a metaphysical realist, an empirical realist does not claim to know how things are in independence of our experience. An empirical realist claims no more than to know what is given in experience. Thus Descartes, a metaphysical realist, holds that we can bring the mind in touch with external objects in knowing them as they are. But Kant, an empirical realist, admits we can think things as they are. Yet since we cannot experience things as they are, Kant denies we can know them as they are and thereby limits knowledge to experience.

Western philosophy turns on a metaphysical view of realism, or knowing mind-independent reality as it is.[16] This view is widely popular in philosophy of the modern era. For instance, Thomas Hobbes typically writes: "Originally all conceptions proceed from the actions of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception."[17] Descartes similarly claims that certain ideas about the mind-independent world must necessarily be true.

Hegel, who follows Kant in rejecting both ordinary and metaphysical realism, rejects neither realism as such, nor a concern with objective cognition. Analytic efforts to defend these types of realism are neither post-Kantian nor Kantian, but pre-Kantian, incompatible with Kant's position and certainly incompatible with Hegel's. Hegel may be said to favor a successor version of empirical realism in his abandonment of the thing in itself and his conception of the real as given wholly and solely within conscious experience, hence any cognitive reference to external reality as it supposedly is in independence of experience. He does not claim, and after Kant should not claim, to know the real as it is, or even to be affected by it. Analytic efforts to appropriate Hegel along ordinary and metaphysical realist lines do so for aims simply inconsistent with his position.[18]

One way to put the point is in terms of the difference between metaphysical realism and epistemological constructivism.

In Kant's wake, many analytic thinkers maintain the traditional, pre-Kantian philosophical commitment to knowledge of the mind-independent world as it is. As a result of the Copernican turn, Kant abandons metaphysical realism in favor of empirical realism based on the insight that we can know only what we in some sense construct, or epistemological constructivism. Hegel further develops Kant's constructivist view of the cognitive object while adding contextualist, historical, and historicist dimensions to the knowing process. Analytic thinkers, committed to analytic themes including metaphysical realism, often appropriate Hegel as if he were an early analytic figure.

The three chapters of this book correspond to successive phases in the effort to clarify the analytic encounter with Hegel (and idealism). The first chapter will be devoted to the nature and significance of the British analytic turn away from idealism, and hence from Hegel. The analytic rejection of British "idealism" is based on a very loose understanding of the term on the part of analytic thinkers. According to Jürgen Habermas, Heidegger is an idealist.[19] Hilary Putnam, who attributes the view that "mind *makes up* the world" to Hegel,[20] describes idealism as the idea that "objects that are not perceived make no sense."[21]

Getting clear about the initial analytic reaction to idealism therefore requires clarifying such terms as "idealism," "German idealism," and "British idealism." These terms are mainly used negatively to designate views one rejects. The accounts of "idealism," "German idealism," and "British idealism" will be as neutral as possible, but appropriately detailed.

Stress will be placed on differences between British and German idealist theories, and between these theories and what early British analytic thinkers say about them. Attention will be drawn to the distinction between Frege's influential critique of Husserlian psychologism, and Moore's even more influential

critique of British idealism for allegedly rejecting the existence of the external world.

This phase of the discussion has three main objectives. One is to point out that the early analytic figures, including Russell and Moore, did not understand the idealism they rejected well enough to formulate telling objections against it. The influential criticism formulated by Moore does not in fact undermine the views of any of the main idealist figures, including Hegel. Second, a critical review of the early turn away from British idealism helps to understand the current analytic turn toward Hegel. Third, reviewing the objections formulated by early analytic figures against British idealism opens the way to recovering Kant and Hegel through very different readings.

In the second chapter, a more polemical account of pragmatism, analytic neopragmatism, and Hegel will focus on the selective analytic turn to pragmatism and only then, and on that basis, on Hegel. Attention will be drawn to differences between classical American pragmatism and analytic neopragmatism, and to further differences between pragmatism and Hegel. I will be arguing that Hegel is not a pragmatist and that pragmatism is not Hegelian. Hegel's commitment to history and historicism represents a basic difference between his position and pragmatism. Some pragmatists are concerned with history, but none of them thinks that cognition is intrinsically historical. Examination of the representative analytic readings of Hegel in Sellars, Rorty, Brandom, McDowell, and Stekeler-Weithofer will suggest that analytic thinkers are often concerned to adopt his ideas for aims incompatible with his overall position.

The third chapter advances a reading of Hegel's position incompatible with metaphysical realism. Hegel's emphases on nonmetaphysical, empirical realism, social contextualism, epistemological constructivism, history, and historical relativism are

enormously promising themes for discussion of the problem of knowledge at the present time. Hegel sees something that few of his students have later seen: after Kant, to progress in the debate on knowledge we need to drop metaphysical realism in favor of empirical realism while adopting a constructivist and historicist approach to knowledge.

Idealism, British Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy

WHAT IS IDEALISM?

We can start by clarifying some basic terms. Any assessment of the long-standing analytic antipathy to Hegel presupposes an understanding of terms such as "British idealism," "German idealism," and "idealism." Analytic thinkers in revolt against idealism, or British idealism, were often, perhaps never very clear about what they were revolting against. None of the early analytic thinkers had more than a very general, imprecise conception of British idealism, German idealism, or idealism in general. There is no idealism in general any more than there is a general triangle and there is no single doctrinal commitment shared by all thinkers in the idealist camp. Types of idealism are very different. German idealists arguably share common goals, such as developing systematic, scientific philosophy through perfecting Kant's Copernican revolution. Other than opposition to standard British empiricism, British idealism apparently lacks a common philosophical project. The main British idealists defend very different views, which are sometimes opposed to each other as well as incompatible with Hegel's. As in Marxism, the frequent, but regrettable analytic tendency to conflate various types of idealism, which on occasion share nothing more than the name, led to the well-known analytic rejection of idealism in virtue of its alleged denial of the existence of the external world. This doctrine, which is widely but uncritically

attributed to idealism, is part of neither, nor featured by idealism as such nor the views of any individual idealist.

The analytic antipathy to Hegel and idealism in general is clear and persistent. Analytic thinkers, members of a philosophical movement that prides itself on the precise use of language, have long been suspicious of nonanalytic thinkers for linguistic reasons. Carnap famously attacked Heidegger's alleged misuse of language in making statements which, since they could not be evaluated empirically, were strictly nonsensical.[1] A. J. Ayer echoed Carnap's complaint, saying that Heidegger's statements contributed to his theories and appeared profound, but could not be evaluated and were therefore meaningless.[2]

For Carnap, Hegel, like Heidegger, formulates metaphysical pseudostatements, and promulgates false doctrines. Hegel's adherence to the "old" logic leads to a view that is materially false, logically untenable, meaningless,[3] and unwarranted as a basis for metaphysics.[4] Popper, who is more extreme, claims Hegel's view is dangerously misleading,[5] absurd,[6] and dogmatic,[7] and represents an absurd theory.[8]

Since Hegel is at least nominally a German idealist, we can start our discussion of terms with "idealism" and "German idealism." It is not easy to say what "idealism" means. Discussions of this term are frequently terse, uninformative, in any case insufficient to identify a view or doctrinal commitment common to all or even most so-called idealists. Such accounts often consist of general comments followed by a selective list of representative forms of idealism, and ending with a few well-chosen words about an important individual idealist.[9]

Analytic critiques of idealism vary greatly. Frege's critique of Husserl's alleged psychologism at the end of the nineteenth century, to which we will return below, was directed against a single idealist. The later English analytic turn away from Hegel and all idealists early in the twentieth century was based on a critique of

any and all forms of idealism. The latter was fueled by the conviction that a generalization of Kant's critique of "bad" idealism for denying the existence of the external world could fairly be applied to idealism in all its many forms. This general critique implies unspecified doctrinal unity among idealists. Yet the suggested unity among different forms of idealism around a single conceptual theme cannot be found in the texts and simply does not exist outside the caricatural depiction of idealism by its adversaries. For no idealist, not even Berkeley, denies the existence of the external world.

In practice, "idealism" has diverse, unrelated, or almost unrelated, meanings, meanings which are incompatible, even sharply opposed. Not only is there no idealism in general, but it is not even clear that there is a family resemblance among the many different idealist views.

Etymologically, the term "idealism" is related to the Greek word "idea," which possesses such meanings as form, appearance (as opposed to reality), species, kind, and nature. The word is used to refer to ideas, concepts, essences, definitions, and objects of the intellect linked to Platonic idealism. It also denotes contents of mind understood as representations of an independent external world—a view common to the so-called way of ideas[10] encompassing both Cartesian rationalism and British empiricism. It further refers to the propensity to be guided by ideals, for instance in a social, political, or religious context, and to the philosophical doctrine of idealism. There is apparently no natural way of using "idealism," which is used normatively or stipulatively, mainly with respect to claims to know. Those who consider themselves, or who are classed as, idealists rarely clarify their understanding of this term. Their opponents typically employ it very loosely to designate anything (and everything) they reject. Who is an idealist obviously depends on what one thinks idealism is. In caricatural form, Kant's rejection of "bad" ideal-

ism remains very influential among analytic thinkers, who consistently reject idealism as such. But Kant's view of Descartes as an idealist is not more widely shared than, say, Hegel's conception of Aristotle as a false idealist.

The term "idealist" seems to have been invented by G. W. Leibniz. In responding to Pierre Bayle, he objects to "those who, like Epicurus and Hobbes, believe that the soul is material," adding that in his own philosophical position, "whatever of good there is in the hypotheses of Epicurus and Plato, of the great materialists and the great idealists, is combined. . . ."[11] Leibniz's usage of the term suggests that idealism and materialism differ, but can be combined. This suggestion was later followed by J. G. Fichte.[12] The contrary view that they cannot be combined was later adopted in Marxism. Neither approach is canonical nor even generally accepted. According to Dewey, idealism concerns ideals. Beginning with Moore, many analytic thinkers routinely hold that idealism insists on an unacceptable denial of the existence of the external world. According to William James, a pragmatist, the basis of modern idealism lies in Kant's doctrine of the transcendental conception of the subject.[13]

"Idealism" is used to refer to an implausibly broad variety of disparate positions associated with numerous important figures. They include Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, the Cambridge Platonists (such as Ralph Cudworth, John Smith, Benjamin Whichcote, Nathaniel Culverwell, and Henry More), Berkeley, the German idealists (such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel), British idealists (such as S. T. Coleridge, J. F. Ferrier, T. H. Green, Edward Caird, F. H. Bradley, J. M. E. McTaggart, and Bernard Bosanquet), Italian Hegelians (such as Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce), and Croce's English disciple R. G. Collingwood. Other alleged idealists include Husserl, the central figure in twentieth-century phenomenology, on occasion

even Heidegger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, arguably the central figure in Anglo-American analytic philosophy.

Idealism was very popular in early nineteenth-century Germany and late nineteenth-century England. It later fell into disrepute, however, as a result of unremitting attack, for different reasons, by analytic and Marxist thinkers throughout most of the twentieth century. Though some philosophers are still mining the idealist conceptual vein, few are currently willing to accept the term as descriptive of their own positions. In twentieth-century America, exceptions include personalists such as B. P. Bowne and P. A. Bertocci; American pragmatists like C. S. Peirce and John Dewey (but emphatically not James, who did much to encourage the reaction against idealism of any kind); Brand Blanshard, a kind of British idealist on American soil; and Nicholas Rescher, whose complex position equally reflects idealist, pragmatist and analytic influences.[14]

The term "idealism" is used systematically to refer to types of idealism and historically to pick out thinkers with whom it is associated. The many different types of idealism include epistemological and metaphysical variants, then within the latter causal and supervenient—that is, the emergentist view that mental characteristics supervene on physical characteristics—subforms. German idealism employs a distinction, following Hegel's practice, between critical, subjective, objective, and absolute idealist subtypes which are often but uncritically associated with the names of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel respectively. Depending on what one means by "German idealism," the term is also associated with Marx.[15] British idealism, which frequently features the absolute in a way different from any form of German idealism, is often known as absolute idealism. Other forms of idealism include social, cosmic, theological, spiritualistic, and conceptual.

The very proliferation of many different types of idealism, which means such different things to so many different observers, sows a considerable amount of confusion even among its proponents. Even a short list is sufficient to show how very diverse "idealist" views are. Platonic idealism concerns the canonical problem of the one and the many, or the relation of forms, essences, or ideas on the one hand—what things of a given kind have in common—and the multiplicity of things on the other. The term alludes to the notorious theory of forms or ideas that many, but not all, observers detect in Plato's texts, although his own position remains shrouded in mystery. Plato's influence echoes through the later Western philosophical tradition, yet Platonic idealism is basically unlike later forms of idealism. The suggestion that "idealism" means that "ideas or ideals are epistemologically and ontologically prior to things or the real,"[16] which describes the position often attributed to Plato, does not clearly apply to any other major idealist.

Later idealists differ in ways that throw into doubt the use of a single term to apply to them all. Leibniz's idealism is sometimes said to follow from his ontological view that there are only simple substances, which possess perception and appetite. It is also said to follow from his teleological view that this is the best of all possible worlds. Berkeley, who is routinely classed as an idealist, refers to his own view as immaterialism. His famous slogan *esse est percipi* has apparently nothing other than the name in common with Plato, whose position he is sometimes said to interpret badly.[17] There is no reason to think he was directly interested in the Platonic problem of the one and the many. He reacts against the perceived consequences of the new science and the empiricist philosophy based on it, most prominently in Locke, which appears to exclude God from any role in the world. Berkeleyan idealism is often understood as a "reactionary" effort to

counter the effects of modern science to which he opposes a conception that supposedly agrees better with common sense.

Although the term is the same, the types of idealism which arise in the German idealist tradition are unrelated, in fact sharply opposed, to the usual interpretation of Berkeley's position. Kant and Hegel object to Berkeley's supposed denial of the existence of the external world. Later objections, for instance by Russell, to their views as defending a variant of Berkeley's position are simply mistaken. The central thrust in German idealism lies in a commitment to the so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy, which exemplifies what I will be calling epistemological "constructivism"—roughly, the doctrine that the subject must "construct" what it knows. This doctrine is incompatible with Platonic idealism, with Berkeley's position, and with the views favored by most, perhaps all, analytic thinkers.

Blanshard's lifelong defense of reason was generally conducted along British idealist lines interspersed with other, incompatible influences. Rescher, who is presently the most important figure to invoke idealism as a designation of his position, rejects causal idealism in favor of conceptual idealism, according to which access to the real is always mind-dependent.[18]

What Is German Idealism?

Other than the fact that they wrote in German, it is sometimes difficult to see what German idealists have in common. As noted above, it is usual, although perhaps misleading, to distinguish at least four different subforms of German idealism: Kant's critical idealism, Fichte's subjective idealism, Schelling's objective idealism, and Hegel's absolute idealism. These subforms, which reflect Hegel's view of his great German contemporaries,[19] should be understood with caution. Critics of

German idealism tend to apply these same terms in very different ways, as in Dewey's critique of neo-Kantianism as objective idealism.[20]

One should be careful not to take these terms as referring strictly to any single position. Critics of idealism, such as Marxists who reject so-called subjective idealism, tend to utilize the terms more strictly than Hegel does. He uses the term "subjective" in two distinct ways: to apply only to Fichte's idealism, or again to apply to Kant's and Fichte's positions as distinguished from Schelling's.

The meaning of all four terms is in any case strikingly unclear. Kant, who depicts all earlier philosophical theories as dogmatic, criticizes forms of prior idealism in depicting himself as a critical philosopher. His idealism has been variously understood as phenomenalistic, psychologistic, transcendental, and so on.[21] Fichte is routinely accused of subjective idealism, or the view that the self, or again the subject, is the origin of all reality.[22] Yet this is a silly position which certainly neither he, nor probably anyone else, has ever defended. In imitation of Kant, Schelling refers to his own position as transcendental idealism.[23] As early as his first philosophical publication, Hegel began the practice of calling Schelling's position objective idealism in virtue of his friend's attention to philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*).[24] There is no agreement about the meaning of Hegel's so-called absolute idealism, a view routinely attributed to him. He never employs this term to refer to his own position. His understanding of "absolute" and "idealism" remains controversial.[25] At least one observer feels it necessary to justify talking of Hegel's position as idealism at all.[26] Contemporary Hegel scholars say little about the absolute, which seems like a holdover from the beginning of the nineteenth century. But this term was important for British idealism, and central for Bradley.

There is no agreed-on or even widely accepted description

of the relation between Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (or Marx) in the literature. Reference works sometimes omit all mention of German idealism. The frequent suggestion that German idealism arose as the result of the felt need to complete Kant's critical philosophy is arguably correct for post-Kantian German idealism. Yet it fails to account for the idealist character of Kant's own position,[27] which depends on his assessment of the proper approach to the epistemological problem.

When one thinks German idealism begins depends on what one thinks "idealism" means. Leibniz, but not Descartes, is often described as an idealist.[28] Kant, who refers to Descartes and Berkeley as idealists, mentions Leibniz often, but apparently not in connection with idealism. Kant's readers sometimes downplay his idealism, which Kant himself regards as central. Later German idealism depends on Kant's view, to which it reacts and which it develops in different directions. Fichte's claim to be a seamless Kantian, hence to carry the critical philosophy beyond its author, was rejected by Kant, who famously accused Fichte of trying to deduce objects from concepts.[29] Hegel, who follows Fichte on this point, classes Kant and Fichte together under the heading of subjective idealism. Although Schelling initially believed himself to be no more than Fichte's disciple, his idealism goes in an entirely different direction from Fichte's.

Kant's imprecise practice of using the term "idealism" in many ways leads to confusion among his students, and inspired radically different, incompatible reactions among the post-Kantians. His understanding of "idealism" is related to his view of "metaphysics," a term which in his usage is synonymous with theory of knowledge. In ancient philosophy, "metaphysics" is mainly used in an ontological way to refer to theories of being in Aristotle and other thinkers. In modern philosophy after Descartes, it also refers to theory of knowledge, what later becomes epistemology. Hume, who is often, but mistakenly, thought to

reject all metaphysics, carefully distinguishes between bad metaphysics, which he rejects, and good metaphysics, which he favors.[30] In part following Hume, Kant understands his critical philosophy as a contribution to the theory of knowledge, which does not yet exist. He intends to identify the conditions of the future metaphysics, which has not yet been formulated, but whose outlines can be identified on theoretical grounds even before it takes shape.

Kant's idealism belongs to good metaphysics, or theory of knowledge. Though his position is ambiguous, he mainly favors ontological dualism. According to Kant, an acceptable theory of knowledge includes an empirical input, or "external" source of the contents of the mind, as well as the activity of the mind in constructing, on the basis of the empirical input, objects of experience and knowledge. Kant refutes "bad" or uncritical forms of idealism repeatedly in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* in the *Prolegomena,*[31] and in other writings. In the "Refutation of Idealism," inserted in the second edition of his book, he distinguishes three modern idealist tendencies: the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley; the skeptical idealism of Descartes; and critical, formal, or transcendental idealism, three synonyms for his own idealism.[32] Kant rejects any effort to question the existence of the external world supposedly placed in doubt by bad idealism. One must suppose, since Moore later takes up this same problem under the same heading, that he regarded it as important but viewed Kant's proposed remedy as ineffective. According to Kant, in his problematic idealism Descartes regards only the empirical claim of the existence of the self as indubitable, and in his dogmatic idealism Berkeley contends that space is impossible, hence things in space are imaginary.

Kant, who returns to this topic in the *Prolegomena,* refers often to Plato, but not to Plato's (or Platonic) idealism. His reference to Eleatic idealism—presumably including such thinkers

as Gorgias, the Megarian school, Melissus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, and Zeno of Elea—is unclear. Like Leibniz, he seems to understand idealism as the opposite of empiricism, or the doctrine that all knowledge begins in, but is not necessarily limited to, experience. According to Kant, so-called genuine idealists from ancient Greece to Berkeley hold that knowledge is not and cannot be arrived at through the senses, or through experience, but rather through the a priori understanding or reason.[33]

This suggestion is doubly unfortunate: it indicates that some forms of idealism are not worthy of the name, and further disqualifies Kant's own idealism, which precisely holds that knowledge must necessarily begin in experience. Kant rejects the claim that knowledge of things can be had prior to or apart from experience, say through pure understanding or pure reason. At the cost of admitting that space and time are not things in themselves, he opposes claims to a priori knowledge of things in favor of (critical) idealism, which depends on experience for knowledge of things.[34]

Kant's view of idealism is obviously complex. For Kant, idealism is unacceptable when it claims to know things apart from and prior to experience, and rejects experience as a source of knowledge. Yet it is acceptable when it claims to know things only on the basis of experience. His conception of idealism commits him to a form of empiricism, hence to the existence of the external world because knowledge requires experience, but to the rejection of classical British empiricism which limits knowledge wholly and solely to experience.

Kant's writings contain no single systematic treatment of idealism in a specifically epistemological context. This theme, however, runs like a red thread throughout Hegel's writings, which, from beginning to end, can be regarded as an ongoing effort to rethink, to criticize, to carry further, and to complete Kant's critical philosophy. It is then a "deep" mistake to think

that epistemology worthy of the name ends with the critical philosophy. Hegel's conception of idealism is initially formulated in a systematic debate with recent German philosophy, including Kant, and his great contemporaries Fichte and Schelling, and is only later broadened to include the entire Western philosophical tradition. This theme appears very early in his writings, as early as the first systematic statement of German idealism, if indeed he is the author of this contested document.[35] It is already a central concern in his first philosophical publication, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*. In the latter work, which begins with the quasi-Kantian claim that it is necessary to separate the spirit of the Kantian philosophy from its letter, he presents Kant's critical philosophy as a basically correct, but unfinished project, a project that he and others, including Fichte and Schelling, are engaged in carrying further than where Kant left it.

Here and in later writings, Hegel's philosophical criterion is always identity, or unity, which he finds implicit in Kant and explicit in Fichte, and later extends to all of Western philosophy. In his mature reading of prior thinkers, Hegel "retroprojects" the criterion of unity to the entire history of philosophy. According to Hegel, the problem of knowledge, which originates with Parmenides, consists not merely in asserting, but further in demonstrating, the frequently asserted (but still undemonstrated) identity of thought and being, knower and known, mind and world, subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity. Hegel builds on prior thinkers in constructing his own position. He detects, for instance, an idealist model of identity in Aristotle,[36] especially in the Aristotelian idea of the *noesis noeseos*.[37]

In the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel depicts idealism as a way of reestablishing identity in order to overcome difference. He argues that the need for philosophy consists in overcoming difference through a speculative identity of subject and object. This

conviction motivates his attitude toward Kant here and in later writings. Hegel detects "authentic" idealism in Kant's deduction of the categories, which provides rules for the understanding to unify what is given in experience. Yet as rigid compartments of the mind, Kantian categories cannot grasp things in themselves, hence fail to overcome difference.[38] Kant's critical philosophy, which in its Kantian formulation leads to skepticism, reaches a higher form in Fichte, who supposedly extracts the genuine principle of idealism. Schelling improves on Fichte since his entire theory turns on the principle of identity in which philosophy and system coincide.[39] In sum, Hegel, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling propose three successive, but different "ascending" versions of one and the same idealist system of philosophy.

Hegel typically does not deny, but rather relativizes, difference within the speculative identity of unity and diversity. This leads him to oppose the irreducible Kantian opposition between the subject and the external real world, knower and known, form and content, phenomena and things in themselves, the a priori and the a posteriori, and so on. Hegel, who is concerned to overcome difference in unity, typically acknowledges, but relativizes, oppositions of all kinds. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* proposes a theory of cognition (*Erkenntnis*) as the experience of consciousness. In the introduction to the book, for the canonical opposition between subject and reality, mind and world, or consciousness and what lies outside it, he substitutes an opposition within consciousness. Knowledge is acquired in and through a process of trial and error in which theories are advanced, tested against further experience, and corrected with a view to gradually diminishing the difference between what is given in the experience of consciousness and our expectations about it. We can be said to know at the point when all difference is overcome, so that the view of the object and the object of the view coincide within consciousness.

To round out this rapid survey of Hegel's view of idealism, it remains to be seen how he locates it with respect to competing views of knowledge. In the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant insists on system as the criterion of science.[40] Kant's contemporaries thought his critical philosophy needed to be restated in systematic form. With Descartes in mind, K. L. Reinhold began post-Kantian German idealism in the effort to restate Kant's philosophy in what would now be called foundationalist form. In his essay on *Difference,* Hegel is critical of Reinhold, whom he regards as a leading nonphilosopher. He rejects foundationalism for the reason that claims to know do not need to be founded or grounded. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* he criticizes Descartes for conflating certainty and truth. In the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,* he further criticizes three attitudes toward, or conceptions of, cognitive objectivity.[41]

In sum, Hegel's idealism features the following main points. First, it relativizes oppositions within a structured unity in order to overcome difference. This is the motivation for his sharp critique of Schelling's featureless absolute in the *Phenomenology,* which precipitated a break between the two friends and former roommates. In sarcastically comparing Schelling's absolute to the night in which all cows are black, Hegel is suggesting that mere abstraction featured in Schelling's position fails to achieve the structured identity which requires that detail be conserved in a deeper synthesis.[42] For Hegel, the problem of knowledge is no longer how mind comes in contact with the world, but rather how, on the basis of what occurs within consciousness, we bring our theories into line with experience. In virtue of its insistence on consciousness, it rejects claims to know mind-independent reality, either dogmatically, through mere intuition, or in some other way. Second, Hegel's idealism rejects any form of the familiar rationalist claim, for instance in Descartes, to know what is as it is on the basis of certainty, for certainty cannot substitute

for and must not be conflated with truth. And, third, it rejects empiricism in either its classical British form, which claims to know the real as it is, or its Kantian form, which aims to ascertain the abstract conditions of all possible knowledge. Yet Hegel does not reject empiricism in general, for he also insists (like Kant) on the need to begin in and (unlike Kant) to remain in experience.

Frege, Husserl, and Psychologism

The analytic attack later launched by Moore and Russell on British idealism occurred in the wake of Frege's attack on Husserl. Frege, who influenced and was influenced by Russell, did not react so much against idealism in general, or even against British idealism, but rather against Husserl. There is a clear asymmetry between Frege's critique of Husserlian idealism, which turns on psychologism, and Russell's and Moore's critiques of idealism, which turn on the supposed idealist denial of the existence of the external world.

The issue that connects Kant, the analytic philosophers including Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and those influenced by them, and Hegel, is the concept of objective thought, or objective cognition. In general, the analytic thinkers believe that idealism is incompatible with objective thought, hence with objective claims to know, while idealists, including Hegel, believe it is indispensable for knowledge.

Frege's effort at objective thought requires an ingenious commitment to a standard form of realism. In "Der Gedanke,"[43] he draws a basic distinction between thought, which means something that can be true or false (p. 3), and representation (pp. 7ff.). He goes on to argue that when someone understands thoughts to be representations, then he is talking about the contents of his consciousness, but not about what is the way it is outside

consciousness (p. 9). Thoughts, according to Frege, concern the way it is in the outside world (ibid.). He further claims, for instance, with respect to the Pythagorean theorem, that thoughts are timeless, eternal, and unchanging (p. 14).

The attitude toward idealism among the founders of analytic philosophy ranges from mere indifference to a sharply negative view. In "Der Gedanke," Frege follows Bolzano's criticism of idealism in his *Wissenschaftslehre*. According to Bolzano, the great difference between idealism and his position is that the proposition "I have representations" is true, or corresponds to reality. That this truth is independent of time is for Bolzano the main difference with respect to idealism.

Frege, who criticizes Husserl's supposed psychologism, was not apparently more than incidentally concerned with idealism. Frege's precise relation to idealism is controversial, in part because he says so little directly about it. Michael Dummett insists that Frege was in revolt against idealism.[44] According to Hans Sluga, Frege, who published in a leading idealist journal, almost certainly shared a series of contemporary idealist ideas, such as antinaturalism, antipsychologism, objectivist epistemology, apriorism, and rationalism.[45] For Gabriel, Frege is a kind of neo-Kantian.[46]

Frege, who to the best of my knowledge does not mention Hegel, is important here for four reasons. First, he is often thought to be the main precursor of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, hence belongs, at least peripherally, to any account of the interaction between analytic philosophy and idealism.[47] Second, he was critical of Husserl, who, following that criticism, took an idealist turn. Husserl's idealism is combined with the strong rejection of psychologism of any form. It remains unclear if his turn to idealism depended in any way on Frege's criticism.[48] Third, both Frege (and later Husserl) are very critical of psychologism. Fourth, it is sometimes claimed, for instance by

Dummett,[49] that idealism as such is prone to psychologism.[50] Dummett, who mainly treats idealism through his reading of Husserl,[51] reads Frege as holding that psychologism destroys objectivity, hence entails idealism.[52]

Frege was influenced by, but also critical of, Kant. Kant never uses the term "psychologism," but depending on how his position is understood—and it is routinely understood in many different ways—psychologism is arguably a central Kantian concern. Kant's dual commitment to a representationalist form of realism (in the famous Herz letter, which will be discussed below) on the one hand and to empirical realism and constructivism in the mature presentation of his position on the other, later led to a controversy between two groups, each of which claimed to base its views on the critical philosophy. This controversy pitted those favoring psychologism, including M. F. Fries, F. E. Beneke, and others, against those who opposed it, such as R. H. Lotze, Frege, and Husserl. Frege, who explicitly insists on separating the psychological and the logical, or the subjective and the objective,[53] sharply criticizes Husserl for psychologism.[54] Kant scholars often emphasize the importance of his rejection of a psychological approach to knowledge.[55]

Frege's reaction against Husserl is earlier than, independent of, and wholly different from Russell's and Moore's reactions against British idealism in England. In discussing Frege, a distinction should be drawn between his criticism of Husserl's alleged psychologism, its effect on Husserl, and Husserl's treatment of psychologism.

In 1891 Husserl published his first book, *Philosophie der Arithmetik,* which was very critically reviewed by Frege in 1894. In the review, Frege accuses Husserl of, among other things, blurring the distinction between image and concept, misunderstanding the nature of mathematical definition, misunderstanding numerical statements, confusing general and common names, mis-

understanding the nature of *0* and *1,* and falling into problems concerning abstraction.[56]

The effect of these criticisms on Husserl is controversial. It is often claimed that Frege's criticisms of Husserl's psychologism were decisive for Husserl's later development.[57] This claim has been supported in detail by Dagfinn Føllesdall and criticized by J. N. Mohanty. According to Føllesdall, Husserl changed his position in response to Frege's criticism of psychologism.[58] For Mohanty, on the contrary, who does not take a position on the alleged psychologism in Husserl's first book, Husserl had already changed his position in a direction decisively opposed to psychologism prior to Frege's review.[59]

Although it is unclear if Frege influenced Husserl, both Frege and Husserl later remained opposed to psychologism. Frege's opposition to it is a constant theme in his writings, above all in *The Foundations of Arithmetic.* In Frege's time, psychologism was prominently represented by J. S. Mill, who—like Quine in our time, who follows Mill—understood epistemology as a branch of psychology. Mill took an empiricist approach to mathematics, which Frege was at considerable pains to refute in his book. He ends the introduction, in which he raises the question of psychologism in different ways, by insisting on the importance of separating the psychological from the logical, stressing that words are meaningful only in context, more precisely within a proposition, and insisting on the distinction between concept and object.[60]

In his phenomenological writings, Husserl later elaborately develops Frege's Kantian concern to distinguish sharply between the logical and the psychological. This is a consistent theme from *Logical Investigations,* his breakthrough to phenomenology, to such posthumous texts as *Formal and Transcendental Logic.* Husserl's understanding of psychologism changed as his posi-

tion developed. Spiegelberg differentiates three forms of psychologism opposed by Husserl. According to Spiegelberg, he was initially opposed, in *Logical Investigations*, to any attempt to derive logical laws from psychological laws. After that work, he widened his conception of psychologism to include any attempt to reduce nonpsychological entities to psychological phenomena in a way that brings him closer to Frege's view. Later he was concerned to refute a transcendental form of psychologism consisting in the confusion of pure psychology with transcendental philosophy based on misinterpreting the transcendental reduction.[61] Yet whether he succeeded through his elaborate attack on psychologism in avoiding psychologism remains controversial. According to Dummett, even though Frege induced Husserl to reject psychologism in the *Logical Investigations*, in failing to ground the study of essences on philosophy of language, Husserl later slipped back into something hard, even impossible, to distinguish from psychologism.[62]

In the wake of Frege's critique of his psychologism, Husserl turned to phenomenology and then later to idealism. Commentators say little about Husserl's turn to idealism. Dermot Moran makes only a few passing comments[63] and Donn Welton unaccountably omits the topic entirely.[64] According to Herbert Spiegelberg, Husserl began to be interested in idealism in 1907 and accepted the term as descriptive of his position in 1922, but increasingly considered it part of phenomenology in distinguishing between Berkeley's position and his own. After 1913, Husserl seems to have understood idealism as the difference between Berkeley's subjectivist thesis, in which being depends on psychological consciousness, and the suspension of the natural standpoint through phenomenological *epoche*.[65] But, since Husserl never clarified the concept of idealism, the precise contours of his view of it remain unclear.

In the present context, British idealism is triply important: as a major post-Hegelian idealist tendency; as a contributory factor to the emergence of the Anglo-American analytic philosophy; and as the proximate source of the enduring analytic antipathy to idealism that arose early in the twentieth century and persists to this day.

Pragmatists and phenomenologists are more likely than analytic philosophers to be familiar with the wider history of philosophy, including Hegel. Analytic thinkers often know selected historical figures very well, but, with prominent exceptions, they tend not to know the history of philosophy in more than selective fashion. Their analytic grasp of Hegel in particular is generally weak. This is now changing, however, as a result of the selective analytic turn in his direction.

It falls outside the scope of the present essay to narrate the story of British idealism, which has been told elsewhere in detail.[66] Two points interest us here. First, since the relation of the different British idealists to Hegel was very variable, it needs to be shown that analytic criticism of British idealism, even if justified, would apply also to Hegel. I will be arguing that it does not. Second, the very diversity among the British idealists makes it unlikely that they could be refuted as a group. It is even less likely that any criticism directed against British idealism would apply to idealism in general. I will be suggesting that unlike, say, the German idealists, there is no common doctrinal commitment or project uniting British idealists as a coherent philosophical tendency other than their shared opposition to traditional British empiricism.

This opposition was a main factor in the rise of analytic philosophy and the related demise of British idealism. The early analytic philosophers like Russell and Moore (and later Witt-

genstein), who were committed to reasserting new forms of British empiricism, understandably turned sharply against a movement whose main, perhaps only, distinguishing characteristic lay in its opposition to the traditional form of empiricism. It is, then, ironic that, having vanquished British Hegelianism, analytic philosophy later turned against empiricism, thus prolonging and perfecting the central critical thrust of the very movement it had in the meantime defeated.

British idealism, which is more often decried than studied, and which dominated the philosophical debate in England at the turn of the twentieth century, is no longer well known. In general, it encompasses a wide-ranging group of thinkers whose interrelation is not always clear. Not all British idealists, even those like McTaggart, who studied Hegel's writings closely, were Hegelian in more than the most attenuated way. British idealism, which was unorthodox, does not follow any standard idealist model. Its theories represent an effort to adapt certain idealist insights in ways congenial to the indigenous British discussion, much as selected analytic figures are now trying to adapt Hegel to preexisting analytic concerns, rather than to import Hegel or even idealism in any wholesale, simplistic fashion. Indeed, one of the more interesting aspects of the current effort to bring Hegel back into the analytic debate is the lack of attention to idealism, as if Hegel were not somehow an idealist or as if it were somehow possible to detach his idealism (as some analytic observers try to do for Kant) from his overall position.

All history, including the history of philosophy, is written by the victors. English-language analytic philosophy was the clear victor in the struggle against British idealism, which it resoundingly defeated. The philosophical discussion in English looks very different at the beginning of the twenty-first century than it looked about a hundred years ago when analytic philosophy was emerging in a struggle to the conceptual death for the soul

of philosophy in England through mortal combat with British idealism. The subsequent victory of analytic philosophy succeeded in vanquishing British idealism, which now appears like a mere foreign body in the midst of the great British philosophical tradition to which it never really belonged, and upon which it thrust itself much as Heidegger later grafted himself onto French philosophy.

In fact, British idealism was not a mere import that remained forever unassimilated in a new land. It was rather the result of a thorough adaptation of a related series of insights, often borrowed from abroad, which, as a result of their domestication had roughly since British idealism's emergence in the latter half of the nineteenth century become entirely British. There is much truth in the view that the way that idealism entered British philosophy was wholly continuous with the English-language philosophical tradition.[67] G. R. G. Mure, who sees even Hegel, suitably interpreted, as continuous with the English philosophical tradition,[68] is followed by Jean Pucelle, who picks out as specifically English Bradley's criticism of relationism, his phenomenalism, and his view of the emergence of the self.[69]

British idealism took shape in a complex interaction among philosophers concerned simultaneously with idealism, especially with Kant and Hegel but also with Schelling, as well as with working out their own positions. This movement was characterized by sharp oppositions among its leading representatives. In their reactions against British idealism, analytic philosophers, who were often insensitive even to the most basic differences among its leading representatives, tended to apply criticism arguably appropriate for one or other British idealist to them all, even to idealism in general.

Later generations of analytic philosophers, who rejected British idealism and continue to reject idealism as such, are often relatively uninformed about it, and certainly less informed than

Russell and Moore. The founders of analytic philosophy in England were contemporaries of such figures as Bradley, Bosanquet, and McTaggart, important thinkers at the time who are now rarely read. Standard works on the history of analytic philosophy usually devote a few desultory pages to British idealism, described as a strange, mysterious doctrine, which they profess not to understand, which can barely be stated, and which no one endowed with a shred of common sense should deign to believe.[70]

Russell's presentation of German idealism in *A History of Western Philosophy,* to the best of my knowledge the most extensive such discussion by a leading analytic philosopher, is reductive in the extreme. He simply jumps from Kant to Hegel, without any effort to discuss either Fichte or Schelling. He is even less charitable with respect to British idealism, which receives no direct treatment at all. Oddly enough he never even mentions McTaggart, a leading British idealist with whom he studied and who for a time influenced his own early work.

Analytic accounts of the relation of Anglo-American analytic philosophy to British idealism differ in such qualified observers as Ayer,[71] Dummett,[72] D. F. Pears,[73] John Passmore,[74] Alberto Coffa,[75] Michael Friedman,[76] Peter Hylton,[77] and others. Ayer stresses the differences between Russell and Moore but touches very lightly on the British idealist context in which their views took shape. Dummett has almost nothing to say about British idealism, which is not part of his narrative account of the origins of analytic philosophy in Frege. Passmore is concerned with the entire canvas. Coffa and Friedman, who are especially interested in the Vienna Circle thinkers, in Friedman's case above all in Carnap, do not address the role of the British idealists in their discussions.

Hylton is mainly concerned with Russell, whom he considers to have been briefly infected early on with the idealist virus from

which he quickly recovered. Hylton mainly considers British idealism through the positions of T. H. Green and Bradley. Like Ayer, he depicts Russell as initially a Kantian who later rejected Kant following Hegel's critique. Hylton's later account of this relation turns on Kant's so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy, which, as he describes it, is none too clear.[78]

British idealism is only the third form of idealism in Britain, the others being Cambridge Platonism and Berkeley's position, which is uniformly regarded as idealist. All three British forms of idealism are linked to the religious reaction to the rise of modern science, which appeared to threaten the established forms of Christian religion. In the seventeenth century, Cambridge Platonists like Ralph Cudworth and Henry More reacted against the mechanism of the Hobbesian philosophy and turned to Platonism in order to defend Christianity by reconciling reason and faith.[79] Berkeley responded to Locke, whose effort to work out the implications of seventeenth-century science in a materialist theory he regarded as profoundly threatening to common sense, and also as leading, through reliance on universal causal determinism, to atheism.

The British turn to Hegelianism in the second half of the nineteenth century as Hegel's fortunes were declining in Germany was closely linked in some, but not all, of its main representatives to religion, as well as to the revival of metaphysics in reaction against traditional English empiricism. British idealism developed on the heels of J. H. Stirling's famous book, *The Secret of Hegel* (1865).[80] Stirling, who was an intellectual champion of Christianity, features a right-wing, or religious, interpretation of Hegel. He regards the central aim of both Kant and Hegel as to restore faith of all kinds: in God, in the immortality of the soul, in freedom of the will, and in Christianity as the revealed religion.

There is enormous diversity among the British idealists, who

were never "orthodox" Hegelians. They were idealists first and Hegelians, if they were Hegelians in any recognizable sense at all, only afterward. It is very difficult to generalize about the British idealists. According to Pucelle, one of the best observers, the British idealists are united by three themes: the (free) self, synthesis of the subject and the object, and a view of organic totality.[81] But Pucelle undercuts his own claim in describing Coleridge's position, which he includes in British idealism, in terms of the twin themes of the self and God.[82]

Another approach to finding a theme common to the British idealists is to relate their views to empiricism. Empiricism of all stripes eliminates religion from experience by reducing objects to impressions or sensations through which they can then be reconstructed through various ways of associating ideas. The idealist metaphysics, as it developed in British idealism, tended to conceive everything as a manifestation of spirit.[83] The absolute, which looms very large in Bradley and Bosanquet, plays no role at all for McTaggart. Even attitudes to religion divide them since, although Bradley understood God as the absolute, McTaggart was an atheist. In fact, a number of those often classed as British Hegelians, for instance Green, who was mainly influenced by Hegel early in his development, were less interested in fidelity to Hegel than in using his theories as a starting point to develop their own views. Bradley, often thought of as the most Hegelian of the British idealists, specifically says he does not regard himself as a Hegelian, since he never mastered Hegel's position and could not accept its central idea. Although Bradley denies that a British Hegelian school even exists,[84] the belief that it did exist, and that it lived on among British idealists, led to a situation in which their positions, which often bore little resemblance to Hegel's, served as a lightning rod for criticism of Hegelianism of all kinds.

Observers often mistakenly conflate British idealism and

British Hegelianism.[85] But not all British idealists were Hegelians, and some of them were very far from Hegel. Coleridge was a disciple of Kant and then of Schelling, and was concerned with the fidelity of the post-Kantians to Kant.[86] Green, a critic of Hume, was always closer to Kant than to Hegel.[87] A. Seth (Pringle-Pattison), J. Seth, and H. Sturt are among the many British idealists who broke with Hegel.

In general, the British idealists were dependent on Kant as well as on Hegel and other sources. Hegel's influence was strongly felt at least through Bradley and Bosanquet before the later transformation of British idealism into personalist idealism. According to Pucelle, Bosanquet was incontestably the most Hegelian of British philosophers.[88] Caird, who wrote an important book on Kant,[89] was closer to Hegel than Green. Bradley denies that Green was Hegelian. Green thought that Caird was too Hegelian, and took the world as a universal mind in returning to Kant.

Green, who depicts his "Introduction to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*" as a study of the relation of Kant to Hume, and considers Hume as rendering philosophy impossible, supposes that Kant knew Hume's *Treatise* in the original English.[90] He offers a sustained polemic against empiricism culminating in Hume in favor of a conception of experience featuring relations. According to Green, empiricism depends on an ambiguous conception of ideas or impressions understood as mere sensations and as knowledge—"an assumption and two fallacies."[91] Like Kant and Hegel before him, and the later Wittgenstein and Sellars after him, Green simply denies the possibility of direct empirical knowledge. Many of Green's younger contemporaries thought that he had forever "destroyed" empiricism. In fact, Green, who regards Kant as answering Hume, remains closer to Kant than to Hegel, though critical of both. In his *Prolegomena to Ethics*,[92] whose Kantian title indicates his philosophical alle-

giance, he explicitly calls for a return to an analysis of the conditions of knowledge along Kantian lines. Such an analysis would be limited to the phenomenal world of appearance, based on the synthetic activity of transcendental unity of apperception. But he also criticizes Kant along Hegelian lines, rejecting the idea of the thing in itself and invoking against Kant a conception of an eternal subject, or spiritual principle, also called soul or mind, which he attributes to Hegel. Green's position is religious in a way that has little in common with Hegel. "The spirit descends, that it may rise again, it penetrates more and more widely into matter, that it may make the world completely its own."[93] Like some other British idealists, for instance Bradley, Green hypostatizes Hegel's conception of spirit as an absolute in a way Hegel never does. In this way he attributes to Hegel a position considerably closer to extreme right-wing forms of Hegelianism, including Stirling's religious reinterpretation of Hegel, than anything Hegel himself ever proposes: "That there is one spiritual self-conscious being, of which all that is real is the activity or expression, that we are related to this spiritual being, not merely as parts of the world which is its expression, but as partakers in some inchoate measure of self-consciousness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world; that this participation is the source of morality and religion, this we take to be the vital truth which Hegel had to teach."[94]

Green was influential in the British idealist discussion. Bradley's *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (1883), which first made clear the scope and range of the idealist movement, is dedicated to Green.[95] Bradley was and remains a difficult, controversial figure, whom his contemporaries interpreted variously as a monistic idealist, a skeptic, a mystic, and an empiricist.[96] According to Hylton, Green was the most standard representative figure of the first generation of British idealists, but Bradley was the most important, although quite eccentric. Ac-

cording to Hiralal Haldar, Bradley, like Hegel, was less often understood than refuted.[97] Bradley's contemporaries were similarly divided about his importance. For Edward Caird, *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley's most important work, reflects the "suicide of knowledge."[98] But J. H. Muirhead thought that nothing like this work had been attempted in English philosophy since Hume.[99]

Bradley was interested in metaphysics, which he understood in a traditional way as "the study of first principles or ultimate truths."[100] Like Green, he holds that order is imposed by mind, or at least some mind. Bradley also accepts Green's view that knowledge depends on relations, but interprets it very differently in denying that the real, or ultimate reality, consists in relations. His conviction that immediate experience is relational was criticized by Russell, who otherwise insisted on his admiration of Bradley.[101] In disagreement with Green, who, in criticizing Hume, denies givennness, Bradley insists on an immediate given, which, as an appearance, is always relative to what is not given, and which lies beyond any finite existence, perhaps beyond existence itself.[102] He seems to be thinking of an unrealizable ideal of knowledge in which everything would be in relation.[103] In rejecting the danger of a false absolutism limited to mere aspects of the whole, he invokes a conception of the absolute characterized by "an all pervading relativism."[104]

Bradley goes on to argue that ultimate reality, which is transcendent to appearances, which in turn relate to it, is nonrelational. He further claims that since only reality is real, and relations govern appearances, relations are not themselves real.[105] This line of thought yields a monistic, all-embracing, unified conception of reality in which everything else has its place within the absolute, but the absolute itself, since it is independent, depends on nothing. Bradley seems to indicate that the absolute cannot be known through reason—indeed it lies beyond reason

—but it can be given in immediate, nonrational experience.[106] According to Bradley, reality lies beyond thought, in what can be immediately experienced but since it is not mere appearance, and is inaccessible to the intellect, it cannot be known.[107]

Criticism of Bradley does not necessarily reflect on Hegel. Although Bradley admires Hegel, his relation to the latter is very distant.[108] His main work ends with a claim that he mistakenly takes to be Hegel's basic insight: "Outside of spirit, there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more it is veritably real."[109] Hegel, of course, makes no claims at all about what lies outside spirit, or more precisely conscious experience. What for Bradley is a central Hegelian thesis is for Hegel simply a non-issue, a theme he does not address. Kant, who is a dualist, in refuting what he understands as bad idealism, claims that experience and knowledge depend on mind-independent but uncognizable reality. Bradley's anti-Kantian claim later plays an important role in provoking the analytic rejection of idealism from Moore onward. But it has nothing directly to do with Hegel, who, like Kant, never denies, in fact consistently insists upon, the existence of the external world.

The religious inspiration that runs through British idealism from Stirling through Green, Bradley, and others is temporarily interrupted in McTaggart, who is opposed to any variety of Christianity. McTaggart, who taught at Cambridge when Russell and Moore were undergraduates, for a time apparently influenced them both.[110] He was interested in Hegel, and wrote extensively on Hegelian dialectic, cosmology, and logic. Although inspired by Hegel, his own position, like Green's, like Bradley's, is very far from anything Hegel ever contemplated.

McTaggart's main work, *The Nature of Existence* (1921, 1927),[111] is written in a distinctly non-Hegelian, quasi-Cartesian style, based on allegedly indubitable first principles from which a

metaphysics is simply deduced in rigorous, a priori fashion. Mc-Taggart argues on a priori grounds that if anything exists, then the universe exists. In an article earlier published in *Mind* in 1908, he also attacks the reality of time.[112] Here he draws a famous distinction between two views of time: the *A* series, composed of past, present, and future; and the *B* series, composed of earlier and later. According to McTaggart, the *A* series is not real. This line of argument led him to assert the unreality of time and the immortality of the soul. His argument against matter but in favor of the view that all substance is spiritual makes him sound like the popular caricature of Berkeley. It is no doubt one source of the analytic tendency to conflate the different idealists. If there are only spirits or selves, then the universe or absolute is nothing more than the complete collection of selves.

In Bosanquet, the impulse guiding the development of British idealism derives more directly from Hegel. Bosanquet was influenced by Green, with whom he studied; by Bradley, whom he also influenced; and by Hegel, whom he translated. He supported the so-called new realism, which stressed that cognitive objects are independent of the knower. Yet he came to dislike the word "idealism," which he viewed as suggesting that nature is merely a product of mind. His interest in Bradley was critical. In his first important essay, "Logic as the Science of Knowledge," he criticizes Bradley's departures from Green.[113] In turn, his position was criticized by other British idealists. In his review of Bosanquet's *The Principle of Individuality and Value* in *Mind* in 1912, McTaggart claims that chapter 7 on mind and matter could have been written by a materialist.[114] Yet this criticism, which implies that Bosanquet's position is less closely related to idealism than to its opposite, is less telling than it might seem, since in *Knowledge and Reality*[115] Bosanquet maintains that the difference between idealism and materialism is merely verbal.

The analytic view of the British idealists imposes unity on

a complex debate through a reductive account of very different positions implying a doctrinal coherence that they do not in fact possess, but which, through attribution, makes it easier to refute them. The variety of idealist positions, which are often sharply opposed, suggests that arguments that count against one or more of them do not necessarily count against them all. In fact, the one thing that the British idealists have in common is that they are all in different degrees original thinkers who were not content simply to take over nor to expound Hegel's theories.

In their sheer diversity, the various positions in British idealism are far not only from each other but also from anything that is even remotely Hegelian. The British tendency to hypostatize the absolute is more closely related to Schelling's theories than to those of the other main German idealists. As concerns Hegel, it is fair to say that, with exceptions, the British idealists were in general not well informed. One reason for this was the relative unavailability of reliable translations of Hegel when the British idealists were in their heyday. Wallace's very free rendering of the *Encyclopedia Logic* into English, which came out in 1874, is one of the weakest translations of the great philosophical classics and wholly inadequate as an instrument for interpreting Hegel. Bailey's translation of the *Phenomenology* only appeared in 1910, too late to influence either the British idealist movement, whose influence had already peaked, or the growing analytic reaction against it.

The result of this rapid, selective discussion of some leading forms of British idealism is threefold. First, it shows that the views of British idealists differed widely and that, other than their opposition to traditional British empiricism, their self-proclaimed interest in idealism, and their formulation in the British conceptual space, they had little else in common. Second, it shows that their positions—like those of analytic thinkers now interested in Hegel, who interpret him against

the analytic philosophical context—were never merely restatements of Hegel in an English idiom, but in all cases theories with varying relations to him. None of the British idealists merely presents anything like an "orthodox" version of Hegel's ideas; none of them is more than moderately close to anything that Hegel would presumably have cared to defend; and although they were influenced by Hegel, Kant, and other German idealists—Schelling's impact on Coleridge is well known—their resultant theories are not necessarily idealist at all.

Russell and Moore as British Hegelians

One aim in discussing Russell's and Moore's relation to British idealism, particularly British Hegelianism, is to correct simplistic readings of the origins of analytic philosophy that treat the founders of the analytic movement in England, particularly Russell, as seamlessly related to Humean empiricism.[116] Another is to oppose the reductive analysis of analytic philosophy as originating solely or at least mainly in the thought of Frege, which rests on an influential, but controversial reading of the latter.[117] Still another aim is to counter the widespread conviction that either Russell or Moore, neither of whom knew enough about idealism to characterize it fairly, was ever "idealist" in more than a very superficial sense.

Russell gives conflicting accounts of his relation to idealism, especially to Hegel. In *My Philosophical Development*, he suggests that he was briefly a full-fledged Hegelian.[118] But his writings do not show more than a superficial acquaintance with Hegel's position and in his autobiography, he tempers this suggestion.[119] Qualified observers differ on the nature of Russell's supposed early idealism. According to Hylton, who takes an unusually wide view of the meaning of Hegelianism, Russell's claim to be a Hegelian means he was at one time committed to

McTaggart's view of dialectic, mainly as contained in the latter's *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (1896). Russell's understanding of McTaggart shaped his first book, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry,* a revised version of his dissertation.[120] Yet it is not clear that McTaggart was himself a Hegelian in any meaningful sense. Other observers discount the idea of attributing Hegelianism to Russell. According to Ayer, in *Foundations of Geometry* Russell takes a Kantian line.[121] No one seems to think that Russell's alleged Hegelianism means he was, or thought of himself as being, a disciple of Hegel.

In his study of geometry, Russell works out the implications of the Kantian antinomies. Is Russell here an idealist, a Kantian, or even a Hegelian, as is sometimes claimed? In the preface, he records his intellectual debt to Bradley, Bosanquet, and Christoph Sigwart, a contemporary German thinker, as well as to James. This acknowledgment makes him neither an idealist nor a pragmatist. In the conclusion, he indicates his criticism of, but partial agreement with, Kant. Projective geometry, he claims, is necessarily true of any form of externality.[122] This claim suggests that his position here represents an effort, after the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry, to defend a revised version of Kant's claim that geometry is a priori against those who, even before the formulation of the general theory of relativity, already regarded geometry as empirical. Perhaps. But this is not a Hegelian view, since Hegel, unlike Kant, consistently rejects a priori reasoning of any kind. Russell's defense here of a form of geometrical apriorism is also not specifically Kantian, for he opposes the Kantian conception of Euclidean geometry as the only one possible, retaining only the idea that a non-Euclidean, projective geometry is necessarily true of real external space.

Does this commitment mean that Russell is or ever was an idealist? This is unclear, since it is unclear that a commitment to apriorism of any kind is necessary for, or equivalent to, ideal-

ism. Some idealists, such as Kant, favor apriorism, while others, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, oppose it, and still others, such as Plato, seem neutral to the familiar Kantian distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.

The young Russell, who was clearly influenced by his surroundings, is not at this point obviously committed to other typically Kantian doctrines. Idealism was everywhere in British philosophy in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Early on both Russell and Moore considered themselves as loosely Hegelian. This might mean that one or both of them for a time accepted one or another allegedly Hegelian claim. Yet it might also mean no more than that either of them believed himself to be Hegelian, mainly because he knew little, in fact very little, about Hegel. Russell, who supposedly turned to Hegel under the influence of McTaggart,[123] reports that during his undergraduate years he at one point considered the ontological argument to be sound and regarded himself as a Hegelian for two or three years.[124] Left unclear is the relation between the ontological argument, which is not specifically Hegelian, and which is not a major Hegelian theme, and Hegel.

Russell's view that he was at one time Hegelian conceivably relates to his early interest in McTaggart. Russell seems to have convinced his undergraduate colleague Moore to attend McTaggart's Hegel lectures, which Moore viewed rather skeptically.[125] Russell notes that about the same time, but for a shorter period, Moore was also a Hegelian under McTaggart's influence.[126] Later on, following Moore, Russell began to oppose Hegel. The version he rejected was mainly McTaggart's emphasis on the interconnectedness of everything in the world as described in *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*,[127] a work that influenced Russell as an undergraduate. Yet whether McTaggart's position in that book or in general can fairly be labeled as Hegelian is question-

able. Hence it is not clear that Russell, in rejecting McTaggart's theories, was really rejecting anything that Hegel espoused or might have espoused.

In fact, the conceptual die was already cast for the analytic attitude toward Hegel before the founders of the movement were able to acquire a sound grasp of his position. The future antagonism between their English version of analytic philosophy and idealism derives from their early enthusiasm for, and then their later rejection of, British idealist theories in general, the general British idealist criticism of empiricism, as well as specific features of particular British idealist theories. Certainly McTaggart's synthetic conception of philosophy was diametrically opposed to the view of logical analysis that Russell, under Moore's influence, adopted after distancing himself from British Hegelianism beginning in 1898. According to Ray Monk, the break with Hegelianism, and the turn from a synthetic to an analytic approach toward philosophy, was precipitated by Moore's paper, "The Nature of Judgment" (1899). In the paper, Moore maintains that propositions can be analyzed into constituent concepts, in opposition to Hegel's supposed view that they defy analysis.[128] Monk points out that for Russell and Moore, analysis was ontological, relating to the way the world is, and not merely limited to language about the world. This suggests that the budding analytical thinkers Moore and Russell were committed to metaphysical realism, a hallmark of analytic philosophy since its beginnings, which rejected the idealist critique of metaphysical realism in Kant, Hegel, and other idealists. Moore, who was later critical of McTaggart, was even more opposed to Bradley, the most original and certainly the most influential of the British Hegelians. As late as 1924, decades after the publication of *Appearance and Reality* in 1893, Bradley was still regarded by competent observers as the most significant British philosopher.[129]

The question of what the analytic philosophers revolting against idealism thought it was depends on the analytic philosopher in question. Frege, as already noted, was mainly concerned with Husserl's alleged psychologism. He believed that even after Husserl's elaborate critiques of psychologism, Husserlian phenomenology failed to escape this problem. Moore and Russell were in revolt against British idealism, especially Bradley. It is significant that Husserl is never named in *A History of Western Philosophy,* where, late in his long professional career, Russell settles accounts with everyone still of importance to him in the philosophical tradition.

After his early brush with British idealism, Russell became a staunch adversary of idealism in general and of all forms of German language philosophy with the exception of that of Gottlob Frege. Unlike Moore, who made it a central point to refute idealism, this was never Russell's aim. Like Moore, Russell, who was not given to fine distinctions between positions, tends to run different forms of idealism together into a single lowest common denominator view to which all idealists allegedly subscribe and which he rejects in any conceivable form.

An instance is Russell's now largely forgotten controversy with Bradley about internal and external relations. Russell seems to equate his objections to Bradley's theory of relations with rejecting all monistic theories of reality, such as Hegel's, and, further afield, with rejecting dialectical thinking in any form.[130] This inference has attracted critical attention. According to Rolf-Peter Horstmann, since Bradley's theories differ basically from Hegel's, Russell's critique of Bradley apparently leaves Hegel unaffected.[131]

Russell shares Moore's conviction that, like Berkeley, the familiar British idealist whipping boy, Hegel and his successors

hold that "only minds and mental events can exist."[132] But this position, if it is Berkeley's, is clearly not Hegel's. Although Russell and Moore were co-founders of analytic philosophy in England, Moore's opinion of Hegel, which was largely shared by Russell, was far more influential. Moore's reactions to idealism were concentrated in a few well-known papers. Russell's were spread throughout his enormous corpus.

In discussing Russell, it is useful to distinguish his understanding of idealism, which is unclear; his treatment of German idealism, which is arbitrary; and his often implausible readings of positions of idealists whose work he did not know well, such as Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel. Russell had a low opinion of many of his predecessors. Yet unlike many other analytic philosophers, who simply neglect the history of philosophy in favor of systematic discussion, at different places in his corpus he devotes considerable attention to the philosophical tradition. Indeed, he discusses it at great length in *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945).

In general, Russell's account of the history of philosophy is highly partisan and often simply very odd. His remarks on Leibniz, whom he knew well, and to whom he devoted an important early study, are a model. But here he mentions Frege and Moore only once each and entirely omits Wittgenstein, and his remarks on Henri Bergson and James, two philosophers he distrusts, are intended to show them up as unworthy of their reputations.

The treatment of idealism in the *History of Western Philosophy* is very sparse, and the account of specimen idealists is only slightly fuller. The British idealists, among whom Russell grew up as a philosopher, are, surprisingly, almost wholly absent. His discussion of German idealism is scarcely better. He says almost nothing about Fichte, who does not receive separate treatment, and even less about Schelling. One could not infer from reading Russell's account that the German idealist movement was

philosophically significant. In the discussion of Kant, there is a short passage on German idealism, which Russell describes, in a way worthy of such a careless observer as Engels, as stressing mind over matter, so that "only mind exists."[133] One may doubt that any serious student of Kant, or indeed any kind of idealist, would accept this doctrine.

Unlike Moore, Russell was very interested in philosophy of science. In a discussion of Berkeley, to whom he devotes more space than to other idealists, Russell offers three views of idealism, all of which are supposedly opposed to common sense and traditional physics: as solipsism in denying the validity of inference from present percepts to other events; as mitigated solipsism in allowing inference to what he oddly describes as "other events in my biography"; and as forbidding inference to what is not experienced.[134] The first two alleged forms of idealism seem based on Kant's view of Descartes as an idealist. The third picks out a claim that idealism shares with rigorous empiricism. Following Berkeley, Russell sharpens his objection to opposing mind to matter. "Every one knows," he writes, "that 'mind' is what an idealist thinks there is nothing else but, and 'matter' is what a materialist thinks the same about."[135] Happily for Russell, he cites no examples for an indictment that fits no known idealist position. This generalization, which appears in Russell's account of Berkeley, conflicts with the Irish philosopher's view that there are finite spirits or finite minds and ideas, and infinite mind or God. Russell is no nearer the truth in suggesting that Berkeley believes, as allegedly do Hegel and his followers, that "only mind and mental events can exist."[136] Russell, who thinks this view is a complete mistake, is evidently unaware that Hegel did not hold it.

In opposing mind to matter in much the same way as Marxism, Russell takes the line, close to that of scientism as it later developed in Carnap, Sellars, and others, that matter is what-

ever science says it is. According to Russell, science tells us what the real is, for which idealism merely substitutes clever arguments. Unlike Moore, who, like Berkeley, Thomas Reid, and many others, is concerned to reestablish the views dictated by common sense, Russell distrusts common sense. Throughout his career, Russell is concerned to show that common sense, which is not a reliable epistemological source, should lead us toward science as the arbiter of knowledge. This attitude, which governs his treatment of Kant throughout his many writings, points to the ordinary realist conviction that we discover the real above all through science, but denies Kant's conviction, central to the critical philosophy, that we "construct" what we experience and know.

Russell's grasp of Kant, which never developed much beyond that evinced in the very early *Foundations of Geometry,* always remained precarious. He is consistently oblivious to basic distinctions, arbitrary in his judgments, never willing to enter very far into positions. Russell consistently objects to the so-called subjectivism, as he calls it, of the critical philosophy. In the *Foundations of Geometry,* in insisting that he will defend a view of the a priori as logical, hence as not psychological, he seems to be following Frege's view that Kant was unsuccessful in avoiding a fall into psychologism, or a subjective approach to knowledge.[137] Russell, who later repeats this criticism in his study of Leibniz,[138] follows Bradley and Bosanquet in denying the Kantian distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments.[139] His suspicion that Kant's critical philosophy is a form of subjectivism extends to the latter's Copernican revolution in philosophy, which he oddly describes as the contention that "propositions may acquire truth by being believed."[140] This description, which suggests that for Kant truth is merely a subjective affair, misrepresents Kant's epistemological constructivism.[141] In the *Foundations of Geometry,* Russell objects to Kant's

view that space is unreal,[142] and in *The Principles of Mathematics,* he rejects Kant's view that space is merely subjective.[143]

The later treatment of Kant in *A History of Philosophy* does not substantially modify Russell's consistent complaint that, in linking the a priori and the subjective, Kant simply abandons objective cognition. Kant carefully says that the thing in itself can be thought but not known, more precisely thought of as the cause of which appearances can be thought of as the effect.[144] Russell, who overlooks this crucial distinction, mistakenly assigns a causal role to the thing in itself as the unknowable cause of sensations,[145] or as the cause of percepts (he conflates sensation and perception, which Kant separates),[146] or again as the cause of events.[147] In foreshadowing later analytic scientism, Russell unfavorably contrasts Kant's views of space and time with views taken for granted in physics at the time he was writing, views which he does not even attempt to justify.

It is clear that Russell never read Kant carefully. It is not clear, although he at one time considered himself to be a Hegelian, that he ever read Hegel carefully or perhaps even at all. His image of Hegel as a holist in which the real is composed of a series of relations is unrelated to Hegel's texts. It is mainly modeled on Green's neo-Kantianism and Bradley's absolute idealism. Since Hegel rejects apriorism, Russell's objection to his allegedly a priori analysis of the characteristics of objects incorrectly represents his views. The suggestion that Hegel, like Berkeley, claims that what is not experienced is nothing also finds no support in the texts.

Russell's view of Hegel, like his view of Kant, was arbitrary, even cranky, but it succeeded in attracting attention from other, even less-informed colleagues of similar bent. Russell's general lack of knowledge of Hegel prevented him from seeing how close on occasion his own position was to the latter's. One instance, mentioned above, is Russell's objection to the alleged

subjectivism of the critical philosophy, a point Hegel also raises. Another instance is Russell's conviction, at odds perhaps with his logical empiricism, that philosophy is integrally linked to social and political life.[148]

Russell's basic misunderstanding of Hegel is compounded in the *History of Philosophy* by his mode of presenting the latter's position. Early on, he cautiously contents himself with presenting and criticizing what he describes, without specific citation, as an interpretation that has at least the merit of making Hegel's position important. Later, he less cautiously presents roughly the same overall reading as correct, although merely implicit in the texts.[149]

Russell's views of Hegel, like his own position, change, often greatly, from book to book. His central complaint, which recurs in different versions throughout his many books, is that rigorous, scientific thought, which Russell favors, is incompatible with metaphysics, which Hegel allegedly favors. According to Russell, as a metaphysician Hegel clearly violates the standards of ordinary logic. Left unclarified is whether in fact Hegel favors metaphysics and what "metaphysics" means for him. Suffice it to say that Hegel clearly does not favor "metaphysics" understood either as a dogmatic claim about what is, or as an a priori form of epistemology, that is in either a noncritical or a critical sense of the word as usually understood.

After an early brush with Hegel, Russell quickly withdrew from direct consideration of either Hegel or idealism. His attention to Hegel in his early writings, which is occasional at best, appears mainly to be filtered through the views of other authors, but only rarely to be based on direct acquaintance with the text. In *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900) he remarks in neutral fashion on the relation between Leibniz and Hegel concerning what the latter calls the bad infinity.[150] About the same time, Russell made a few comments in *Principles of*

Mathematics (1900), mainly on Hegel's view of contradiction, through references to the *Encyclopedia Logic,* using Wallace's very weak translation, although he read, wrote, and spoke German fluently. From this point on, although he continued to refer to Hegel in his writings, he does not, so far as I know, refer to specific passages in Hegel's texts.

Russell's apparent lack of acquaintance with the texts also leads one to suspect that his supposed early Hegelianism was never based on anything deeper than his general, superficial intuition about the direction his ideas were then taking. In *The Problems of Philosophy* a decade later (1911), he casts Hegel as a leading exponent of metaphysics, understood as a form of ontological holism. In attributing ontological holism to Hegel, Russell seems not to notice that Hegel makes holistic claims about truth, hence about epistemology, but not about ontology. Russell objects that we cannot prove that the universe as a whole forms a harmonious system, hence cannot demonstrate the unreality of space and time.[151] This criticism may be derived from Russell's resistance to McTaggart's form of idealism, a doctrine that he incorrectly also attributes to Hegel. Slightly later, in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), he credits Hegel with a fallacious extension of logic, allegedly further developed by Bradley, according to which the necessary features of the world can be derived a priori.[152] Yet Hegel consistently opposes apriorism as a result of his critique of Kantian apriorism.[153] Several years later, in *Mysticism and Logic* (1917), Russell erroneously depicts Hegel as a metaphysician like Parmenides, who objects to the reality of the past and the future.[154] Yet Hegel, who explicitly criticizes Parmenides in favor of Heraclitus, never denies the reality of time.

Russell's desultory discussion of Hegel comes to a head and to an end in *A History of Philosophy,* where, to the best of my knowledge, he provides the only substantive discussion of the

Hegelian position in his voluminous writings. Though Russell concedes Hegel's influence, he begins by saying that he believes that almost all the latter's views are false. He then again provides a very rapid "potted" overview of Hegelian logic before concluding that it violates elementary logical principles. His criticism of Hegel's view of historical events is more apt and quite interesting. He notes, correctly enough, that in Hegel's day children were taught to admire Charlemagne and Barbarossa. He criticizes Hegel for perhaps overestimating the role of the state, a doctrine which he sees as inconsistent with Hegel's metaphysics. He ends by claiming, although not demonstrating, that Hegel's position arose from an elementary logical mistake.

Moore on British Idealism

Russell and Moore always held very different positions. Though both were later eclipsed by Wittgenstein, both were very influential, but Russell proved to be more influential than Moore on the later evolution of analytic philosophy. Though strongly influenced by Wittgenstein and hence different from the views of either Russell or Moore, analytic philosophy as it exists today is much closer to Russell than to Moore. Yet to an even greater extent than Russell, Moore was directly responsible for undermining British Hegelianism (and Kantianism).[155]

Moore almost single-handedly succeeded in turning analytic thinkers against idealism, hence against Hegel, and the effects of this are only now, a century later, starting to be undone in the nascent analytic return to Hegel. Moore engineered the analytic turn away from idealism in his famous but now little read article, "The Refutation of Idealism."[156] This influential text was directed against idealism in all its forms, including British idealism, Hegel, and Kant. Here and elsewhere, Moore asserts that Kant denies any effort to question the existence of the ex-

ternal world, which is supposedly placed in doubt by what from Kant's perspective appears as "bad" idealism. Moore generalizes this complaint in a direct attack on idealism of all kinds. His article represents an attempt, not to continue Kant, but rather to resolve a problem that, in his view, Kant had not resolved.

Although as an undergraduate Moore was attracted to Kant, and his dissertation was closely concerned with Kant (and Bradley), the mature Moore was an anti-Kantian. Moore's later anti-Kantianism began to develop very early. It is already apparent in his dissertation, "The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics" in 1898, where he denies that conditions of knowledge are transcendental in favor of a choice between empirical and logical conditions.[157] He rejects the very idea that what we know is in some sense "constructed" by us in favor of the traditional metaphysical realist idea that what I take as true is independent of my thinking it.[158]

As Descartes already knew before commonsensism was discovered by Reid, commonsense theories have no way to adjudicate between different views of common sense. For this reason, Descartes feels called upon to introduce a method that will be reliable, as common sense is not, in discovering knowledge. Berkeley claims that materialism defies common sense while contending that his immaterialism accords with it. Moore, who opposes Berkeley, merely substitutes his own view of common sense for Berkeley's. Moore in effect asks us to accept his view on dogmatic grounds, since he does not advance a criterion for choosing between the two views of common sense. His form of commonsensism presupposes knowledge by direct perception, roughly what Russell later calls knowledge by acquaintance. In making a qualified return to such earlier commonsense thinkers as Reid, Moore implicitly denies any need for epistemology, more precisely for the justification of claims to know.

As a spokesman for common sense, Moore follows Thomas

Reid, the inventor of commonsensism. In the eighteenth century, in arguing against dualism from Plato to the present Reid claimed that we have direct, immediate knowledge of the existence of things.[159] As Moore would later do, Reid accuses Berkeley and Hume of denying the existence of the external world. Yet for Reid as for Moore it is unclear that their steady opposition to Berkeley is backed up by adequate knowledge of his position.[160]

The interest in common sense remains widespread. Among contemporary thinkers, Donald Davidson takes a similar view, on the grounds that common sense outweighs any supporting philosophical argument that can be made. This is a view of self-evidence not very different from Roderick Chisholm's position, and is arguably related to forms of traditional empiricism, which Wittgenstein thinks is unnecessary for logic.[161]

Moore's criticism of Hegel, unlike Russell's which was mainly centered on the latter's putative rejection of standard logic, is keyed to the supposed Hegelian rejection of common sense. Moore's knowledge of Hegel, like Russell's, was mainly indirect and certainly very sketchy. Like Russell, he attributes doctrines to Hegel that cannot be found in the texts. In *Principia Ethica* (1903), he mentions authors who employ such "Hegelian terms" as "organic whole," "organic unity," "organic relation,"[162] and what he calls a metaphysical Hegelian approach to ethics.[163] In *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1928), which reproduces lectures given in 1910–1911, he represents Hegel, without referring to any specific text, as holding, in violation of the law of excluded middle, that objects can simultaneously have contradictory properties, and this understanding of Hegel then forms the point of departure from which Moore embarks on a critique of the Hegelian doctrine of relations.[164] In these and other writings he seems to be opposed less directly to Hegel[165] than to selected British idealists whom he understands as Hegelian disciples, such as McTaggart and above all Bradley.[166]

Early analytic philosophy, as already noted, tended to revive classical British empiricism in various forms. On the way to his later theory of knowledge by description, Russell initially held that meaning requires a correlation between the words in a sentence and something outside it.[167] Moore's critique of idealism is mainly directed against British idealism, against which he reaffirms a commonsense form of classical empiricism. He criticizes idealists, meaning Bradley and perhaps Hegel, for reducing reality to concepts. This complaint is superficially similar to Kant's imprecise objection that Fichte deduced objects from concepts. Yet it does not count against Hegel's conception of reality (which, incidentally, is close to Peirce's), not as the mind-independent external world, but as what is given in conscious experience. Hegel follows Kant in limiting cognitive claims to experience, while denying any effort to provide a transcendental analysis of its conditions. Like Kant, Hegel declines metaphysical realism in favor of empirical realism. Reality, which is not reduced nor reducible to concepts, is for us only insofar as it can be grasped through concepts.

Moore was especially interested in the problem of the existence of the external world, and in the refutation of idealism for allegedly denying it, over a long period of time stretching from his early "Refutation of Idealism" (1903) through "Is Existence a Predicate?" (1936) and "Proof of an External World" (1939). The problem was always the same. He was convinced that idealists asserted very queer claims about the world, basically unlike the rather ordinary, allegedly commonsense view he asserted against them.

Moore's attack on idealism, which was so influential in creating the well-known, persistent analytic enmity against Hegel, is rarely read.[168] It is astonishingly imprecise, and difficult to evaluate or even to state. It is unclear whether Moore intends to criticize all forms of idealism, modern idealism only, Berkeley,

British idealism in general, Bradley, or perhaps only the Platonist A. E. Taylor, all of whom he conflates under the general idealist heading. Yet the charge he raises continues to resound through the later discussion. Thus more than a half-century after Moore's initial attack on idealism, Quine echoes his view when he writes: "We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is evidence of external objects in the testimony of our senses. . . ."[169]

Significantly, the title of Moore's "Refutation of Idealism" recalls, but suggests the inefficacy of, Kant's own effort. Moore begins by claiming that for modern idealism the universe is spiritual.[170] This remarkable claim is doubly interesting. First, it indicates his basic awareness of a distinction between forms of idealism. Even if his target is often unclear, unlike many other analytic critics of idealism, Moore does not simply run all its forms together. Second, it simply ignores Hegel and other German idealists, none of whom holds this or an analogous view, in taking up English-language idealists like Berkeley and Bradley. Since the proposition Moore proposes to dispute is Berkeley's view that *esse est percipi*, it seems that for Moore Berkeley represents modern idealism in general.[171]

If Moore thinks there is a common idealist doctrine, then his view is indefensible, since there is no single "idealist" thesis common to Plato, Berkeley, the German idealists, and the British idealists. A refutation of Berkeley would not, then, count against other idealists, including Hegel. Against Berkeley, Moore maintains that to be is to not be perceived. Following out this point, he further denies, against Bradley, that what is experienced is identical with the experience.[172] On the contrary, sensation is always sensation of something,[173] and hence, according to Moore, we are always already outside spirit.[174]

Moore holds that idealists in general and Berkeley in particular deny the existence of the external world. This is incorrect

about idealism in general and manifestly incorrect as concerns Berkeley. In defending received opinions, Berkeley consistently claims that his aim is to protect us from philosophy that leads us astray.[175] Not only does he not argue for the nonexistence of the external world; he specifically argues against any denial of anything. On this topic, he is very clear. "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question."[176] He only admits to denying the philosophical view of the nonexistence of such things, for instance, when he affirms the real existence of what is perceived by either sense or reflection, while denying the existence of corporeal substance. His clear intent is, as he plainly says, not to undermine any claims to what he calls "the existence or reality of things. . . ."[177]

Moore's proposed refutation is inadequate in respect to idealism in general, however understood, and in respect to Kant and Hegel in particular. Moore cannot refute idealism in general, which does not exist; there are only idealists, who hold different, often incompatible views. It remains unclear what Moore thinks idealism is. According to Ayer, Moore makes two correct claims: an idealist is committed to the idea of a spiritual substance; and nothing exists without being given in experience.[178] Yet these twin themes are not common to all forms of idealism, even to Plato, Berkeley, Bradley, and British idealism in general, and much less to Kant, Hegel, and German idealism. Since Moore does not show that Berkeley and the British idealists share the same or relevantly similar views, even if his arguments were valid against, say, Berkeley or one or more British idealists, it would not follow that they count against Plato, against individual German idealists such as Kant, Schelling, or Hegel, or against German idealism in general.

Moore's problematic view of idealism resembles an early usage

of the term by Christian Wolff. According to the latter, who is thinking of Berkeley, idealists acknowledge only ideal objects existing in our minds, but deny the independent reality of the world and the existence of material bodies.[179] Kant admitted to having been influenced by Wolff, whom he treats as a co-equal of Leibniz. He even suggests that had Wolff adopted a critical perspective, he could have anticipated the critical philosophy.[180]

Moore's critique of Kant relies on a selective, inaccurate account of Kant's view.[181] This is not the place to enter into the details of Kant's argument. Suffice it to say that in invoking direct, unmediated, immediate knowledge, Moore merely begs the question. Kant's position turns on the so-called Copernican revolution, which precisely denies the direct knowledge of a mind-independent external world, on which Moore insists. Moore's proposed solution bears approximately the same relation to Kant's difficulty as Dr. Johnson's reported refutation of Berkeley by kicking a stone: both simply miss the point.

In maintaining that reality has nothing to do with sentience, Moore is close to realism as ordinarily understood. Ordinary, or metaphysical realism is often understood as combining two distinct theses: there is a mind-independent world, and under appropriate conditions we in fact grasp it as it is. There is no good reason for concluding there is not a mind-independent world, although there is no way to know that there is such a world, and certainly none to know that we know it as it is.

In a later article, Moore links his reassertion of metaphysical realism against idealism to Kant. He recalls Kant's famous remark about the scandal that philosophy must take the existence of the external world on faith, before remarking that it is by no means sure that Kant's own proof is successful.[182] Moore's proposed alternative consists in the reassertion of what he took to be commonsense claims, such as "Here is one hand . . . and here is another."[183]

Kant, who defends a distinctive form of idealism, merely intends to refute an unacceptable, or "bad," form of idealism, but Moore intends to refute idealism as such. The weakness in Moore's proposed refutation of idealism is twofold. On the one hand, he merely asserts dogmatically, but does not show, that any idealist ever denies commonsense claims. On the other, he thinks that merely to assert such claims dogmatically without argument of any kind, hence to make an end run around epistemology, suffices to refute the idealists in question.

Moore's critique rests on a conflation between the ontological claim that sensation is sensation of something, hence of that which is outside spirit, outside experience but given in it through sensation, and the epistemological claim that what is given in sensation is identical with, or the same as, what stands outside experience. The ontological claim is adduced to understand the epistemological claim, which cannot extend beyond the limits of experience. One can think but not show that what one knows is in fact mind-independent reality. For there is simply no way to show that sensation is sensation of something outside experience.

Moore's attack on idealism set the standard for the analytic reaction to that tendency over the past century. Analytic writers routinely echo Moore's view of idealism, which, with the passage of time, has acquired the status of something approaching sacred writ. Often they do not bother to compare Moore's view to the texts, much less to verify the strength of his arguments.

Moore, Existence, and Later Analytic Philosophy

Moore's effort to refute idealism, understood as denying the existence of the external world, has been and still remains influential in the analytic debate. One reason may be that it is con-

sistent with the later analytic tendency to avoid epistemology, hence to avoid the justification of claims to know, by adopting such alternative strategies as appeals to science as the arbiter of knowledge, intuitive appeals to immediate truth, and so on.

Moore's objections to idealism were widely adopted, but his own position rapidly lost influence. Moore's commonsensism is consistent with traditional English empiricism, but inconsistent with Kant, who affirms the existence of the external world but denies immediate knowledge of it. It is inconsistent as well with the widespread attack on empiricism, in part directed against Moore, which was later developed by such analytic thinkers as Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Sellars, Putnam, and Rorty.

Moore's claim for immediate knowledge was attacked by Wittgenstein in a manner influenced by Russell. The latter was concerned with definite reference, or denotation.[184] In contending that knowledge of physical objects is merely descriptive, he distinguishes sharply between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.[185] Following Russell, in *On Certainty,* Wittgenstein denies any claim for direct knowledge, which Russell calls knowledge by acquaintance. According to Wittgenstein, Moore misuses the term "to know" in refuting idealism, which cannot be answered by claiming immediate knowledge at all.[186] In going beyond Moore and Russell, Wittgenstein further maintains that claims to know are mediated by a frame of reference (*Bezugssystem*),[187] or language game (*Sprachspiel*), in which words are meaningful in relation to their employment.[188]

Moore is not an ordinary person but a highly sophisticated thinker. He rehabilitates a commonsense form of metaphysical realism against idealism. Wittgenstein's attack on that rehabilitation yields two suggestions. First, the problem of the existence of the external world is the kind of nonproblem that interests philosophers but cannot be solved. Second, our knowl-

edge claims cannot be justified through an appeal to immediate experience, but only against the background of a conceptual framework.

The latter idea was later developed in physicalist form by Carnap. In *The Logical Structure of the World* (1928), he provides a rational reconstruction of knowledge through concepts that immediately refer to the empirical given.[189] The type of physicalism Carnap professes in this book, which was shared by a number of members of the Vienna Circle, with the important exception of Neurath,[190] comes down to an ontological claim about reality as ultimately composed of physical entities. In that case, everything that is real, hence meaningful, can be known empirically, or on an empirical basis; and since what cannot be known empirically is obviously not real, cognitive reference to it cannot be meaningful.

Carnap applied this latter idea in a nontechnical attempt to eliminate pseudoproblems—what for Kant would be "bad" metaphysics—from epistemology in an article published in the same year, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language."[191] Following the early Wittgenstein's view[192] that metaphysical sentences are unverifiable, hence meaningless, he argues that statements either asserting or denying the reality of the external world are mere pseudostatements.

The latter suggestion was taken up several decades later by Sellars, who, in Wittgenstein's wake, makes a half-way turn toward Hegel. In this way, Sellars contributes to healing the breach between analytic philosophy and idealism, including Hegel, opened by Frege's attack on Husserl and then expanded by Moore and Russell. In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* which first appeared in 1956, Sellars, like Wittgenstein, rejects the idea of direct givenness, which is basic to classical British empiricism and is restated in Moore, as no more than a myth.[193] According to Sellars, who explicitly follows Hegel, we cannot

depend on immediate experience for the justification of claims to know, as classical empiricists claim, for its probative form is undermined by what Sellars influentially calls the myth of the given. Yet Sellars's Hegelianism, which periodically surfaced against his favored Kantianism, is very thin, very minimal. He clearly relies on Hegel in his critique of empiricism. Yet in other ways he is opposed to Hegel. His scientism, or the view that science is the final arbiter of what we know, which is intended to disqualify both the so-called folk view as well as philosophical speculation, is clearly at odds with Hegel's own view.[194]

Pragmatism, Analytic Neopragmatism, and Hegel

Pragmatism, Idealism, and Hegel

Pragmatism, Hegel, and the neo-analytic interest in pragmatism are interrelated. Idealism is an ingredient in the emergence of classical American pragmatism and in different ways in analytic neopragmatism. There is a reciprocal relation between the analytic concerns with pragmatism and with Hegel. The analytic interest in appropriating Hegel sometimes leads toward pragmatism and, conversely, the analytic interest in pragmatism sometimes leads toward Hegel.

Much of the debate about pragmatism and among pragmatists concerns nonepistemological issues. J. E. Smith, a scholar of American pragmatism, denies that pragmatism can be fairly understood as a specific form of empiricism, or even, more generally, as extending the modern preoccupation with epistemology.[1] The contrary view, recently stated by Rescher, which is that pragmatism represents a novel approach to the problem of knowledge, seems more plausible.[2]

The advantages of understanding pragmatism from an epistemological perspective are threefold. First, it becomes possible to discern the central thrust of American pragmatism in the shared effort to develop a viable theory of knowledge on an anti-, non-, or a-foundationalist basis following upon Peirce's seminal critique of Cartesian foundationalism. It is difficult to discern the central thrust of classical American pragmatism in anything resembling a shared doctrinal commitment, or even a concern

with a single problem or specifiable set of issues, if one looks away from this distinctive pragmatist project. Second, it becomes possible to evaluate the distinctive pragmatist contribution to theory of knowledge, which is difficult to do if one denies that pragmatism makes such a contribution. It is obvious that the founders of American pragmatism were deeply concerned with aspects of the epistemological problem. Third, it becomes plausible to understand the emerging form of analytic neopragmatism as engaged in working out a different form of anti- or nonfoundationalist epistemology after the turn away from the classical analytic concern with formal semantics, or definite reference.

Pragmatism has certainly never been a homogeneous movement. Peirce's annoyance at his claimed misreading at the hands of James is well known. James's opposition to monistic idealism is reflected in the title, *A Pluralistic Universe,* he gave to his last book.[3] If pragmatism eschewed monism for pluralism, it was fitting that the particular pragmatist movement to which James belonged do so as well. In a well-known paper from 1908, ten years after the "official" inception of pragmatism, Lovejoy distinguished no fewer than thirteen varieties.[4] In his classic article, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce maintains that meaning is indissociable from future practical consequences.[5] More recently, Cornell West has suggested that pragmatism is a form of cultural criticism.[6]

The question of how to understand pragmatism cannot be resolved through scrutinizing the reactions of various pragmatists to each other. The members of the first generation of American pragmatists, which, interpreted generously, includes Peirce, James, Dewey, and, depending on the point of view, perhaps Emerson, G. H. Mead, C. I. Lewis, and even Josiah Royce, differed greatly on what they thought pragmatism was about.

Peirce, one of the founding fathers of the movement, devoted considerable effort over a long period of time to trying to clarify his view of a doctrine that he more than anyone else invented. In just the three years between 1905 and 1907 he wrote no fewer than five texts directly on this topic.[7]

The origins of pragmatism lie deep in ancient philosophy, in Aristotle's distinction between *praxis* and *techne* and scattered hints in later thinkers. There is even an unsuspected pragmatic dimension to the forbidding architecture of the critical philosophy, in Kant's surprising description of "pragmatic belief" as "contingent belief" which is useful in various actions.[8] Peirce, who is generally regarded as the great progenitor of what later became American pragmatism, was certainly the first to give definite shape to anything like a pragmatic theory. He talked frequently about figures in the history of philosophy, but infrequently about other pragmatists, including James, from whose generous embrace he increasingly sought to distance himself. He also criticized Dewey,[9] who was himself more generous in commending Peirce.[10]

The first generation of American pragmatists and later analytic neopragmatists share a concern with theory of knowledge while decisively breaking with Cartesian foundationalism. Foundationalism, which originated in ancient Greek philosophy, and which was influentially reformulated by Descartes, has been the dominant epistemological strategy in modern times. The turn to practical efficacy, which is often cited as the central doctrine in early American pragmatism, only becomes meaningful after the general pragmatic critique of Descartes initiated by Peirce leading to the rejection of epistemological foundationalism, and of such related Cartesian doctrines as the spectator approach to knowledge, the concern to know the real, certainty as the criterion of truth, and so on.

The rejection of epistemological foundationalism, shared by

all members of the first generation of American pragmatists, is a hallmark of the initial form of pragmatism as it emerged in the writings of Peirce and those he influenced. For Descartes and many later thinkers, epistemological foundationalism is methodologically necessary for knowledge. The pragmatist rejection of foundationalism, which Descartes considers as the condition of certain knowledge, would be misconstrued as giving up the concern with knowledge. The concern with the problem of knowledge continues unabated after the pragmatist rejection of Descartes on the basis of a very different normative conception of what it means to know. This shared concern is central to Peirce's early statement of his basic insights in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," to James's efforts to work out a distinctively pragmatic theory of truth eschewing correspondence, and to Dewey's decisive rejection of Cartesianism in *The Quest for Certainty.*

A staunchly negative attitude toward Cartesian foundationalism, which was accepted by Kant but rejected by all the post-Kantian idealists, is reflected in very diverse pragmatist reactions to idealism. The dividing line is not always easy to draw.

If R. W. Emerson is included among the early American pragmatists, it becomes difficult even to distinguish between pragmatism and idealism; there is direct, unbroken continuity between German idealism and his brand of New England transcendentalism. A similar continuity is illustrated in Rescher's so-called pragmatic idealism.[11]

Peirce is sometimes called an objective idealist because of his doctrine of tychism. James, who classed his friend with Hegel among the logical idealists,[12] compared this doctrine to Henri Bergson's *devenir réel,* a comparison that cannot have been to either's liking.[13] Dewey is regarded on occasion as an objective idealist, as he sometimes seems to regard himself. Analytic neopragmatists tend to know the German idealists less well than

such thinkers as Peirce and Dewey, and, when they mention them, often distort their views.

The first generation of American pragmatists exhibit a wide range of attitudes toward idealism. All of them are marked by their encounter with idealism, especially German idealism, but in very different ways. With the signal exception of James, a very public foe of something he never knew very well, early American pragmatists maintained a close relation to German idealism. A constant, mainly implicit reference to idealism of various kinds, as opposed to explicit study of idealist doctrines, is complexly interwoven, both positively and negatively, in their writings.

Peirce, the most impressive philosophical mind among the first generation of American pragmatists, also possessed the best grounding in the history of philosophy, including idealism. He comments on Berkeley, finds Schelling sympathetic, knows Kant best of all, and although at first highly critical, comes increasingly to think of himself as close to Hegel. James mentions Kant often but is frankly hostile to Hegel, in large part because of his misperception of the latter's attitude toward his own favored empiricism. Dewey, who began in the St. Louis brand of American Hegelianism and was marked by his encounter with Hegel, quickly wandered away from idealism. Among Americans sympathetic to pragmatism, Royce knew German idealism best, indeed exceedingly well. He said that the idealists were in fact what people in his day were calling pragmatists.[14]

Peirce had a deep grasp of Berkeley. His early review of a new edition of the Irish philosopher's writings reveals a detailed acquaintance with the whole range of Berkeley's theories as well as a sensitive interpretation of their importance for the realist-nominalist controversy.[15] He goes to some pains to show the link between Berkeley, Hobbes, and Ockham. Though he was impressed by Berkeley, Peirce rejects the Irish philosopher's inconsistent treatment of mind and matter. According to Peirce,

Berkeley could have brought the same arguments against mind that he brought against matter.

Peirce, who mentions Kant frequently in the course of studying different topics, famously claims to have known the first *Critique* nearly by heart. He was especially intrigued by Hegel, yet his interpretation of Hegel's position is not always sound.[16] He explicitly says that if Hegel had had a more robust conception of reality, he could have accepted Hegel's position.

Since Peirce was both interested in and critical of Hegel,[17] one could discuss Hegel's influence on him.[18] One might compare aspects of their positions in general or point by point.[19] Peirce's idea of the long run appears to be a reformulation, within the scope of philosophy of science, of the view Hegel advances in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*. It would be especially fruitful, although this would surpass the limits of the present study, to bring out the way that both philosophers contribute to epistemology after Kant by reducing the divide between philosophy and science. This is a divide which others—Karl Popper comes easily to mind—are concerned to reinforce.[20] Peirce is always aware, but critical of at least a family resemblance between his position and types of German idealism, particularly Hegel's. Peirce, who was less inclined than his friend James to generalize, neither embraces nor rejects idealism, preferring to see links between Hegel's thought and his own. As he grew older, Peirce mistakenly came to feel that the differences between his views and Hegel's mainly concerned specific formulations.[21] Yet he never knew Hegel well enough to perceive basic differences in their respective positions. One difference, to which we will come back below, is Hegel's explicit interest on the historicity of the epistemological process, which has no equivalent either in Peirce or in pragmatism in general.

Peirce's sympathy for idealism, and his critical concern with Hegel, was by no means shared by James, Peirce's impatient

pragmatist champion. James was influenced by the French neo-Kantian Charles Renouvier, whom he credited with helping him to reject the "monistic superstition" in which he had been schooled.[22] Although not uninformed, James was certainly less informed than Peirce about the philosophical tradition. Detailed passages on individual figures are infrequent in his writings. His treatment of Hegel is finally slightly more nuanced than some of his intemperate pronouncements would indicate. An example is his generous claim, in the course of alluding to British neo-Hegelianism, about the relation of Hegel to liberal Christianity.[23] Many other passages are less favorable to Hegel and certainly less sensitive to the nuances of a position, which did not lend itself well to James's picturesque language and his taste for sweeping pronouncements that were often lacking in philosophical rigor.

James, unlike Pierce, presents his own conception of pragmatism in clear, but not always knowledgeable opposition to idealism, particularly Hegel's theories, which he flatly rejects. Like Peirce and Dewey, James mainly wrote on philosophical problems, not individual philosophers, but he devoted several papers to Hegel and Hegelianism. James often turns to psychology to make his central points, which rarely if ever depend on close reading of the texts. In James, Peirce's wide knowledge and careful interpretation of the philosophical tradition give way to an often generous, but even more often unreliable and uninformed discussion of figures he either liked (such as Bergson) or disliked (such as Hegel and the British idealists).

"On Some Hegelisms," in *The Will to Believe* (1896) is appropriately accompanied by apologies for its superficiality.[24] Later on, as if emboldened by his increasing fame, in his unfailingly polite way James kept up a sort of minor campaign of criticism against Hegel. James's criticism was not too different from what budding analytic philosophers were at the time in the process of

launching against British idealists. In both cases the aim was to discredit, if not idealism, at least its Hegelian form. A typical comment occurs in the first paragraph of "On Some Hegelisms." "Hegel's philosophy," he writes, "mingles mountain-loads of corruption with its scanty merits. . . ."[25] This dismissive observation reflects James's desire to go on the attack against a theory he never knew well enough to criticize fairly or even to interpret. He unwittingly concedes the point when, after a dozen pages, he characterizes Hegel's position: "His system resembles a mouse-trap, in which if you once pass the door you may be lost forever."[26]

In *Pragmatism* (1907), where the mature James develops his conception of the "new" philosophy, Berkeley and Hegel are scarcely mentioned. But in scattered remarks he indicates his reaction to Bradley and Green, two central British idealists. Absolute idealism is described as a type of pantheism, a religious philosophy operating on pure logic, opposed to his own empiricism. James presents his own pragmatism, unlike materialism, as accepting religious ideas as true if they are useful. In passing, he generously, but rather oddly appropriates Berkeley for pragmatism on the grounds that Berkeley denies no more than the useless scholastic view of substance.[27]

In *A Pluralist Universe* (1911), a series of lectures that appeared posthumously—James died in 1910—he returns to the conceptual fray to take on Bradley and Green more systematically while linking the former to Hegel. Green is doubly interesting for the mature James as a strong critic of (Humean) empiricism, and as supposedly a neo-Hegelian. Green's attack on empiricism, he asserts, consists in denying any relational element in sensation; James labels this approach as intellectualism. For James, Green misdescribes sensation, since relations of all kinds are integral to the sensational flux. That is the point of his own radical empiricism.[28]

Bradley comes in for extensive treatment as a leading proponent of monistic pantheism, which James considers to be inconsistent with radical empiricism. Appendices A and B reprint his earlier discussions of Bradley's view of relations and activity. In James's discussion of Bradley's view of relations, the point is once again that experienced relations among things are in fact real. He develops this complaint in detail in the chapter on monistic idealism, depicting absolute idealism and radical empiricism as opposing forms of pantheism. James sees a Bradleyan conception of relations as common to such other thinkers as Lotze and Royce. According to James, all of them finally rely on an absolute akin to a theistic God, which he is at pains to reject. The main point seems to be that either relations are immediately given in sensation, as James contends, or no later effort to provide this relation, such as Bradley's form of intellectualism, can be successful. The attempt undermines what we in fact express without having any acceptable substitute to propose. In contending against Bradley that external relations exist—"They seem to, undoubtedly"[29]—James levels a sweeping charge against all forms of post-Kantian idealism as committed to an unworkable idea of the absolute: "Any other picture than this of post-Kantian absolutism I am unable to frame. I see the intellectualistic criticism destroying the immediately given coherence of the phenomenal world, but unable to make its own conceptual substitutes cohere. . . ."[30]

The title of the chapter on Hegel, "Hegel and His Method," refers to a basic tension James detects between Hegel's vision of the whole as rational and the German idealist's supposed triadic dialectic. The unjustified assumption that there is such a method and that Hegel relies on it shows that James approaches Hegel more in terms of what others say than through personal acquaintance with the texts. James, who concedes the difficulty of comprehending Hegel on his own terms, admits to an im-

pressionistic reading of Hegel's position. His main complaint is directed against the concept of the absolute, which conflicts with his own radical empiricism. He correctly suggests that no one accepts Hegel's view of absolute truth.[31] Yet this is a doctrine to which Hegel was also never committed. In asking whether the absolute exists, James construes it in the religious terms of Royce, rather than in the secular terms of Hegel's concern with the idea of the whole, as in the claim that the truth is the epistemological whole. Multiplying references to Leibniz, Lotze, and McTaggart does not suffice to get at Hegel's difficult conception of the absolute, which is best construed along cognitive, hence epistemological, not ontological lines. James's conclusion that the absolute affords religious peace but remains irrational bears no obvious relation to Hegel's view.[32] James's own interest in a finite conception of God is utterly irrelevant to Hegel's conception of method. His suggestion that the absolute is not forced on us by logic, since reality exists distributively,[33] completely misses Hegel's insight that one can only think, but neither know nor even formally designate individuality, to which James is attached, on the basis of an overriding whole.

The clash between James and Hegel is motivated by the American's radically different spirit, which makes it all but impossible for him to sympathize with the German. James's radical empiricism leads him to reject monistic idealism as the purveyor of a form of block universe that is clearly opposed in James's mind to his own convictions. Yet in reality the view James rejects is professed by Bradley, not by Hegel. The latter is as committed to empiricism, although not to the same empiricism, as James. The further suggestion that Hegel belongs to a long list of thinkers who claim finality for their systems is flatly inaccurate.[34] Hegel, who regards thought as essentially historical, hence always unfinished, consistently rejects conceptual finality in any form.[35]

In comparison to James, Dewey, who comes out of an overtly Hegelian environment, has a much better grasp of what he agrees with and what he rejects in idealism. Suffice it to say that he is consistently critical of Kant. Though he rarely addresses Hegel directly, his position is permanently marked by his early encounter with the German idealist. Many, though perhaps not all the main facets of Dewey's position look like further developments of Hegelian views. These include Dewey's insistence on experience, his naturalism, his experimental view of logic, and his rejection of the Cartesian quest for certainty.

Since Dewey's relation to idealism is less controversial, better known, and better understood than those of either Peirce or James, less needs to be said about it. Dewey's interest in idealism, particularly Hegel, is attributable to numerous factors. It was nourished by his undergraduate teacher, a certain Professor Marsh, who was one of the first in the United States to be interested in German philosophy. It was reinforced by his initial publishing efforts in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* edited by W. T. Harris, a well-known nineteenth-century American Hegelian. It was later stimulated during Dewey's graduate studies by G. S. Morris, who held that Hegelianism provided scientific validation of Christianity. And it was further stimulated by the rise of British idealism.

Dewey, like Hegel, is above all a philosopher of experience, a concept which he understands in many different ways. Certainly the idealists, who disagree sharply among themselves, understand experience in other ways than the British empiricists, who also disagree with each other. Dewey, who was sympathetic to various views of experience in the Hegelians and in British idealists, modifies them in the direction of an active experimental approach involving an ongoing transaction among individuals and their environment. In an early article on "Kant and Philosophic Method" (1884), in reaction against Kantian dualism the

young Dewey suggests an organic model, or idea of "organic relation" pointing in Hegel's direction. According to Dewey, the task of providing an adequate account of experience for which Kant formulated his transcendental logic requires an account of the conceptions and categories formative of experience in an organic unity. This is the method of philosophy he claims to find in Hegel.[36] Dewey's revised form of this approach, which surpasses any simple allegiance to Hegel, is offered in "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896). In the process of rejecting a mechanistic stimulus-response model, Dewey sketches a functionalist, organic alternative on the way to working out a very non-Kantian view of logic as a so-called method of effective inquiry.

A good place to detect Dewey's revised view of experience is an important article on "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" (1917). In anticipation of his later position, he lists five traits that contrast with traditional approaches to experience common to empiricists and their opponents, but which contradict present science and social practice. He deplores the overemphasis on knowledge, the attention to subjectivity at the expense of objectivity, the stress on finality instead of experimentation, the empiricist failure to notice real connections, and the insensitivity to the possibility of inference that is present in every step of experience.[37] For Dewey, different philosophical approaches reveal different national characters. In delineating the lineaments of a new theory of experience, he moves away from the so-called German dogma of the inner evolution of ideas in the direction of a position supposedly adapted to American tastes. He aims to "bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principles of successful action."[38] At this point, Dewey means to combine idealism and realism in a theory that applies intelligence to the realization of human ends.

The resultant theory is clearly non-Kantian, though its rela-

tion to post-Kantian idealism remains unclear. Dewey is obviously not here and in fact never was an "orthodox" follower of German idealism. Yet one must wonder if Dewey's distance from German idealism is not greater in his mind than in reality. His understanding of his conceptual trajectory is contained in the very title of his brief autobiographical sketch, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism." Certainly as his position evolves, Dewey's relation to idealism, indeed the sense in which his position is itself a form of idealism, changes. Yet in rejecting the idea—which, probably under the influence of British idealists, he attributes to Hegel—that idealism, or absolute idealism is compatible with a flexible conception of experience, he overestimates his own distance from idealism.

Certainly Dewey's difference from Kantian idealism was real. His critical reaction to Kant points to his concern to carry further the rejection of residual Cartesian elements in the Kantian position, such as a spectator view of the subject, dualism, stress on cognition as seeking certainty, unrevisable systematicity, and experience as equivalent to knowledge. All of this is swept away in Dewey's new view of experience.

Yet much remains that is idealistic, sometimes strongly so. Like Fichte, Dewey thinks of human beings as basically active. In his view of people as inherently social, he disagrees with Kant's famously abstract conception of the subject as a mere original transcendental unity. Although he is rarely mentioned in the same breath with Fichte, whose theories he may not have known, Dewey shares with his German colleague a conception of philosophy as basically practical. Like Fichte, Dewey thinks the task of philosophy lies in reflecting on problems, conundra, and enigmas arising out of real life experience. In the shift from the theoretical to the practical, he is at one with Hegel in refusing anything like a transcendental idealist analysis of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Knowledge develops as an

ongoing process of inquiry about a world that cannot be mapped out in advance, and which must simply unfold before it can be known or even entertained as a possibility. Dewey's naturalistic bias, and his anthropological-biological orientation, are a New World version of the Hegelian shift from pure reason to spirit entailing a revised concept of the philosophical subject as finite, social human being.

Perhaps the deepest similarity between the mature Dewey and Hegel lies in the experimental view of philosophy for which Dewey is well known. It would be mistaken to conflate the two positions, which overlap in a shared view of philosophy as not remote from but as engaged in the present while scrutinizing the future. With an eye to modern science, Dewey advances a conception of philosophy as operational, as a theory of real human practice which, after the decline in belief in ultimate reality, is called upon to restore the relation between science and values by adopting an experimental, rational approach to the latter through intelligent examination of consequences. This is an updated, Americanized form of the well-known Hegelian conception of philosophy as its own time captured in thought. For both Hegel and Dewey, philosophy should not be under-stood as a source of eternal values or atemporal truth. It should rather be understood as a way to meditate on what has occurred from the present perspective, which is forever open to revision, hence always experimental, in order to look to the future.

Two differences between Dewey and Hegel can be noted, one of which will be important later on. The first, more a matter of degree than anything else, lies in Dewey's concern to find a way for philosophy to participate in such specific "battles" as the Moscow purge trials, a concern more suitable to the can-do mentality of the American interested in quick results than in the slow work of the Hegelian concept. Hegel, who believes that philosophy always arises *post festum*, accordingly denies it the ca-

pacity of directly intervening in the social world. The second, deeper difference concerns the relation of philosophy to science. Hegel and Dewey understand philosophy as dependent upon natural science, which they approach in different ways—Hegel in a historical frame of mind, Dewey in an evolutionary perspective. Hegel is a pre-evolutionary thinker, whereas Dewey, who was born in the same year as the publication of the *Origin of Species* (1859), was impressed by the scientific revolution it promoted.[39] The impermanence he acknowledges is not historical, but evolutionary. This leads to a revised view of philosophy which, like the sciences, is concerned, he says, with new methods and new problems following from the recognition that forms of life are the result of an ongoing struggle for survival and adaptation.

Analytic Neopragmatism

The turn away from Hegel, which has been so productive in the development of a distinctive analytic philosophical approach, has recently been supplemented by a nascent, still very modest turn (or return) toward Hegel, which is often embedded in a wider analytic turn toward pragmatism. We can distinguish between the general analytic turn toward pragmatism and the further analytic turn toward Hegel.

The analytic interest in pragmatism is older than analytic neopragmatism. Wittgenstein, though not a pragmatist and not well informed about pragmatism, indicates in *On Certainty* that he is trying, as he remarks, to say something that sounds like pragmatism.[40] In his wake, analytic thinkers have been turning to pragmatism in a modest but steadily increasing way for many years. Analytic neopragmatism can be dated from the early 1950s if it is taken as beginning with Quine, and from the early 1930s

if one dates it back to Neurath. The analytic turn to pragmatism then began rapidly to gather steam in the early 1980s, when Putnam, whom Rorty idiosyncratically now regards as the leading contemporary pragmatist, came on board.[41] Yet it is only recently that those engaged in writing about the classical pragmatists have been willing to acknowledge a broadening of the terms of debate to include those who, fleeing the typical but increasingly problematic analytic concern with the formal semantic approach to reference, the analytic analogue of Cartesian epistemology, have in recent years been seeking refuge in pragmatism writ large.[42] At present, any treatment of pragmatism that ignored analytic neopragmatism would be incomplete.

The plausibility of any reading of a philosophical doctrine obviously depends on its hermeneutical precision. A wider, less precise, less specific interpretation is usually less interesting than a narrower, more precise, more specific one. In Rorty's wake, one of the results of the increasing analytic concern with pragmatism has been to give this doctrine, or set of doctrines, an ever wider, increasingly less meaningful interpretation in which it simultaneously appears to include just about everyone, and hence to exclude almost no one. This belies the intentions of Peirce, the undisputed inventor of the doctrine, who was clear about what he was ruling in and ruling out. This sharp focus animating Peirce has meanwhile seemed to dissolve in a kind of conceptual haze. Rorty's currently favorite pragmatists are Dewey and Davidson.[43] Others take a still wider, even less plausible view. Brandom, who describes pragmatism as the epistemological equivalent of a secular theory of morality,[44] lists among the pragmatists Sellars, whose scientism is consistent with a certain strain of analytic philosophy stemming from logical positivism, but simply inimical to any known form of pragmatism, and even Frege, the progenitor of the semantic concern with the problem

of reference running through the entire analytic debate, a semantic concern that has no clear or even unclear analogue among the first generation American pragmatists.[45]

As might be expected, since the analytic turners toward pragmatism emerge from their own distinctive conceptual background, analytic neopragmatism is often significantly different from its classical American predecessor. The resistance to epistemological foundationalism, a hallmark of classical American pragmatism, is a frequent theme for more recent neo-analytic thinkers such as W. V. Quine, Putnam, Rorty, and Brandom. These oppose Cartesian foundationalism as well as all the other main facets of the Cartesian position. In comparison to classical American pragmatists, neo-analytic converts to pragmatism sometimes take a more moderate view of Cartesianism. Unlike other analytic neopragmatists, Rorty, the only pragmatic skeptic currently in captivity, seems to favor foundationalism while believing that since it fails there is nothing interesting to say about knowledge.

Classical and analytic neopragmatists tend to differ on the proper attitude to take toward realism. Classical American pragmatists staunchly resist metaphysical realism. Analytic pragmatists are divided on this topic. Analytic neopragmatists seem widely favorable to metaphysical realism, to forms of the canonical epistemological claim that to know is to know the mind-independent world as it is, and hence are not opposed to, but rather in basic agreement with, Descartes, who favors a form of realism close to, perhaps identical with, metaphysical realism. Quine and Putnam in his internal realist phase are both committed to a form of analytic holism influentially limned by Quine, which, in rejecting any comparison of thought to reality, is inimical to a metaphysical realist solution to the problem of knowledge as usually understood, but not to an ontological form of metaphysical realism. Rorty's skepticism following from an

acceptance of, but despair about, analytic foundationalism as even possibly fulfilling the Cartesian dream of perfect knowledge, points toward, not away from, metaphysical realism. He is joined by Putnam, whose recent turn to natural realism, which he links to his reading of James, has all the hallmarks of a Cartesian conception of realism.

Analytic neopragmatism is a distant consequence of the young Carnap's defeat at the hands of Neurath. As a result, the idea of a seamless web between empiricism and science suggested by a certain reading of logical atomism promoted by Russell and the young Wittgenstein, especially the latter, was abandoned.[46] In reformulating his position in the wake of Neurath's critique of it, Carnap eventually came to the view, stated in the *Logical Syntax of Language* (1934), that all standards of "correctness," "validity," and "truth" depend on, hence are relative to, logical rules which define one or another formal, or ideal, language or linguistic framework.

Neurath is a much undervalued thinker. He was the hidden architect who provided the shape of later positivism in Carnap and of nonstandard analytic philosophy in Quine. When the history of analytic philosophy is written, Neurath will loom very large. A straight line leads from Neurath's criticism of protocol sentences (in the early Carnap) to Quine's view of the underdetermination of theories, his related turn to pragmatism, and, beyond Quine, to Putnam.

Neurath, who was a co-founder of the Vienna Circle, is a somewhat mysterious figure, now little known, but central to the unity of science movement, which included Carnap and others, as well as to the reaction against it. His critique of Carnap defeated the latter's ambitious early effort at empiricist foundationalism through a theory of protocol sentences. It undercut the entire program sketched out by the early Wittgenstein, which was restated in different form in the Vienna Circle, particu-

larly in the early Carnap. This in part explains why Neurath is so often simply but distressingly ignored by historians of the Vienna Circle like Coffa, who shares the positivistic aspirations Neurath quickly squelched, or more recently by Friedman, who is attracted to rehabilitating Carnap against Quine's critique.

A later version of Neurath's position, which is not often discussed, lives on in Quine. The latter conspicuously cites Neurath's famous boat metaphor as the motto of *Word and Object*, where he works out an updated version of Neurath's views. Neurath believes that from time to time we modify our overall theory of the world from "within" but the theory itself does not depend on an a priori of any kind. The overall theory rather depends on conceptual holism in which even particular scientific and mathematical theories presuppose the whole of science. Unlike many others in the Vienna Circle, Neurath distances himself from the characteristic effort to reject Kant's synthetic a priori. He further denies Wittgenstein's use of Kant in the *Tractatus* to argue for a single common language with a uniquely specifiable structure. In its place, Neurath favors a language-relative view of the a priori, which is famously spelled out by Alfred Tarski in his theory of truth relative to a given language.[47]

In holding that claims to know cannot be founded, nor forever fixed in an adamantine conceptual firmament, but must be continuously adjusted "on the fly" as it were, Neurath points toward a post-foundationalist, naturalized approach to knowledge he never succeeds in elaborating. This view is later worked out by Quine and a succession of analytic philosophers standing among the ruins of the analytic dream of a semantic theory of perfect reference. In different ways, Quine, Putnam, Rorty, and many others [48] are all party to a diffuse analytic turning toward pragmatism resulting from the increasingly obvious failure of formal semantics. Among the important analytic thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century, perhaps only Davidson remained

a significant holdout. Rorty, the self-proclaimed heir to Dewey, whom he constantly but eccentrically invokes, seems in some ways very distant from pragmatism, as McDowell points out.[49] He is as far from pragmatism as Davidson, who never claims to be a pragmatist, and who resists the appellation,[50] but whom Rorty has controversially tried to recruit for the cause.

Ironically, as concerns pragmatism Quine and Davidson represent the two analytic extremes.[51] This is ironic since Davidson, who is often thought of as a strong follower of Quine, something he does nothing to discourage, is in fact one of his deepest critics. Unlike Quine, unlike Neurath, but rather like the early Carnap, Davidson thinks that statements about the world match up with it, if not directly, at least indirectly. That is the basis of his vaunted, but brief (and later renounced) rehabilitation of correspondence on the basis of coherence.[52] The analytic turn to pragmatism, which is already under way in Neurath, accelerates in Quine's wake. If we limit the discussion to Quine, Rorty, and Putnam, we have three further, but very different, analytic forms of neopragmatism, all of which are related in different ways to Hegelian idealism.

Quine's influential view of pragmatism, like the rest of his position, is exceedingly spare. He was still publishing until his recent death, but had long stopped mentioning pragmatism. He had already done so when he composed *Word and Object* (1960). To the best of my knowledge, the term has not appeared in his writings for decades. His minimalist view of pragmatism can be inferred from a few remarks, primarily in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," but also in "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis," a pair of essays written around 1950.

The former essay, which is perhaps the single best-known philosophical paper of the twentieth century, is squarely directed against the fallback position adopted by Quine's friend Carnap. Quine here takes up and extends Neurath's critique of Carnap's

early position.[53] After his defeat at Neurath's hands, Carnap sought refuge in the conception of an ideal language. Carnap, like many others in the Vienna Circle, was always close to a certain Kant. In *Logical Syntax of Language,* where he worked out a formal account of any possible language along Kantian lines, in line with physicalism Carnap touts natural science as in effect an adequate replacement for any other source of knowledge. In a famous passage, whose consequences were later felt and continue to be felt throughout analytic philosophy, he writes: "Philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science [and] the logic of science is nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of science."[54]

After his defeat by Neurath, Carnap abandoned his commitment to protocol sentences. He gave up any version of the early Wittgensteinian idea that our claims about the world can be matched up one to one with the world in adopting a doctrine Quine later takes over in modified form in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." According to Carnap, our cognitive assertions are indexed to an underlying linguistic framework. The Carnapian conception of linguistic frameworks rests on a quasi-Kantian distinction between form, or analytic sentences, and empirical content, or synthetic sentences. In attacking the analytic-synthetic distinction, Quine's target was not Kant, but rather Carnap's fallback position in an ideal form of language, whose very possibility he means to deny.

Carnap's abandonment of empiricism after Neurath's critique in favor of the logical analysis of syntax is seen by some observers as an implicit shift toward pragmatism.[55] Quine's attack on Carnap motivates a renewed shift toward pragmatism, which follows from the inability to match up claims about the world with the world.[56] In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine undercuts Carnap's revised position in *The Logical Syntax of Language* in providing what he presents as an explicit shift toward prag-

matism. In a slightly later article, "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis," he explains the reasons for the pragmatic shift. Since claims to know depend on a prior conceptual scheme, which cannot be compared to the mind-independent world, we must abandon the idea of a (Baconian) mirror of reality, or a realistic standard, in favor of a pragmatic standard.[57] This is a proximate source of the view later developed by Rorty. In these and other writings, Quine refuses a priori claims to know of all kinds, as well as claims based on facts unrelated to a prior framework in famously denying, as he says, that there is any fact of the matter. For Quine, "pragmatism" means that claims to know must meet the test of experience as a whole, or, in his language, as a corporate body.[58] In a word, for Quine "pragmatism" means epistemic holism and conversely.

Quine's epistemic holism, which motivates his shift to pragmatism, sets him apart from most other analytic philosophers, who, if they espouse pragmatism, usually do so on different grounds. Putnam has always been close to Quine, hence to pragmatism. Quine's holism calls attention to an explanatory gap between sensory information and theory. Putnam's internal realism similarly points to plural interpretations of the single mind-independent real. For Putnam as for Rorty, the central classical pragmatists are James and Dewey with scarcely a glance at Peirce. Putnam has always seen his interest in pluralism as close to James's own similar commitment in *A Pluralist Universe* and in other writings.[59]

Putnam's pluralism, which survives his recent abandonment of internal realism for so-called natural realism, leads to an explicit commitment to a Jamesian form of pragmatism. Like Carnap, one of his early heroes, whose intellectual development was exceedingly convoluted, Putnam, who is never sure of what he wants to defend, constantly changes his mind. The history of Putnam's development reflects the formulation and rapid later

abandonment of a series of ideas, often while they are still influential, recently in giving up internal realism.[60] In *Reason, Truth and History,* Putnam draws attention to a contrast between external realism, a so-called God's eye view, or view without perspective, and internal realism, or the view that there is more than one "'true' theory or description of the world."[61]

Putnam was never too clear about what this latter view entails. In the initial formulation, he claims that internal realism concerns both the mind-independent world and the world as produced by our concepts.[62] These claims are irreconcilably different. The former is common in different ways to Descartes and to the British empiricists. The latter is formulated by Kant in reacting against them. Certainly, the very idea that we construct what we know smacks of idealism as popularly understood, a doctrine which Putnam, who never shows he has more than the most superficial grasp of idealism or even of particular idealist positions, is at pains to avoid.

In response to Rorty,[63] he has recently abandoned internal realism, however construed, in a shift to so-called natural realism, his new name for direct realism.[64] In so doing, he gives up sense data for the direct experience of external objects. Putnam makes no claims to invent this view, which, he believes, goes all the way back to Aristotle. He curiously regards Husserl, a self-proclaimed transcendental phenomenologist (!), as exemplifying a doctrine,[65] which he claims is only first stated in non-metaphysical fashion by James. Although he rejects James's suggestion that the world is in part the product of our minds, he accepts the idea that normal, veridical perception picks out external things as they are.[66] According to Putnam, who now clearly distances himself from Kant, there is no interface between the mind and the external object of perception.[67] He agrees with what he calls the great insight of pragmatism, that what is important in our lives must be important in philosophy.[68]

Hence, pragmatism, for Putnam, comes down to the view that claims to know rest on natural realism, or direct perception of the external world, which can be interpreted in different ways.

Rortean Pragmatism as Skepticism

Rorty is the figure in contemporary analytic philosophy most closely identified at present with pragmatism. Neurath and Quine have both passed from the scene, and the other leading analytic neopragmatists quickly stopped talking about their adopted doctrine, though Putnam sometimes mentions it in passing.[69] Rorty is the only one of the main trio of analytic neopragmatists who still seems interested in pragmatism, although what he says and how he says it often makes one wonder how his concept of it relates to even an "average" view of pragmatism. He has been remarkably persistent in his insistence on pragmatism, praising the pragmatist movement and Dewey in particular in a growing series of books. Yet he has also been remarkably unpersuasive, as if whether he persuaded anyone other than himself was not really his main concern. His revisionary efforts to show that anyone and very nearly everyone is a pragmatist, but that "pragmatism" in general has no clear relation to the American pragmatist tradition in particular are, if not convincing, at least amusing. In part because of his interest in Dewey, he is also the only analytic neopragmatist who still desires to make philosophy socially useful. But whether he is a pragmatist, an analytic neopragmatist, or, as seems more likely, an analytic skeptic claiming to be a pragmatist, is germane to how one evaluates his views.[70] If the first generation of American pragmatists is our standard, certainly none of them is in any sense a skeptic. They share the concern of apparently everyone attracted to pragmatism—that is everyone other than Rorty—to work out an approach to knowledge alternative to (Cartesian) foundational-

ism. Rorty's sharp way of counterposing hermeneutics to episte-mology and then espousing the former while rejecting the latter suggests that he has given up on knowledge, hence implicitly endorses some form of epistemic skepticism. This suspicion is heightened by his suggestion that we should give up truth with-out putting anything in its place.[71] Or, to put the same point in other words, Rorty often writes as if he were still nostalgically committed to some form of Cartesianism epistemology, which simply fails. Since it fails, claims to know, understood as know-ing the mind-independent real, say through some kind of cor-respondence theory of truth, must be abandoned in favor of, as Rorty says, what society lets us say.[72]

Like Putnam's position, Rorty's is not stable but unusually labile. Unlike Rorty, who, after an early concern with episte-mology has become a kind of philosophical gadfly, without any-thing resembling a clear focus, Putnam at least has a dominant philosophical theme. He has always been committed to real-ism, which in different forms runs throughout his entire corpus, but has never been satisfied with his defense of it. Rorty has an equivocal, unstable, even contradictory relation to philoso-phy in any form. In writings prior to *Philosophy and the Mir-ror of Nature*, he featured an early Wittgensteinian view that philosophy's problems were unreal and needed to be dissolved, for instance by reforming our language or changing the way we speak. Beginning with this book, he adopted the rather differ-ent conviction that philosophical problems cannot be solved (or resolved) philosophically, which is equivalent to epistemic skep-ticism. In later writings, he has continued to write of philosophy as engaged in a hopeless task, while seeking, within the limits of his form of skepticism, to recover the traditional philosophical claim for social relevance, recently in scrutinizing the relation of *Philosophy and Social Hope*.

Rorty's tacit embrace of skepticism represents a shift from

his initial commitment to what he saw as the main thrust of analytic philosophy, about which he later became discouraged. Early on, when he was still a rising star in the analytic establishment, and when he was still concerned with eliminativism, he took the line that linguistic philosophy could indeed genuinely solve (or dissolve) philosophical problems through changing the way we talk about them. In that phase of his development, he was close not only to the early Wittgenstein, but also to Quine's view of semantic ascent, according to which the proper way to conduct philosophy is to talk not about objects but about words.[73] The main question he was interested in confronting was whether to adopt the attitude of an ideal language with Carnap (and Gustav Bergmann) or the ordinary language approach featured at Oxford. The so-called linguistic turn meant for him a reaction against the view that philosophy is a specific discipline concerned to solve a particular set of problems, above all the rejection of the idea of philosophy as "pseudoscience,"[74] perhaps as science in any sense. Yet even in this strong analytic phase, Rorty had enough historical sense to formulate what he called criteria of the possible success of analytic philosophy. These criteria were intended to determine if analytic philosophy would in fact be able to carry out its project.[75]

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* a dozen years later, Rorty is no longer concerned, or at least no longer mainly concerned, to show that we need to change the way we talk about problems in order to cause them to disappear. At this point, he thinks, rather like Wittgenstein, one of his three main philosophical heroes (the others were at this point in his evolution Heidegger and Dewey), that we can show that selected philosophical problems, above all the problem of knowledge, cannot be solved (or resolved). Roughly since the later Wittgenstein, analytic writers have been increasingly critical of traditional British empiricism. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Na-*

ture, Rorty depicts the problem of knowledge along traditional empiricist lines in order to show, following Sellars's celebrated attack on what he calls the myth of the given, why we should just turn away from it rather than try to devise a way to save some form of empiricism. As the title of the book suggests, Rorty describes the possible solution to the epistemological problem in Baconian fashion not only as requiring an actual bringing of the mind in touch with the real, but further as the mind's mirroring it. In Rorty's description, an adequate epistemological theory would need to be like Baconian empiricism, Engels's reflection theory of knowledge, or the early Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. Starting from this assumption, Rorty has little difficulty in showing that it is meaningless to claim that our conceptual scheme mirrors, reflects, grasps, or in any other way provides a picture of metaphysical reality.

Others, to be sure, reject correspondence but allow different, weaker claims for knowledge. Hegel, the later Wittgenstein, the middle Carnap, Quine, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Michel Foucault suggest that claims to know are relative to an explanatory matrix, form of life, the whole of science, an episteme, a paradigm, and so on. Such revisionist views of knowledge abandon the venerable idea of matching up our ideas with the mind-independent real through indexing claims to a conceptual scheme as the basis of interpretation. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* Rorty takes two steps to combat a weaker version of epistemology understood either as an interpretation of what is given, or as interpretation *tout court*. On the one hand, he follows Sellars in denying that there is any given, in short in declining the classical empiricist view that the mind-independent real ever is, or even conceivably through suitable adjustments can be, known as it is through a given. On the other, he rejects any attempt to substitute hermeneutics, or interpretation, for epistemology on the grounds that it is not possible to continue theory

of knowledge by other means. For Rorty as for Husserl, in that sense the dream is indeed dreamed out.

Rorty's pessimistic rejection of the question of knowledge is consistent with his conviction that philosophy is unable to solve (or resolve) its problems, unequal to its self-assigned tasks. Unlike the early Wittgenstein, in this stage of his development Rorty no longer holds that philosophical problems are merely verbal, or that they result only from the misuse of language. Although he now increasingly acknowledges that the problems are real, Rorty sticks to his conclusion that philosophy is not up to the challenge.

Rorty is certainly not the first skeptic in the tradition which, since Socrates, is chock full of philosophers unable to decide between competing theories, and frequently convinced that claims to know cannot be sustained. Rorty is consistent in holding that there is nothing interesting to say about knowledge, hence in emphasizing that philosophy is misconceived as being in the business of discussing knowledge at all. Yet in firmly shutting the door to knowledge, Rorty, the self-described pragmatist, isolates himself from all other pragmatists, none of whom is an epistemological skeptic, and each of whom declines Cartesian foundationalism while working out a weaker, postfoundationalist claim to know.

The difference can be explained through Rorty's residual commitment to a traditional claim to know in a strong sense. It follows that for Rorty it is unacceptable to seek a substitute for analytical foundationalism, in his eyes the culminating point of the debate on knowledge. Beyond it there is no possibility of further efforts to reinstate the possibility of knowledge, for instance by adopting a weaker, interpretative view, such as those worked out by Dewey or Heidegger, two of his other philosophical heroes at the time.

In a later collection of essays, Rorty suggests that the great

pragmatists, by which he means James and Dewey (but strangely enough not Peirce), should not be seen as offering theories of knowledge. This omission of Peirce from the pantheon of the most important pragmatists, which results in a distorted, foreshortened image of pragmatism, is not accidental, but rather follows from Rorty's position. In virtue of his skeptical refusal of the very possibility of a solution to the problem of knowledge, Rorty is committed to the idea that any effort to find the right way to approach epistemology is simply misplaced. If the correct counter when someone brings up knowledge is to change the subject, then it makes sense to turn away from a pragmatist like Peirce for whom epistemology is central, and toward other pragmatists for whom it has at most a less central or even a peripheral role. In suggesting that this is the case for James and Dewey, Rorty seems to mean that classical pragmatists do not subscribe to the idea that to know is to get it right about the world, or to represent the real correctly or even accurately.[76] Of course there are many types of knowledge which do not require us to get it right about the world, such as knowing how to play chess, or knowing how to choose among various possibilities for action, or even knowing how to deal with philosophical colleagues. The list is nearly endless. Rorty, however, sees the question in a nearly Marxist way as a fateful choice between theory and practice. In Rorty's opinion, epistemologists are concerned with theory but pragmatists are concerned with practice, ultimately with helping us cope. What Rorty misses is Marx's idea that theory can also be a kind of practice, which precisely helps us cope. Marx's position is arguably intended as a theoretical analysis of capitalism with the intent of helping us cope with the results of the Industrial Revolution which often threaten to engulf us within liberal democracy.

Rorty's accounts of pragmatism and of the history of philosophy are often very insightful but just as often simply ar-

bitrary. Rorty, who sees Dewey, a notoriously poor writer, as blurring distinctions, systematically does so himself. Rorty's peculiar, skeptical view of pragmatism is matched by his arbitrary effort—this is a malady which is extremely infectious, and has been caught by Brandom—to see pragmatism nearly everywhere.

Rorty clarifies his view in an important paper on "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," where he develops Quine's idea that pragmatism consists in giving up correspondence with reality.[77] Here he maintains, using James as his standard since he thinks Peirce does not go far enough, that Davidson's view that a theory of truth cannot compare sentences with objects[78] qualifies him as a pragmatist. He enlarges this claim in later writings to include Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell. In Rorty's opinion, the fact that, like Wittgenstein, Sellars thinks there is nothing to be gained in discussion of such terms as "sentience," "consciousness," or "qualia" qualifies both of them as pragmatists.[79]

The difficulty with this interpretation of "pragmatism" is not that it sets the bar too high; rather, it sets it too low in allowing nearly anyone, including idealists of whatever stripe, who are only pragmatists if a distinction between pragmatism and idealism cannot be drawn, to qualify for membership in the pragmatist circle. If this is the criterion, then literally anyone who declines correspondence would be a pragmatist. Surely this is too inclusive as a measure of what "pragmatism" means. Indeed, even Rorty sometimes balks at this overly inclusive view of his favorite doctrine, as when he curiously restricts it to Dewey and Davidson.[80]

In the same way as in his most expansive moments he sees pragmatism everywhere, Rorty detects no difference worth mentioning between idealism and pragmatism. His treatment of the relation between idealism and pragmatism exhibits his

familiar tendency to blur all distinctions by conjuring up a kind of conceptual alphabet soup in which, as he tells the story, everything resembles everything else since there are no longer any differences worth speaking of.

Already in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* where he makes the neopragmatic turn and cuts loose his previous analytic persona, he provides what looks like a questionable treatment of Kant, in effect an uncritical reading of the critical philosophy. In Rorty's narrative, the distinction between philosophy and science took hold in virtue of Kant's invention of epistemology.[81] Rorty's view of the critical philosophy is far too simplistic. He appears uncritically to accept Kant's self-congratulatory version of things, according to which philosophy worthy of the name only comes into existence (and reaches its end) with the critical philosophy.[82] He further overlooks the emergence of the distinction between philosophy and science in the seventeenth century, when leading scientists like Galileo and Newton became aware they no longer needed to depend on philosophy to buttress their claims to know. Despite what Rorty says, Kant did not transform philosophy into an epistemologically foundational discipline.[83] He rather provided another form of a strategy for knowledge that goes back in the tradition at least to Plato, and which is influentially restated in modern epistemological form by Descartes and others. Rorty's further suggestion that Kant is unconcerned with how to validate the transcendental conditions to which cognitive objects must conform is puzzling. For that is the central thrust of Kant's heroic, but unavailing efforts to deduce the categories.

Rorty is similarly cavalier in his treatment in a recent article of Dewey's relation to Hegel.[84] Dewey, who began as a kind of Hegelian, later moved away from Hegel in part because of his growing commitment to modern science, particularly Dar-

winian evolutionism. Rorty, who typically runs Dewey and Hegel together, simply obliterates any significant differences between their positions. In part, his failure to perceive differences between them as significant lies in his antisemantic view of historicism. His suggestion that historicism means that language fails to fit the way the world is[85] fails to distinguish between a rejection of correspondence, which has been common in the analytic debate since the later Wittgenstein but neutral with respect to history, and a further claim—unusual in philosophy, lacking in classical and analytic neopragmatism, but central to Hegel—that epistemological assertions are intrinsically historical. Rorty's suggestion further implies that pragmatists are epistemological historicists and vice versa.

This series of claims is arbitrary, difficult to defend, even wild. None of the pragmatists, either early or late, is a historicist, including Rorty himself. Historicism and pragmatism seem unrelated, even on Rorty's account. Putnam, for instance, is an ahistorical thinker who rejects correspondence, whereas Hegel is a historical thinker who rejects correspondence. Putnam is not an idealist, at least on his own account; and no one has yet given a convincing reason to think that Hegel is a pragmatist.

In line with his effort to blur distinctions, Rorty assiduously redraws the usual outlines of our views of Hegel and Dewey. According to Rorty, Hegel, like the other German idealists, restricts science to mere appearance. Dewey, a nonidealist historicist for whom Darwin offers merely another view, but not the truth about reality, agrees with James that the true is the expedient.[86] Yet this cannot be correct since none of the German idealists, not even Fichte, who knew little about science, deprecates it.[87] And Dewey thought that Darwin was about as close to getting it right as anyone. For this reason, he abandoned what he saw as a revival of absolutistic thinking in philosophy, or know-

ing distinct from science, for the kind of knowing that takes place within the sciences, and adopted an experimental logic for his own thinking.[88]

When Rorty gets around to Hegel, it becomes clear that he does not intend to have any serious dialogue with a thinker whom he credits with the idea that humanity just could not be wiped out by a comet.[89] Like many others, he features a right-wing reading of the German thinker. According to Rorty, Hegel recommends the power of the Incarnate Logos as opposed to biological evolution.[90] He locates the main difference between Hegel and Dewey in the fact that the former insists on an absolute, idealist, teleological view of history, for which the latter substitutes a relativist, materialist version of teleology.[91] Yet this reading only makes sense if Hegel in fact professes something like Rorty's view of the absolute more as "a historicized Spinoza than as a metaphysicized Herder."[92] But there is no evidence, and Rorty provides none, that this was Hegel's view. On the contrary, Hegel's famous claim that philosophy is its own time captured in thought suggests he is closer to the former than the latter—closer, in fact, to what Rorty recommends than he is aware—but in his commitment to a historicist form of epistemology, still very far from Dewey and other pragmatists, including Rorty.

Further Remarks

The disparities among these four analytic views of pragmatism are real and significant. Neurath, who argues that the very idea of a pure protocol sentence that directly records scientific experience is incoherent, clears the way for an approach to knowledge that does not rely on a one-to-one relation between empirical observations and the world. Quine is concerned, on that basis, with how we can reasonably be said to know. As an epistemo-

logical skeptic, Rorty is interested in knowing why we can reasonably be said not to know. And Putnam is occupied with what we know if and when we know.

Quine and Rorty have different attitudes toward the idea that knowledge depends on correspondence with reality. Quine is undismayed by the impossibility of showing that our conceptual scheme mirrors reality. He opts for a weaker, but still acceptable, claim in adopting a version of Pierre Duhem's scientific holism. Quine is opposed to analytic foundationalism as well as to reductionism and refuses other standards. He accepts a pragmatic measure, which he never explores and which is none too clear, as the only one that is meaningful for knowledge.

Although Rorty explores pragmatism, he is still committed to analytic foundationalism though disappointed that it fails, and sees no reasonable alternative that will yield knowledge. Rorty takes the need to apply such a standard as tantamount to skepticism. In criticizing empiricism, in particular Carnap's Vienna Circle view, Quine follows Neurath at a distance of several generations in seeing pragmatism as the responsible alternative to epistemological foundationalism. By implication, Rorty takes the failure of Vienna Circle reductionism, manifest in Neurath's and then Quine's successive critiques of Carnap, as suggesting that no claim to truth is, or can even potentially be, meaningful. That is part of the reason why he is attracted to Dewey and James, but not to Peirce, who clearly makes stronger truth claims than his pragmatist colleagues of the first generation. These are claims that Rorty, who, like Descartes and Kant, thinks there is no alternative between strong claims to know and skepticism, finds uncongenial.

Quine's holism presupposes that claims to know cannot be judged through an appeal to facts, which cannot be separated from perspectives. Davidson, in famously rejecting the very idea of a conceptual scheme, also rejects Quine's doctrine. Putnam's

newly adopted natural realism commits him to the view that the independent world is given as it is, even if he still wants to maintain that different interpretations of it are possible.[93] In more recent efforts to clarify his position, Rorty stresses the difference between two pragmatic views of truth, both of which are in James: the idea that truth is what is "expedient," hence a way of coping,[94] as distinguished from matching up to reality; and the further idea that truth is what happens when ideas fit into a further set of ideas.[95] Rorty recommends the former, but disclaims the latter, since he wants to deny there can be anything like a better way of coping. He seems to believe that all ways of coping are equally useful in helping us to make it through the day. Yet clearly there are better ways to cope, and ideas that fit in with those already on hand are preferable to those that, since they are at odds with the views we already have, require a wholesale rethinking of our other ideas, in rare cases even a paradigm shift.

How does analytic neopragmatism relate to pragmatism? The answer to this apparently simple question is very complicated. It depends on one's normative view of pragmatism as well as on the particular trajectory followed by recent analytic converts to it. Recent analytic neopragmatists have very different views of knowledge than classical pragmatists. Joseph Margolis insightfully suggests that classical pragmatists are committed to a natural approach to knowledge incompatible with analytic interest in naturalizing epistemology.[96] Naturalizing epistemology is related to physicalism and scientism, two doctrines incompatible with naturalism as classical pragmatists understand it. But there is no reason why the later evolution of the pragmatism need retain any particular classical pragmatist doctrine.

Other than the commitment to naturalizing epistemology, which Rorty, a skeptic, does not share, it is difficult to see what analytic neopragmatists have in common. Quine, as already

noted, approaches pragmatism through Duhem, a French physicist, philosopher, and historian of science. Duhem's conventionalist views are similar to those of Neurath and Quine, though their relation to pragmatism is not obvious. Rorty comes to pragmatism through the later Wittgenstein[97] and Sellars, whose views he reads as continuous with pragmatism, and less so through Heidegger or even Dewey, whom he ostensively champions. Putnam makes the turn to pragmatism through his interest in James. This does not mean his theories are more pragmatic than those of other thinkers, although, with the possible exception of Rorty, he is more interested in the actual texts of the classical pragmatists than Rorty, for example. Rorty reads Wittgenstein (and Sellars) as supporting the social view of verification that is an ingredient in his own turn to pragmatism. In turning to pragmatism, Putnam rejects a social verificationist reading of Wittgenstein.

Depending on what one thinks "pragmatism" means, the first generation of analytic neopragmatism might include Neurath, Quine, Davidson (whom Rorty proposes against Davidson's better judgment for membership in the analytic clan), Putnam (Rorty's candidate for the leading contemporary pragmatist), and Rorty himself, who is widely regarded as playing that role. If we abstract from Neurath, who is almost unclassifiable,[98] the first generation of analytic neopragmatists is composed of figures who, despite impeccable analytic credentials, hold dissenting views about the main line analytic concern with the problem of reference, hence about a solution along analytic lines to the problem of knowledge.[99] The complex relation of analytic neopragmatism to classical American pragmatism is further complicated by the recent emergence of analytic neo-Hegelianism in which, as in Rorty's writings, the distinction between pragmatism and Hegelianism is none too clear, indeed on occasion nonexistent.

Analytic Neo-Hegelianism

For analytic neopragmatists, the turn to pragmatism functions as an epistemological alternative to more standard analytic epistemological approaches, mainly rooted in semantics. A similar concern, a search for alternatives to traditional analytic doctrines, motivates analytic neopragmatists, as well as analytic thinkers unconcerned with pragmatism, who are now turning to Hegel.

As a result of the turn (or return) to Hegel, old barriers are clearly starting to break down. The consequences include inter alia an increased interest in Hegel, but also the persistence of the traditional analytic rejection of idealism, a broadening of the understanding of "pragmatism" and a certain insensitivity to the distinctions between pragmatism and Hegel. Analytic philosophy, which has long shunned Hegel, now seems to be receptive to at least some of his ideas, and hence, if Hegel is an idealist, cautiously returning to a form of idealism, although not under that name, which it left behind at the beginning of the analytic movement in England. In the process, the distinction between analytic philosophy, pragmatism, and Hegel, which has not often been clear, is being further muddied.

With the exception of Rorty, who at least mentions Dewey's relation to Hegel, none of the other first-generation analytic neopragmatists is more than incidentally concerned with Hegel or idealism in general. This changes in what is increasingly starting to look like the emergence of a second generation of analytic neopragmatists, thinkers who as a group are less concerned with idealism than with Hegel. This second generation tends to read Hegel in a distinctive way that leaves his idealism behind while simply conflating pragmatism and Hegelianism, which are read as overlapping, even identical.

The more recent analytic pragmatists are not interested in

giving up mainline analytic philosophy, whatever that now means, although they are increasingly unwilling to make any definite claims about its doctrinal commitments. Unlike, say, the early Wittgenstein, Carnap on Friedman's interpretation, or Dummett, they are uninterested in maintaining epistemological foundationalism.[100] Instead, they continue the interest in post-foundational theories of knowledge common to classical American pragmatism and the first-generation analytic neopragmatists, with the obvious exception of Rorty. But their approach to knowledge, unlike that of earlier analytic neopragmatists, is squarely situated in the conceptual axis of analytical philosophy of mind and language linking together the later Wittgenstein and Sellars. Hence, although they are interested in Hegel shorn of his idealism, they are at least as firmly linked as their analytic predecessors to whatever remains of analytic philosophical orthodoxy.

The evolution of the discussion in the hands of analytic thinkers turned neopragmatist has more recently broadened the understanding of "pragmatism" in a way that makes it questionable whether the term is still meaningful. In particular, Rorty innovates in applying the term to just about anyone whose theory he finds interesting. Brandom has extended the term, to the best of my knowledge for the first time, to apply even to Frege, someone who until now has always seemed to fall outside "pragmatism," however understood. As a result, as described in recent analytic writings Hegel sounds suspiciously like an analytic neopragmatist.

Moore's commonsensism relied on an appeal to direct, immediate knowledge, well known in British empiricism since Reid, to refute idealism. With exceptions, such as Putnam's recent return to natural realism, analytic philosophy has largely abandoned direct claims to know as part of its lengthy and multi-

faceted critique of empiricism started by the later Wittgenstein and continued by Neurath, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Rorty, and others.

Following this critique, there are two very different analytic schools of thought about justifying claims to know. One, despite the analytic critique of empiricism, is to make a surreptitious return to that doctrine under the guise of favoring what looks like ordinary or metaphysical realism. Davidson and Putnam have arguably lately been engaged in resurrecting a form of what they and other analytic thinkers had spent so many years banishing. A kind of empiricism is manifest in Davidson's return to the correspondence theory of truth, and in Putnam's revival of a form of direct realism. Both views depend on coming back in empirical touch, in Davidson's case indirectly through language, and in Putnam's case directly, with the mind-independent external world. Both fall back into what Rorty sees as a bad habit borrowed from Descartes.[101] The other option in the analytic discussion is increasingly to turn to Hegel.

The specifically Hegelian turn, which is still in its nascent stage, is mediated by several factors, including the effect of the later Wittgenstein on the subsequent debate, and increasing attention to Sellars, above all Sellars's transient interest in Hegel. The later Wittgenstein directs attention to a contextualist view of knowledge sometimes referred to as linguistic idealism.[102] Wittgenstein's indirect rehabilitation of idealism calls attention to its general resources, which he never explores but illustrates in his writings.

Wittgenstein's later turn to contextualism has been read both as social and as asocial. In analytic hands, these different readings lead to different, incompatible views of Hegel. A straight line runs from a social contextualist reading of Wittgenstein, as illustrated by Kripke,[103] through Sellars's transient flirtation with Hegel, to Brandom's still nascent but explicit turn

to Hegel. A different line leads from the later Wittgenstein to McDowell's refutation of this social contextualist reading of Wittgenstein and his own distinctive appropriation of Hegelian themes.

Building on the later Wittgenstein, Sellars clearly signals in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* his receptivity to Hegel in what he describes as *Méditations hégéliennes*.[104] His interest in Hegel is evident in his frontal attack on classical empiricism, which he calls the myth of the given. Sellars's attack on this myth borrows Hegelian arguments in building on Hegel's famous critique of so-called sense certainty at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel's target is any claim for immediate knowledge that presupposes an epistemological given, in English empiricists such as Bacon and Locke, and in different, more sophisticated fashion in Kant's critical philosophy.[105] If the immediate given cannot be known, as Hegel contends, then empiricism as it has been understood in the English tradition and perhaps even in Kant, if Kant subscribes to a successor form of English empiricism, is indefensible. In restating Hegel's argument in an analytical idiom, Sellars rejects the idea of direct givenness, in Hegelian terms immediacy, as no more than a myth, in favor of the justification of claims to know within the so-called logical space of reasons.[106] Although the critique of traditional empiricism is closely Hegelian, numerous other features in Sellars's theories, such as the scientism resulting from his appeal to the so-called space of reasons, are non-Hegelian, even anti-Hegelian.

In *On Certainty* and other texts, the later Wittgenstein undermined traditional English empiricism in the course of a direct attack on Moore's commonsensism. In developing lines of argument opened by the later Wittgenstein and appropriating Hegelian themes, Sellars deepens this attack by extending it to the very idea of empiricism. In this way, Sellars opens the way for

analytic philosophy to make a limited turn (or return), if not to idealism, at least to Hegel. The nascent analytic turn to Hegel now under way concerns less Hegelian scholarship, which has always interested analytic thinkers, than the appropriation of Hegelian themes and arguments for analytic purposes.

Sellars, who taught for many years at the University of Pittsburgh, was interested in Kant, then became interested in Hegel for a short time before returning to Kant. His interest in Hegel is currently being developed under analytic auspices by two Pittsburgh colleagues, Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Brandom and McDowell differ about as much as any two figures can differ and still qualify as members of the same general philosophical tendency—for instance on how, after Sellars and Wittgenstein, to justify claims to know.[107]

Brandom and McDowell both see Wittgenstein and Sellars as centrally important thinkers. They read Wittgenstein and Sellars differently in proposing two very different epistemological strategies. Likewise, Brandom and McDowell accept Sellars's view of linguistic nominalism, which asserts that all awareness of whatever kind is linguistic,[108] while drawing very different inferences. Rorty puts the point usefully in remarking that Brandom is committed to developing the linguistic turn, but McDowell is committed to experience.[109] Another way to read this remark is to say that Brandom is closer to Rorty than McDowell; but the latter, who is very critical of Rorty, is arguably closer to Hegel, whose position, as repeatedly noted, turns on experience.

In order to assess the strength and weaknesses of the nascent analytic turn (or return) to Hegel, it will be useful to discuss some examples in detail. Brandom and McDowell, who approach Hegel very differently, each appropriate selected Hegelian ideas to further different analytic agendas. Both consider Hegel as outside the analytic fold, but as offering important resources to further analytic projects. Working independently,

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer has suggested that Hegel is more than simply useful for analytic philosophy while located outside it. For Stekeler-Weithofer, Hegel is in fact an analytic thinker.

Brandom, McDowell, and Stekeler-Weithofer all approach Hegel from an epistemological angle of vision. In examining these three specimen analytic readings of Hegel's position, my overall aim is to bring out significant differences between Hegel's position and the analytic framework that they presuppose. I will not be claiming to possess the correct Hegel reading, while reserving the right to object that a proposed reading is incorrect. I will be sharply critical of Brandom, whose interpretation I will consider in detail, since I believe it is generally incorrect and one can profit from identifying its errors. I will be less critical of McDowell, whose more cautious, but so far less developed account of Hegel is potentially more interesting than his colleague's. I will finally argue that Stekeler-Weithofer simply misreads Hegel's distinctive view of logic.

Brandom's Pragmatic Hegelian Inferentialism

Among current analytic philosophers, Brandom has most closely identified his position with those of both pragmatism and Hegel. Hence, his reading of Hegel requires the most careful scrutiny. Brandom's pragmatic Hegelianism is increasingly intertwined with, even inseparable from, his interest in what he calls inferentialism.[110] Since he thinks, or seems to think, unlike any other current analytic figure, that his inferentialism is both pragmatic and Hegelian, his position stands or falls by his use (or abuse) of Hegel.

Since Brandom identifies inferentialism with his pragmatism and Hegelianism, in order to discuss his Hegelianism, we will need to discuss his conceptions of pragmatism and of inferentialism. This is far from easy to do, since Brandom is a diffi-

cult writer. Although he mainly employs simple language, his writing style is more than usually convoluted, even by elastic philosophical standards, and often difficult to follow. He typically circles around a point more than once, multiplying technical vocabulary. Brandom is strongly, even decisively influenced by Sellars. He tends to work from "within" Sellars's position on the apparent assumption that it is familiar to his readers, that it does not require more than the most minimal interpretation, and that it has definitively settled a number of important questions. A crucial instance is the status of empiricism, which Brandom does not address.

In describing Brandom's position, or at least enough of it to understand his approach to Hegel, we can begin with inferentialism, Brandom's name for his distinctive doctrine. As the name suggests, inferentialism features inference of all kinds and for various purposes. As concerns knowledge, inferentialism is a second-best, potentially fallible approach, which is to be used if and only if we cannot do better. Doing better would mean going beyond (the need for) inference, which would then become superfluous, unneeded, in any case unnecessary for cognitive purposes. Many thinkers make cognitive that which appear to preclude the need to resort inference. Descartes clearly means to go beyond inference in his foundationalist epistemological strategy. He is not claiming that we can infer that true and distinct ideas are true but rather that (through deduction from a true principle, or the cogito) we can know that they are (in fact) true.

Brandom is mainly interested in an inferential, nonreferential approach to semantics with an explicitly epistemological intent. In a recent book, he develops this idea through a series of alternatives, initially by privileging inference over reference in the order of semantic explanation.[111] Thus he rejects a so-called Platonic strategy, or a prior understanding of conceptual content, for a so-called pragmatist (or functionalist) strategy in which

"the use of linguistic expressions, or the functional role of intentional states, confers conceptual content on them."[112] What this means can be understood in terms of the familiar distinction between knowing how and knowing that. According to Brandom, the implicit content of language with respect to stating, asking for, and providing beliefs, or knowing how, can be rendered explicit in the form of knowing that.

Brandom links his inferentialism to a series of figures, such as Frege, Wittgenstein, and Sellars, and to various movements, such as analytic semantics and pragmatism, between which he typically sees similarities where other observers more often see differences. Since for Brandom, cognitive claims appeal to, hence rely on, semantic inference, in his view pragmatism is a form of semantics and semantics is firmly linked to epistemological concerns.

Brandom's exposition of semantics runs from Sellars, his acknowledged hero, back to Frege, whom he criticizes. He takes issue with the mature Frege for holding that truth is based on inference and not vice versa. The difficulty does not seem to lie in Frege's epistemological appeal to semantics, since Brandom also makes this move. It seems rather to lie in Frege's appeal to one type of semantics, formal semantics, as opposed to the informal, inferentialist semantics Brandom favors. According to Brandom, the inversion of the relation of truth and inference points to the priority of the propositional, or of claiming. "And what can play the role of premise and conclusion of inference is a saying in the sense of a *claiming*."[113]

Brandom links his account of concepts to rationalism, which he understands as asking for and giving reasons within an inferential context, and to so-called expressivism. It is unfortunate, since he relies heavily on expressivism, that he never satisfactorily clarifies his understanding of this concept. One source may be Charles Taylor's reading of Hegel.[114] According to Tay-

lor, who follows Isaiah Berlin, Herder reacts against the anthropology of the Enlightenment in developing an alternative anthropology based on categories of expression. This leads to a view of human activity and human life as expressions.[115] Brandom seems to rely on this view in his conception of expressivism as an alternative to rationalism.

Sellars claims in Kantian fashion that rules, or reasons, are causes. Brandom, who is less interested in why or how we act as we do, is more interested in cognitive claims with respect to thought and action. From Sellars, he takes over the idea that "grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word,"[116] which he glosses as "making *explicit* in a form that can be thought or said what is *implicit* in what is done."[117] His main concern seems to lie in the standard epistemological goal of making true claims about what is as it is, that is, about the mind-independent real world. This intention becomes clearer, if not clear, in his reliance on expressivism as an alternative to representationalism.

The term "representationalism" is usually employed to indicate the cognitive relation of something, called a representation, to something else, for instance in Plato's denial that art, literature, or poetry captures, or adequately captures, depicts, or otherwise correctly represents the forms. In his famous letter to Marcus Herz (21 February 1772), Kant describes what later became the critical philosophy as the analysis of the relation of representations to (mind-independent external) objects.[118] Brandom similarly regards representationalism as a way of thinking about empirical knowledge in which representations are caused by what is represented, leading on to philosophy of language, including views of reference, denotation, and extension.

Inferentialism and expressivism appear to be synonymous for Brandom. Inferentialism is expressivist since it elicits commitments, and expressivism is inferentialist since it gives up representationalism in favor of making things clear through infer-

ence. Brandom applies his inferentialist view in a number of ways, for instance as concerns logic. He gives up the traditional view of logic as proving claims in favor of an expressivist view of logic as helping us, through a logical vocabulary, to make explicit implicit inferential commitments. As Brandom reads logic, it must abandon its role as an independent source of knowledge and subordinate itself to the appropriate scrutiny of inferential relations.

Expressivism is further important to Brandom's reading of Hegel. According to Brandom, Hegel takes a pragmatic approach to conceptual norms by adopting a rationalist form of Enlightenment expressivism, which Brandom sees as a potentially very promising alternative to representationalism. In Brandom's lexicon, rationalist pragmatism and rationalist expressivism are equivalent terms.[119] Brandom very clearly attributes this idea to Hegel. "[R]ationalist expressivism understands the *explicit*—the thinkable, the sayable, the form something must be in to count as having been expressed—in terms of its role in *inference*. I take Hegel to have introduced this idea, although he takes the minimal unit of conceptual content to be the whole holistic system of inferentially interrelated judgeables, and so is not a propositionalist."[120] It follows that, for Brandom, Hegel pioneers rationalist pragmatism and expressivism, or rationalist pragmatism and rationalist expressivism, as opposed to expressivism or pragmatism.

The epistemological payoff of Brandom's materialist semantics is visible in his critical remarks about naturalism. According to Brandom, naturalism as ordinarily understood denies the characteristic human appeal to conceptual norms developed in social linguistic practices. He may have in mind the conception of naturalized epistemology as it has developed in Quine's wake. In "Epistemology Naturalized," as part of his critique of positivism, Quine proposes that epistemology is no more than a branch

of psychology.[121] In this way, Quine closes up the Kantian distinction, stressed in Frege and Husserl, between the logical and the psychological that is the basis of the familiar epistemological antipsychologism.

Brandom avoids this issue entirely as well as what Quine makes of it. It is unclear that naturalizing epistemology in any way precludes, to use Brandom's language, the characteristic human appeal to conceptual norms in social linguistic practices. There is no good reason why a naturalized approach to epistemology prevents or even impedes conceptual norms as arising in the social context. Brandom, who does not address this question, simply takes a nonnaturalist approach by claiming that inferentialism-cum-expressivism features a distinction between things that have natures and those that have histories.

Brandom's claim looks suspiciously like essentialism, which goes all the way back in the Western tradition at least to Aristotle. Brandom does not clarify the relation of his view of natures to essences, but he proposes an argument including two claims. His first claim is that the objects of science (physics, chemistry, biology) have natures that cannot be reduced to their histories. Brandom seems to mean that objects with natures can be studied empirically or through empirical experience. This is very different from, say, an Aristotelian noetic claim to intuit essences, Brandom perhaps also has in mind the familiar distinction, developed by Wilhelm Dilthey, between the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Geisteswissenschaften*.

His second claim is that the empirical properties of things allow us to determine whether inferences based on them about concepts are correct. It is important here, in order to grasp just what Brandom is suggesting, to focus on the distinction between a claim that might be correct according to the prevailing standards of a given cognitive discipline, and a claim that is not merely correct but also true. As usually understood, a true claim

grasps what really is as it is, as opposed to what merely seems to be the case. Brandom, who uses the term "correct," seems to be making a version of the latter, stronger claim about what is, and hence about truth. "For the properties governing the application of those concepts [e.g. physical things such as electrons and aromatic compounds] depend on what inferences involving them are *correct*, that is, on what *really* follows from what. And that depends on how things really are with electrons and aromatic compounds, not just on what judgments and inferences we endorse."[122] He is not, it would seem, suggesting that cognitive assertions are indexed to conceptual frameworks that might later require adjustment. He is rather, it appears, making a suggestion about what is the case. By using the phrase "how things really are," he signals the capacity to go beyond mere inference to ascertain how things in fact stand.

Brandom's "pragmatism"

Brandom's suggestions that his inferentialism is pragmatist as well as Hegelian may strike some readers as arbitrary. After all, it is not every day that someone who traces his position to Sellars and Frege also insists on its relation to pragmatism and to Hegel. Since these thinkers are so different, observers might want to emphasize the differences between such thinkers, or at least the differences between pragmatism and Hegel. Brandom's claims are based on his unusual, pragmatic readings of the positions of Hegel, Frege, and Sellars.

Brandom's argument rests in part on the interpretation of pragmatism as semantic, which is apparently the result of a deduction. The argument can be reconstructed as follows: since cognitive claims appeal to, hence rely on, semantic inference, if pragmatism makes cognitive claims, then it relies, or at least ought to rely, on semantics for claims to know. This argument

implies that all cognition of whatever kind is finally inferential, where inference is a form of semantics. Yet even if that were correct, it would not demonstrate that all forms of semantics, or even those forms associated with Frege and Sellars, are pragmatist.

One thing Brandom gets right about pragmatism is its often neglected epistemological thrust. Yet he has almost nothing to say, except in the most general terms, about the classical pragmatists. In identifying his position as pragmatist, he seems to have in mind specifically cognitive forms of inferential practice as opposed to theory. This is rather like concentrating on arguments as distinguished from the theory of argumentation. But that is simply not enough to justify the claim for pragmatism, since, beginning with Socrates, it is difficult to think of anyone willing to engage in dialogue who refuses asking for reasons. All the action is about whether the reasons offered are worth taking seriously, that is, whether they can withstand examination. In any case, Brandom's commitment to a nontraditional, Sellarsian approach to the analysis of meanings seems to have nothing particular in common with, say, classical American pragmatism. It does not have much more in common with such analytic neopragmatists as Putnam, Rorty, and Quine. Since Brandom finally says so little specifically about pragmatism, and since what he does say is not clearly related to it, one may doubt whether the term "pragmatism" ought to figure in Brandom's vocabulary.

Brandom's Quinean "Hegelianism"

Brandom's unfamiliar form of pragmatism is relevant to his equally unfamiliar Hegel. He straightforwardly claims to be a Hegelian, and teases the reader with repeated references to a forthcoming Hegel book. Yet the little he says about Hegel only arouses suspicion,[123] and his more recent book, which includes

two earlier texts on Hegel, does nothing to dispel this suspicion.[124]

Brandom exhibits a distinctive, original approach to Hegel. He always, or almost always, reads Hegel through the positions of leading analytic figures, in practice mainly Quine and Sellars (but also Gilbert Harman and others), and never, or almost never, reads Hegel directly. Put another way, he develops his reading of Hegel on the basis of standard analytic doctrines he claims to find in Hegel, not through a direct reading of Hegel's texts in terms of Hegel's own concerns, problems, readings of and reactions to other positions, and so on. In Brandom's approach, Hegel appears as a very early analytic philosopher, as someone who about a couple of hundred years ago, well before Frege, presciently anticipated a number of ideas that would later become central to the analytic debate.

For present purposes, we can divide Brandom's nascent Hegelianism into two phases: an earlier, Quinean phase in *Making It Explicit* and in a series of articles leading up to *Articulating Reasons;* and a more recent, Sellarsian phase in the latter book. These phases are connected by Brandom's conviction that Hegel inverts the traditional approach to semantic explanation by means of a conception of experience as inferential in which concepts, like Wittgenstein's view of meanings, emerge from the roles they play. In other words, Brandom begins from the apparently unexamined assumption that Hegel's position is an inferentialist form of semantics, hence an ancestor of his own inferentialism. In the earlier, less developed, more tentative Quinean phase of his Hegelianism, Brandom approaches Hegel through a series of concepts and problems, especially epistemological holism, that he finds in Quine. In the later, slightly more developed, less tentative Sellarsian phase of his Hegelianism, he approaches Hegel through concepts and problems he finds in Sellars. In both cases, he silently assumes that the concerns of

leading analytic philosophers transpose effortlessly into Hegel's position.

It is hardly surprising, since doctrinal unity within analytic philosophy has by now decreased to the vanishing point, that Quine and Sellars hold very different, in part opposing positions. Thus Quine is identified with holism which is not favored by Sellars, and Sellars with scientism which is not endorsed by Quine. Sellars simply dismisses so-called folk views as epistemologically unreliable,[125] whereas Quine sees science as continuous with, but not as a replacement for, nonscience.[126] Sellars is committed to semantics, whereas Quine is an important critic of analytic theories of reference.[127]

In light of these and other differences between Quine and Sellars, it is not surprising that Brandom presents different readings of Hegel in his successive phases. In his Quinean phase, Brandom reads Hegel through holism. In his Sellarsian phase, which partially overlaps with its predecessor phase, he reads Hegel through analytic philosophy of language. A holist approach to Hegel is initially plausible in that, at least since the early Lukács, attention has been focused on the Hegelian category of totality.[128] Yet Hegel, Quine, and analytic thinkers apart from Quine understand holism so differently that the analogy seems strained, uninformative, even forced.[129] One can detect a nascent philosophy of language in Hegel, although the differences between Hegel's antisemantics, including his refusal of definite reference, and analytic semantics, which is predicated on the idea of definite reference, seem more important than the similarities.

In *Making It Explicit*, the most important allusion to Hegel, later developed in a series of papers, is the very odd suggestion that he anticipates Quine's holism.[130] Other than by Brandom, there has been practically no attention to a possible link between Hegel and Quine, and, to the best of my knowledge, none

at all to their supposed common allegiance to epistemological holism.[131] In a chronological sense Hegelian holism obviously precedes Quinean holism. Yet Brandom seems not to be aware that Hegel did not invent or discover holism, which goes back at least to ancient Greece (e.g. Speusippus). Is it meaningful to say that Speusippus anticipates Quine's holism? What does Brandom have in mind? There are different types of holism. Quine, as noted above, relies on his reading of Duhem's scientific holism. Brandom might mean that Hegel anticipates Quine's specific form of holism. Yet this way of reading the relation is implausible, since Hegel's and Quine's forms of holism are incompatible.

In Brandom's interpretation, Quine's holism relativizes meaning to a "total theory," more precisely a theory for which the unity of meaning is the whole.[132] According to Quine, a theory stands or falls as a whole, not, say, as Popper claims, in piecemeal fashion.[133] It is well known that for Hegel the truth is the whole. This seems to be mean that a theory is only true when concept and object fully coincide, thus bringing the cognitive process to an end. Quine, who takes a behaviorist view, is not interested in anything remotely like Hegel's conception of the dialectical evolution of the relation of theory and cognitive object within consciousness. It is further implausible to equate Quine's essentially asocial and ahistorical view of the change of meaning and belief with Hegel's very different view of the constitution of knowledge and ethics for real human individuals within the social and historical context. Or to put the same point in another way, Quine focuses on the epistemic conditions of knowledge in general, in virtue of the so-called underdetermination of theories, without regard to the underlying social context; but Hegel focuses on their constitution in relation to the conceptual, social, and historical context. Hegel, who never distinguishes cleanly between theory and context, understands

theories as indexed to the historical moment, hence as relative to time and place, in a word as intrinsically historical. Quine takes a behaviorist but not a historical approach to knowledge. There is not the slightest hint in Quine that he understands cognition as historical, or on a historicist model, or again as relative to the changing historical background.

If Brandom is interested in the genesis of Quine's position, then the reference to Hegel and not, say, to Carnap is puzzling. Quine's interest in Carnap and his austere version of holism seem to be decisively influenced by Carnap. In his *Aufbau* phase, Carnap replaced his earlier phenomenalistic perspective with a physicalistic one that concentrates on facts (*Tatsachen*) as opposed to propositions (*Sätze*). This results in a view of science as a system of propositions, based on experience, which can be verified not in terms of the individual proposition, but rather through protocol sentences concerning the entire system,[134] which closely anticipates later Quinean holism.

Brandom's view of Hegel later evolved. In a more recent article on pragmatist themes in Hegelian idealism,[135] he no longer emphasizes Hegel's supposed anticipation of Quine. Here he argues, in more detail than before, for an explicit parallel between Hegel and Quine. According to Brandom, Quine works out his pragmatist view, which Brandom depicts as the adjustment of meaning and belief within experience, in the same way that Hegel works out his idealist view.[136] Brandom's claim here depends on a new distinction between pragmatic and idealist theses not earlier in evidence. This suggests that pragmatism and idealism are not the same, but different, and that Brandom has introduced the distinction in order to call attention to the difference or differences. The suggestion is helpful since pragmatism is not idealism and idealism is not pragmatism on standard interpretations. It would be an important error to conflate them.

The utility of the claim obviously depends on how the distinction between pragmatism and idealism is drawn. Brandom calls attention to a distinction between what he calls the pragmatist thesis ("the use of concepts determines their content") and what he calls the idealist thesis ("the structure and unity of the *concept* is the same as the structure and unity of the *self*")[137] to make two points: Hegel's idealist thesis is his way of making the so-called pragmatist thesis work, and this is useful for contemporary semantics.

It appears that, after calling attention to a distinction between pragmatism and idealism, Brandom is now taking it back. If one reads Hegel as making a pragmatist thesis work, then it follows that Hegel is in a sense a pragmatist and the differences between idealism and pragmatism become harder, perhaps no longer possible, to discern.

One difficulty is the difference between idealism and pragmatism. Like Brandom on occasion, I would like to maintain the distinction. Hegel is an idealist; it remains unclear that he is also a pragmatist. Another difficulty is the very conception of pragmatism. We recall the later Wittgenstein's familiar claim that meaning is determined by use. In suggesting that for pragmatism the use of concepts determines their content, Brandom seems to be working with a Wittgensteinian model. Yet it is not clear that this model picks out anything central to pragmatism. Peirce, for instance, who also defends a version of the view that meaning is determined by use, consistently maintains that the meaning of any idea is its expected empirical consequences.[138] The difference is important, since Peirce is concerned with whether an idea is meaningful in terms of its future utility, but Brandom is concerned with whether concepts can be successfully used to pick out or otherwise to designate objects. To put the same point differently, according to Peirce, for whom reality is a merely operational concept, the scientific method as-

sumes, but does not demonstrate, that there are real independent things, whose properties do not depend on what we think about them. He explicitly refuses metaphysical realism.[139] Brandom, however, embraces it, claiming that—to paraphrase his view—concepts are not only determined by use, but made true or false by objects to which they refer. I will return to this point below.

There are a number of further difficulties about the supposed parallel between Hegel and Quine. Since Hegel precedes rather than succeeds the rise of pragmatism, however understood, Brandom appears here to be reading the history of philosophy backwards. I confess I cannot make any sense of the so-called idealist thesis, which apparently suggests some unspecified (structural?) similarity between concepts and selves. It is obvious that, at a sufficiently abstract level, anything resembles anything else. If there are concepts in Brandom's sense of the word, then it is reasonable to believe that selves have them; but it is self-evident that a self, which presumably has concepts and of which one may have a concept, is not itself, and cannot be reduced to, a concept.

Hegel, who rejects a representationalist approach to knowledge, introduces the term "concept" to designate his view of the cognitive relation between the theory of the cognitive object and the object as given within consciousness. Brandom's understanding of "concept" remains unclear. He gives us no reason to believe that either he or Quine understands concepts in a way even remotely similar to Hegel's technical understanding of the same term.

Finally, the term "idealist" thesis requires a comment. There is not now and never has been a single, univocal understanding of "idealism." There is more than one kind of idealism, hence different idealist theses. But since there is no idealism in general, and it is at least arguable that there is nothing, perhaps not even a family resemblance, which all forms of idealism share, there is

no single idealist thesis. There is a specifically idealist epistemological thesis, which emerges, on the basis of Kant's Copernican revolution, in Kant's constructivism, and which Hegel further develops. Hegel refers to his own version of this thesis in passages scattered throughout his writings, for instance in his dark claim in the *Phenomenology* that "Reason is the certainty of being all *reality*."[140] The danger in referring, as Brandom does, to the alleged idealist thesis as a supposed relation between concepts and selves, a thesis Hegel arguably does not hold, is that one might overlook the deeper, crucially important idealist thesis he does in fact hold, and which is the basis of his approach to knowledge.

Brandom's Sellarsian "Hegelianism"

Brandom's comparison between Hegelian idealism and Quinean pragmatism presupposes a shared commitment to holism, but a distinction between idealism and pragmatism. I contest the similarity between Hegel and Quine, but I find the distinction between pragmatism and idealism helpful. They are not the same and need to be distinguished. In different ways, the classical American pragmatists all react for or against Hegel and other forms of idealism. Whatever idealism is, it is not identical with pragmatism.

   This useful distinction (between idealism and pragmatism) simply disappears in *Articulating Reasons,* where Brandom takes a Sellarsian approach by directly linking his own position to Hegel's. The reason for the transition from a Quinean to a Sellarsian approach to Hegel is mysterious. One point is that Quine's epistemological form of holism simply forbids the identification of individual objects which Brandom pursues in his Sellarsian phase. Yet there is no indication that Brandom has meanwhile become critical of Quine, hence critical of his own

earlier Quinean way of interpreting Hegel. Brandom's Hegel interpretation combines a series of complex claims about the relation of analytic and continental philosophy, Brandom's relation to Sellars, Sellars's relation to Kant, and Brandom's relation to Hegel. As is so often the case for Rorty, each of Brandom's claims depends on blurring a series of useful distinctions.

The case for the significance of Brandom's recent Sellarsian reading of Hegel is made through two specific claims by Rorty. First, through their "proto"-Hegelianism—the text says "prope"-Hegelianism but this looks like a misprint[141]—Sellars and Brandom overcome the split between analytic and continental philosophy.[142] Peirce, who wanted to distinguish between his view of the doctrine he invented and uses others made of it, later stressed his reliance on a so-called purified philosophy for which, as he puts it in another context, "ontological metaphysics is . . . meaningless gibberish."[143] This doctrine seems very distant from, in fact the opposite of, Brandom's view of pragmatism. He seems committed, as Peirce is not, to getting it right about what is as it is. Peirce also recommends in the same context accepting instinctive beliefs and scholastic realism. As a follower of Sellars, Brandom presumably must decline instinctive beliefs or folk psychology in favor of what science tells us. There is no indication of what he thinks about scholastic realism.

Second, Brandom provides a Hegelian extension of Sellars's Kantian approach to thought and action.[144] In Rorty's version of the story, Brandom's Hegelianism depends on characterizing Sellars as a Kantian. Is Sellars a Kantian? It seems more precise to say that at different points in his career and for different reasons Sellars was both a Kantian and a Hegelian, perhaps other things as well. It is inexact to say he was only a Kantian, since he has his Hegelian moments, although he was arguably more Kantian than anything else. Yet it is only if Hegel improves on Kant, and if Sellars is a Kantian, and if Brandom can legiti-

mately be called a Hegelian that his particular form of Hegelianism improves on Sellars's form of Kantianism.

There is more than one way to understand Hegel's and Brandom's relation to Kant. Like many Kantians, one might hold that Hegel does not improve on Kant. Or one might hold that Hegel improves on Kant but Brandom is not a Hegelian. Or again one might hold that Hegel improves on Kant and Brandom is a Hegelian, but his version of Hegelianism does not improve on Sellars's form of Kantianism.

In *Articulating Reasons,* Brandom refers appreciatively to Rorty's view of Brandom's role. Following Rorty's suggestion, he identifies with the task of leading analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage in part through a distinction he attributes to Hegel between nature and culture, Hegel's supposed pragmatism about conceptual norms, and an alleged Hegelian link between logic and self-consciousness.[145] Each of these attributions is doubtful.

Brandom's curious attribution of his own distinction between nature and culture to Hegel echoes Rorty's reading of Sellars. The latter famously distinguishes between what he calls folk views, which are unsubstantiated and cannot count as knowledge, and science, which is supposedly our only reliable cognitive source. Rorty applies Sellar's distinction, contending that philosophy defends the further distinction between science and nonscience, or culture.[146] According to this model, which obviously conflicts with Rorty's skepticism, philosophy distinguishes between cognitive disciplines, the only acceptable source of truth and knowledge, and folk disciplines, which fall below acceptable cognitive standards.

The epistemological import of this invidious distinction is clear. On the Rorty-Sellars view, the philosopher functions like a sports coach choosing a second team and a first team: he must choose between those apt only for folk views, which are incor-

rigibly subjective and depend on local conditions; and those apt for scientific knowledge, the objective form of cognition, which is independent of local conditions, and who win all the conceptual games.

Brandom's reading of Hegel conflates two basic distinctions: the relation between nature and science, and the idea of science as a cognitive enterprise. In simplest terms, Hegel, who systematically relativizes all distinctions, also relativizes the distinction between nature and science, but privileges scientific philosophy, or philosophy as rigorous, over even the most rigorous form of natural science as a cognitive source. Hegel does not, in fact cannot, distinguish sharply between nature and culture. He further detects a reciprocal relation between nature and culture. Culture is situated within nature, which is itself a cultural phenomenon, since what we mean by nature is not a constant, but rather a historical variable.

Hegel's preference for philosophy as the highest form of cognition is incompatible with the scientism endemic in analytic philosophy. An example is Carnap's famous view that henceforth science will be the sole source of knowledge.[147] According to Hegel, the natural sciences comprise a collection of cognitive disciplines that, since they lack a metaphysical or reflexive dimension, fall below the level of philosophical science. This is an important part of his critique of Newton's professed antimetaphysical empiricism.[148] Hegel's preference for philosophy as the highest form of cognition conflicts with Sellars's preference for natural science as the main and indeed final source of claims to know. In a word, a Sellarsian commitment to scientism conflicts with the specifically Hegelian commitment to philosophical science.

It is doubtful that Hegel is a pragmatist about conceptual norms in anything like Brandom's sense. To argue the claim, Brandom points to John Haugeland's suggestion about Hei-

degger that transcendental constitution is social institution.[149] Brandom, who evidently likes this idea, cites it again in a later book.[150] Yet this insight, which is not obviously correct about Heidegger, seems definitely incorrect when applied to Hegel. Hegel, who relies on social institutions, is not a transcendental thinker in Kant's sense, and perhaps not in any sense. Indeed. Hegel's critique of Kant prevents him from substituting any meaningful form of transcendental philosophy for the critical philosophy. It is unclear what "transcendental constitution" could mean with respect to Hegel. He does not use "constitution" in, say, a Husserlian manner. In the very rare instances where he uses this term, it invariably refers to "constitution" in the more familiar legal sense, which is unrelated to Husserlian usage. It is further difficult to know what "transcendental pragmatism," which is sometimes used to refer to Heidegger, means with respect to Hegel.[151] And unless refusing a transcendental approach equals a commitment to pragmatism, it is unclear why Hegel should be described as a pragmatist at all. Hegel's view that conceptual norms depend on the society in which they emerge is not specifically pragmatist. It sounds more like common sense, which even nonpragmatists exhibit.

Brandom on Hegelian Holism

In a more recent book, *Tales of the Mighty Dead,* Brandom reprints an earlier article on Hegel and offers a new analysis of Hegel's holism. These essays are accompanied by a commentary discussing what Brandom intends to do and what he thinks he has accomplished in these texts. Brandom tells us he is trying to think about the holism which goes with a functional approach to intentionality,[152] and describes Kant's way of thinking about intentionality and conceptual content, which he does not clearly characterize, as important for Hegel.[153] He considers

the relation of intentional content, which for him means the way the world is and the way we take it to be, as it relates to the self. Hegel's innovation lies in placing all this within a process extending through history, which Brandom links with pragmatism: "For Hegel places the sort of inferential/causal *process* central to that functionalism in the larger frame of *historically* extended *social practice.* Transposed into this key, functionalism takes the form of *pragmatism*—'pragmatism' in the sense of a particular kind of *use* theory of *meaning* and *content.*" [154]

This statement is not innocuous, but fraught with important consequences. In formulating his view of pragmatism in this way, Brandom implicitly makes three points. First, pragmatism is concerned with the problem of meaning, hence with reference (and semantics). The implication is clear that pragmatism is seamlessly related to the mainline analytic concern with theory of reference. There is no difference, or no significant difference, between them, at least none that prohibits someone committed to the analytic theme of reference from taking over insights borrowed or adapted from pragmatism. Yet while it is true that some pragmatists, such as Peirce, are indeed concerned with meaning, their concern seems very different from the analytic theory of reference. For Peirce, meaning concerns the expected practical consequences, not truth, whereas after Frege the problem of reference is generally understood to rely on the sense of an expression. Second, the proper approach to reference lies in a theory of meaning in use. This suggests that we can look to Hegel to supply such an approach, if not with the formal sophistication of later analytic thinkers, at least in outline. In this respect, Hegel is cast as a forerunner of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning in use. Third, Hegel is cast on this reading as another party in the effort to work out a causal theory of perception. I take this to mean that Hegel is a conceptual realist in the metaphysical realist mode. The general line of a causal theory can be paraphrased

as the view that there is a way in which the mind-independent world is as it is, and that that world causally affects us in causing us to perceive it in certain ways. Knowledge is the result of a backward inference from effect to cause. In Hegel's case the inference is complicated since knowledge turns out to be a process. Important here is the idea that Hegel relies on the way the world is, not, say, on what is given in experience, and that the relation of subject to object is mediated by a series of inferences from the subject side in response to causal influences on it from the object side. If Brandom were correct, then Hegel would resemble one side of Kant, that side that depends on the idea that we can only defeat the skeptic because there really is a causal connection in experience.[155]

In his new essay, "Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," Brandom takes up what he calls Hegel's conceptual idealism with the intention of providing an account of the transition from "Consciousness" to "Self-consciousness" in the *Phenomenology*. He claims that Hegel bases his view of inferential relations on material exclusion or incompatibility. "For Hegel, to be *conceptually* articulated is just to stand in material relations of incompatibility and (so) consequence."[156] Brandom goes on to assert that Hegel is committed to strong individuational holism, that is, to the idea that relations of material incompatibility are not only necessary but also sufficient to define content. On this basis, he attributes to Hegel the so-called principal thesis of objective idealism, namely, that we can understand an objective world only with respect to subjective error in claims about it. This leads to three further claims with respect to the reciprocal sense dependence of singular term and object, of asserting and fact, and of necessity (and law) and counterfactually robust inference. According to Brandom, holism is also a reciprocal sense dependence claim. He seems to have in mind how it is that "a *subjective process* can make intelligible *objective*

holistic relational structures."[157] Brandom puts the point in different language by arguing that "understanding the *objective* world as *determinate* for Hegel entails that it must be understood as a *holistic relational structure*. . . ."[158]

I have given this summary from Brandom's commentary, since, although typically complex, it is still simpler than the essay itself. The essay presupposes an account of what Hegel is doing in the *Phenomenology* with respect to holism. One noteworthy feature here is that Quine is not mentioned at all. Though Brandom earlier featured a claimed relation between conceptions of holism in Hegel and Quine, he simply drops Quine here, substitutes Sellars's linguistic version of conceptual pragmatism, and concentrates more directly on Hegel. The result is to extend the generally Sellarsian reading of Hegel Brandom started to work out elsewhere, for instance in *Articulating Reasons.*

When Brandom discusses the difference between properties that are different but compatible and properties that are mutually exclusive, or as he says materially incompatible, he depicts Hegel as the first thinker to work out the consequences of semantic holism.[159] I take this to mean that for Brandom, Hegel is a semantic thinker, hence concerned with the problem of reference, and that Hegel's take on the problem is holistic in that it refuses atomism in a material sense. The first point seems correct, since any holism has to decline epistemological atomism. Indeed, this conviction motivated the efforts of Russell and the early Wittgenstein to work out what they called logical atomism.[160] The second point is troublesome since it seems to commit Hegel to the kind of ontology that, in following Kant, he is at pains to reject. Brandom begins his discussion of Hegel with the claim that Hegel starts "with the everyday idea of how things are—the idea that there is some way the world is."[161] This

statement points toward metaphysical realism as basic to Hegel's position. Yet it is more plausible to read Hegel as refusing metaphysical realism, hence as refusing to base his approach to cognition on anything resembling pre-Kantian metaphysics, which he clearly rejects in his account of the First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity.[162] Put differently, the whole thrust of Hegel's position lies in rejecting metaphysical realism, and hence representationalism, for a conceptual analysis.

Brandom goes on to consider strong holism in some detail. We do not need to follow this part of his discussion since he has not established, and arguably cannot establish, that Hegel is committed to any version of this doctrine. His account of objective relations and subjective processes provides evidence of a fundamental difficulty in his effort to characterize Hegel's conceptual idealism. According to Brandom, this amounts to "taking one's commitments to be answerable to an objective world (in the sense constitutive of treating them as representations of such a world). . . ."[163] This is, however, a clear statement of what Hegel is not committed to, indeed sharply rejects. A main thrust of the *Phenomenology* is the rejection of any kind of representationalism in favor of concepts that are not intended as representing anything like a mind-independent objective world. For the idea that Brandom advances, that in the case of error our cognitions are answerable to the world, more precisely "thereby treated as representations *of* such a world,"[164] Hegel substitutes the very different idea that our theories must be tested against whatever is given in conscious experience. Brandom's reading only holds if the world is as it is given in experience. But there is no way to show this. And Hegel follows Kant in rejecting this hypothesis.

Having made his case, as he believes, that Hegelian conceptual idealism consists in correctly representing the world as it is,

Brandom offers a more formal sketch of the same claim based on Sellars's version of conceptual pragmatism. Brandom fleshes out his basic idea that Hegelian concepts refer to the world. This leads him to a thesis about Hegel's objective idealism in the section of the *Phenomenology* dealing with consciousness: "*determinateness* requires a kind of *holism,* and . . . holism is intelligible only on the hypothesis of objective *idealism.*"[165]

This claim seems to me to be misguided as a description of what happens in the section. One objection is that the inability to refer to the world as it is, is not part of what Hegel is attempting. Indeed, it is excluded. A further objection concerns the status of cognitive objects. The entire section on consciousness consists in reviewing three models of the relation of subject to object. The first is sense-certainty, or a primitive kind of empiricism directed toward immediate knowledge which tells us only that something is but not what it is. Then comes perception, which identifies the many properties or predicates of an unknowable subject. Finally there is the kind of dualistic theorizing that relies on a supersensible realm, which is not and cannot be given in experience, whether in classical mechanics (which relies on force), or in the critical philosophy (which invokes the understanding). Hegel's overall point here is that any effort to approach knowledge simply through consciousness is insufficient since the conceptual unity required to grasp anything given in experience cannot be attained merely by considering the relation of the subject to its object.

Following his idea that Hegel provides us with a theory of knowledge of the world as determinate, as opposed to the contents of experience, Brandom goes on to insist that in virtue of its holistic character knowing develops dialectically. At this point, a series of slips shows a certain uncertainty in Brandom's understanding of Hegel. Brandom suggests that Hegel relies

on *Vernunft* rather than *Verstand*. Yet in fact the view of *Vernunft* that Hegel proposes is *Geist,* or spirit, not reason in the Kantian sense of the term at all. Brandom depicts the process of cognition as one of bringing together identity and difference to yield determinateness in order, "in Hegel's terminology, to 'posit' [*setzen*] something determinate *as,* for instance, simply immediate being."[166] This is obviously a slip, since the term "posit" is Fichtean, not Hegelian.

Brandom's effort to provide a formal description of the knowing process is helpful. Others have also made this attempt with varying success.[167] Missing, however, is any sense of the way in which for Hegel a cognitive object is literally constituted by the conceptual framework that picks it out. Brandom's concept of strong exclusion points toward metaphysical realism in which we gradually come to know the mind-independent external object as it is. Hegel is, I think, saying something different. It is not the case that one and the same mind-independent reality, or the world as it is, is progressively disclosed in cognition. It is rather the case that we develop a series of different theories about, and more generally conceptual approaches to, what is given in experience, as a result of which the object changes as the theory that identifies it changes. To put the same point differently, the problem is not framed by material incompatibility in any ordinary sense at all, if "material" refers to the way things are. The problem rather lies in formulating a theory that corresponds to what is experienced, where no reference is supposed between what is experienced and what really is. If this is correct, then the idea that the world is always already there, as Brandom notes, is not a challenge to idealism, or at least not to Hegel's idealism. The reason is not that the world as it is there yields to cognition, but rather that Hegel is not interested in anything other than the contents of experience.

Hegelian Criticism of Inferentialism

Brandom's claim that his position is Hegelian is implausible even on a broad interpretation. Unless "Hegelian" is used in an unusual manner—similarly to the way in which Brandom uses "pragmatism" to apply to Frege—it is not meaningful when applied to Brandom's inferentialism.

An awareness of deep, irreconcilable differences between Brandom and Hegel—that is, between what Brandom says about Hegel, what Hegel says, and what Hegel's statements can plausibly be taken to mean—opens the door to Hegelian criticism of Brandom. Brandom presents inferentialism as a semantics with epistemological intent. His inferentialism apparently centers on two main claims: first, concepts are norms determining what counts as reasons for particular beliefs; and, second, the mind-independent real makes the conceptual structure true or false by telling us how it is with the world. The latter claim, which I understand as a version of ordinary, or metaphysical realism, means that under appropriate conditions we can and do cognize the mind-independent world as it is.

Brandom's commitment to metaphysical realism is a consistent theme throughout his writings. For instance, in *Making It Explicit*, he writes: "A semantically adequate notion of correct inference must generate an acceptable notion of conceptual content. But such a notion must fund the idea of *objective* truth conditions and so of *objectively* correct inferences. Such proprieties of judgment and inference are actual attitudes of taking or treating judgments as correct. They are determined by how things are, independently of how they are taken to be. Our cognitive attitudes must ultimately answer to these attitude-transcendent facts."[168]

In *Articulating Reasons,* where Brandom distinguishes physical, chemical, and biological things that supposedly have natures

and presumably are the stuff of science, from those, like English Romantic poetry, that have histories, Brandom holds, in a passage already quoted, that our concepts about such objects can be known to be either true or false: "For the properties governing the application of those concepts [such as electrons and aromatic compounds] depend on what inferences involving them are *correct,* that is, on what *really* follows from what. And that depends on how things really are with electrons and aromatic compounds, not just on what judgments and inferences we endorse."[169]

This passage, which clearly indicates Brandom's intent, raises more questions than it answers. Left unclear are such crucial issues as how we can ever know which inferences are in fact correct; and which inferences reliably tell us about what not only reliably but really follows from what and how things in fact really are: Do quarks exist because we infer that they do? Or are they conceptual inventions that cannot be matched up to anything in the world?[170] What does it mean for inferences about electrons or aromatic compounds, in Brandom's language, to *really* follow? Does that mean we can check them against the way the world is?

An ordinary, uncritical form of the metaphysical realist view is clear in the claim that through concepts we know how it is with electrons and aromatic compounds, and, more generally, through facts we know how it is with the mind-independent world. Brandom's suggestion that in appropriate conditions it just is the case that natural science is correct about the world is a version of the traditional realist claim to know.

On the basis of his realism, Brandom criticizes Rorty, who is annoyed by any claim for truth. He answers Rorty in contending that "facts make claims true—for they make claimings true" and that "in a central range of perceptual experience, the facts *are* the reasons that entitle perceivers to their empirical beliefs."[171]

Rorty, in his rejoinder, typically rejects the idea of getting it right in favor of more conversation, since no amount of discussion will show that a given belief cuts reality at the joints.[172] According to Rorty, there is no way to know if beliefs are true merely because reasons can be asked for and given concerning a particular belief without matching it up with the world. This observation effectively disposes of Brandom's inferentialist realism at the price of endorsing epistemological skepticism. For Rorty, either we know how the world is, in which case discussion comes to a successful end, or we do not and cannot know how the world is, and the discussion is endless and not worth conducting since we finally cannot know anything. In effect, in working with a dualistic conceptual framework he proposes epistemological skepticism as the sole possible alternative to metaphysical realism.

Hegel offers a promising alternative to Brandom and Rorty. Brandom, who claims to be a Hegelian, and Rorty, who makes no such claim, are both pre-Kantians; both still make the possibility of knowledge depend on knowledge of external reality. Hegel, who accepts Kant's point about the impossibility of knowing the real as it is, constructs a view of knowledge with no pretense about knowing the way the world is—an aim that does not figure in his account—by confining knowledge claims to conscious experience. Unlike Brandom, he does not pretend to know the mind-independent world as it is. And unlike Rorty, he does not conclude that failure to know the mind-independent world leads to epistemological skepticism.

Hegel does not regard knowledge as correctly resolving the problem of how to match up a theory to mind-independent reality. Rather, he regards knowledge as a process turning on the reciprocal interaction, and eventual correspondence, of subject and object within consciousness. He never claims, nor could he

claim, to understand reality as the mind-independent external world that makes our concepts true. At most, he claims that in principle the knowing process would come to an end when subject and cognitive object coincided within consciousness. For Hegel, a concept is not and cannot be an inference to the real as it is. It is rather a way of understanding cognition as a process unfolding within conscious experience. In avoiding the pre-Kantian assumption that to know is to know mind-independent reality, Hegel avoids epistemological skepticism while showing how in practice we know how things stand, not outside of, but rather within the limits of conscious experience.

On Semantics and Epistemology

In the wake of the analytic critique of British idealism, and the ensuing emergence of analytic philosophy as a distinctive philosophical tendency, the relation between analytic and continental thinkers, including idealists, has often been fraught with mutual suspicion. Efforts to overcome this divide, to engage in mutual dialogue, have so far been unavailing. Brandom's attempt is in principle praiseworthy, but not promising. Rorty seems to believe that by being interested in Hegel, Brandom somehow overcomes the split between continental and analytic philosophy. Yet it does not suffice to be interested in Hegel to bridge the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. Important but divergent doctrinal commitments on both sides impede any effort to bring them together, and there is no reason to think Brandom has actually done so. In fact, Brandom's prior commitment to analytic philosophy writ large acts as a powerful impediment to bringing his inferentialism and Hegel, or more generally analytic and continental philosophy, together. Like Rorty, Brandom simply disregards the conditions under which analytic philoso-

phy could usefully enter into contact with continental philosophy by proclaiming that the split between the two traditions has been overcome.

This theme is important since, like other forms of cognition, philosophy is a collective enterprise. It is profitable to inquire how we could usefully learn from each other in advancing our shared concerns. Obvious presuppositions might include the idea that the discussants are sufficiently informed about each other's views, and that there is sufficient overlap between their doctrinal commitments to make debate fruitful.

Although the analytic and continental traditions may later draw closer together, they are presently so far apart that even informed debate between them is unusual and very difficult to carry out. In supposedly bringing Hegel and the analytic tradition together in a single position, Brandom draws on the available resources of theories of knowledge (or epistemology) in the continental debate, and theories of reference and semantics in the analytic debate, which are different and should not be conflated.

The relation between reference and semantics is unclear. Depending on how they are understood, reference and semantics are older than analytic philosophy. Following Frege's seminal distinction between sense (or meaning) and reference, it seems reasonable to understand reference, or the problem of reference, as belonging to semantics. It further seems reasonable to understand the problem of reference as concerned with picking out or identifying an object, or referent. This leads to a question: Can semantics even potentially stand in for, or solve (or resolve) epistemological questions? To put the same point differently: Is an adequate theory of semantics an acceptable candidate to take the place of epistemology?

This question is relevant to assessing the epistemological import of semantics. As part of his logicist project, Frege origi-

nally separated philosophical logic from psychology and epistemology in opposing what later became known as psychologism. Others, such as Tarski, see semantics as epistemologically neutral, and still others, such as Davidson, who transgresses the informal separation between semantics and epistemology, see semantics as epistemologically significant.

Brandom belongs to the latter group. Since reference is cognitive, hence epistemologically significant, inferentialism, or his view of material inference, turns out to be his proposed solution to the problem of reference. In other words, although he has little to say about meaning, Brandom's intention is simultaneously to provide an acceptable theory of reference within the framework of semantics and to solve (or resolve) the epistemological problem.

The link Brandom establishes between his inferentialist semantics and epistemology suggests three related points: first, when it is suitably understood, semantics can appropriately replace epistemology; second, Hegel is either a semanticist, or, at the very least, as Brandom says, Hegel's theory has potential semantic uses; and, third, the semantic elaboration of Hegel as an inferentialist will at least narrow, or even potentially overcome, the split between analytic and continental philosophy which took up nearly the whole of the twentieth century.

My skepticism about this entire program concerns the deep difference between semantics and epistemology as usually understood. This difference undermines any effort to develop a Hegelian semantics, or to solve (resolve) epistemological concerns through semantic means. As usually understood, semantics and epistemology have different agendas, different reasons for being, different strategies, and different forms of argument. Semantics since Frege is usually understood to concern problems of meaning and reference (or, in Russell's terminology, denotation). Russell, for instance, typically holds that denota-

tion requires a correlation between the words in a sentence and something outside it.[173] Epistemology is usually understood to be concerned with a wider theme, to which problems of meaning and reference arguably belong, roughly how we can reliably claim to know the world and ourselves.

The aims of semantics and epistemology are different, and should not be conflated; and neither can be reduced to the other. Semantics can no more replace epistemology than reliabilism can replace reasons. Semantics could replace epistemology if and only if the problem of knowledge could be reduced to those of meaning and reference. Semantics, which is not epistemology, is at most a part of epistemology, as meaning and reference arguably belong to the justification of claims for truth and knowledge.

Brandom obviously deserves credit for perceiving the epistemological interest of Hegel's position. This is all too often overlooked in the uncritical acceptance of the Kantian view that epistemology worthy of the name reaches a peak and an end in the critical philosophy, and of the analytic rider to the Kantian view, that epistemology reemerges miraculously in analytic philosophy. Yet Brandom's effort to develop a Hegelian form of inferentialism, or a semantics with epistemological intent, enlists Hegel's theory of cognition for aims inconsistent with it. Hegel is not a semanticist, but an antisemanticist. He is opposed to semantics, understood as including a theory of definite reference, on the grounds that reference can only be developed informally, or ostensively.

According to Brandom, Hegel's rationalist expressivism is rich enough to do real semantic work,[174] and hence to function as an alternative to the representational semantic paradigm. This is correct, but not for the reason Brandom advances. Hegel, who rejects representationalism of any form, attacks the very idea of

linking up words with things through theoretical means, that is, in other than ostensive form. He famously contends that language, which is general (or universal), cannot adequately designate singular items. He specifically insists that, at least as concerns sense certainty, we cannot say what we mean or mean what we say. Saying and meaning are separated by the intrinsic generality of language which identifies the true on the level of generality, whereas our immediate intention is to pick out a single item given in sensation. For representationalism, Brandom substitutes a reliabilist form of externalism based on inference. Hegel, who gives up representationalism, does not, like Brandom, rely on inference. Rather, he relies on concepts as referring, not to the external world, to which we have and can have no specifiable cognitive relation, but rather to the cognitive process that unfolds within conscious experience.

There is still another way to interpret Rorty's ambitious claim, which Brandom enthusiastically espouses, that Sellars and Brandom overcome the split between analytic and continental philosophy. It cannot have escaped either Rorty or Brandom that this statement has not only philosophical, but also political consequences in the philosophical debate.

In about the same way as Marxist thinkers comprehend what they like to call "bourgeois" philosophers, Rorty is obliquely suggesting that continental philosophers are not up to solving (or resolving) the problems of continental philosophy. He further implies that analytic and continental philosophers do roughly continental things, so that analytical techniques transfer seamlessly into the continental domain. To put the point another way, we are meant to infer that analytic philosophers are just better at philosophy, hence better as well at what continental philosophers do.

This type of claim is distressingly familiar. The idea that one

approach is superior to another is often suggested in proposing to solve (or resolve) philosophical problems outside philosophy, or even within philosophy. Examples include Piaget's extraphilosophical, allegedly psychological solution of epistemological questions;[175] the supposed extraphilosophical Marxist resolution of German idealist concerns;[176] and Sartre's intraphilosophical gesture in making existentialism available to found, to ground, or better, simply to prop up Marxism.[177]

In claiming that Sellars and Brandom overcome the difference between analytic and continental philosophy, Rorty suggests in theory a political move that Brandom attempts to carry out in practice. In part, the struggle between different philosophical tendencies is a political struggle for preeminence in the academy. If Rorty and Brandom have their way, and if Brandom's inferentialism is accepted as doing what Hegel had in mind better than any continental philosopher could possibly do, when the smoke clears only analytic philosophers will be left to do what earlier was understood to be the business of continental philosophers. Yet to look the other way in allowing this move, in permitting this power play in which analytic philosophy takes over from continental philosophy, would merely be a form of self-deception. Since, if I am right, Brandom's Hegel has only the name in common with Hegel, this would be an example of what Russell calls procuring by theft what one has failed to gain by honest toil.[178]

It is not possible to see how Brandom's turn to Hegel will play out, nor possible to foresee if the identification he now claims between Hegel and himself will later be attenuated or abandoned. It is reasonable to suspect that, if he is seriously committed to what he is doing, he will come to realize that his position and Hegel's are simply incompatible.

McDowell on Hegel

I have given a lot of space to Brandom, since his pragmatic Hegelian inferentialism presents a large target, and I will be giving less space to McDowell. It is not my intention to suggest that Brandom's analytic reading of Hegel is better, or more interesting, or more worthy of attention than McDowell's. On the contrary, in all these respects, for reasons I will spell out below, I prefer McDowell's to Brandom's Hegel. McDowell's more cautious, less florid approach, is apparently more promising than his Pittsburgh colleague's. Since he has written less on Hegel, there is less to consider, although that should not be construed as indicating that what there is less interesting than other analytic writings on Hegel.

McDowell and Brandom differ philosophically as concerns their own views, their reading of other leading figures, and their relation to Hegel. As Brandom has often and consistently claimed to be a Hegelian, his position can be evaluated in terms of Hegel's. Since, to the best of my knowledge, McDowell never claims to be a Hegelian, it seems more appropriate to concentrate on his use of Hegel than on how it feeds into his position.

McDowell's approach to Hegel differs specifically from Brandom's in that it is not mediated through, hence does not in any way depend on, claims about pragmatism or about the relation of Hegel and pragmatism. This is an advantage since, as pointed out, despite a number of resemblances, Hegel is not a pragmatist. Another difference lies in the specific approach to the texts. McDowell, who goes directly to Hegel's texts, does not read them through those of other analytic thinkers. In the careful way one might expect from someone who earlier worked extensively on Greek philosophy, McDowell reads and interprets the texts with care, sometimes even line by line.

Although Brandom and McDowell write in a recognizably

analytic manner about typical analytic themes and are in part attracted to the same thinkers—with the exception of Rorty, whom Brandom strongly favors but McDowell strongly criticizes—they are philosophical opposites in nearly every way. What they say about the thinkers they study, including analytic thinkers and even Hegel, is very different, incompatible, and indicative of the wide range of opinion within contemporary analytic philosophy. Since I think McDowell is closer to Hegel than Brandom is, I will mainly be playing McDowell's Hegel interpretation against Brandom's, which it undermines from a different analytic perspective.

The cast of philosophical heroes for McDowell and Brandom is similar, although the relevant interpretations are not. McDowell is as committed to Wittgenstein and Sellars as is Brandom, but to a different Wittgenstein and to a different Sellars. McDowell's turn to Hegel is recent; there is no direct trace of it in a collection of his papers over the last twenty years.[179]

Unlike Brandom, who embraces pragmatism, McDowell keeps his distance while remaining critical of those who opt for it. McDowell points out that Rorty regards pragmatism as debunking dualisms, but relies on the dualism between reason and nature. Although he makes no claim to be a pragmatist, he does suggest that his own view is closer to pragmatism on Rorty's model than the latter's position, which he describes simply as "half-baked."[180]

Brandom mentions McDowell frequently in *Making It Explicit*, not at all in *Articulating Reasons,* and only a few times in *Tales of the Mighty Dead*. The change in attitude might be attributable to McDowell's forceful rejection in the meantime of a number of interpretations and doctrinal commitments that Brandom favors. Above all, he rejects as such Brandom's inferentialist account of concepts. According to McDowell, mental events, which are not judgments, can justify beliefs. It follows

that perceptual experience, even if it is conceptually structured, has a role to play. This permits McDowell to hold on to experience as making a difference in our claims to know, and hence gives him a viable alternative to a mere coherence approach to truth.

Someone like McDowell who takes texts seriously is concerned with producing plausible interpretations of key doctrines as they appear in the texts. McDowell criticizes figures Brandom respects, like Sellars, and rejects Brandom's readings of thinkers like Wittgenstein and Sellars, who are key to his reading of Hegel. In virtue of his interest in experience, McDowell rejects coherentist approaches to knowledge. His rejection of coherentism leads him to criticize Sellars's effort to distinguish between placing something in the so-called space of reasons as opposed to giving an empirical description of it.[181] According to McDowell, Sellars, despite his criticism of empiricism, remains an empiricist in a nontraditional sense.[182]

McDowell's criticism of Brandom's appeal to Sellars to support the idea of word-world relations[183] is doubly important. First, it undermines Brandom's reading of Sellars as well as his reliance on Sellars to justify the general semantic project that, according to McDowell, Sellars undercuts. Second, it suggests that Brandom's view of Sellars, Hegel, and himself as engaged in the same or even a relevantly similar project, say in considering inference and concepts as two similar ways of talking about the word-world relation, is seriously confused.

McDowell makes a similar point about Sellars's reading of Kant. Rorty's suggestion that Sellars and Brandom show us how to overcome the split between analytic and continental philosophy presupposes that Sellars gets both Kant and Hegel right, and that Sellars's line of thought can be extended in a way that leads on from a Kantian to a Hegelian form of analytic philosophy. McDowell, who defends the opposite claim, that is, that

Sellars gets neither Kant nor Hegel right, contends that Sellars's interpretation of Kant not only does not lend itself to a Hegelian extension of the critical philosophy, but rather prevents it.

Rorty's idea is not that Hegel would turn out to be an analytic philosopher, as Brandom suggests. It is rather that, just as there is an analytic form of Kant, there could also in principle be an analytic form of Hegel. Rorty's claim seems to be that, under Sellars's influence, Brandom's inferentialism could plausibly be regarded as a genuinely Hegelian type of analytic philosophy. This claim is weaker than the one that Brandom makes. It is not, as Brandom implies, that Hegel and he are doing the same or closely similar things, nor, as Brandom flatly claims, that he, Hegel, and Frege are all pragmatists.

McDowell argues against this project, hence against even the possibility that Brandom could successfully complete it, in a careful examination of Sellars's reading of Kant. A central element in the idea of taking analytic philosophy from its so-called Kantian moment under Sellars's influence to a putative Hegelian moment under Brandom's leadership is that Sellars's Kant lends itself to appropriate extension in Hegel's direction. This idea seems more plausible before one examines the text than afterwards. Historically the evolution of post-Kantian German idealism led from Kant to Hegel. Both Rorty and Brandom presuppose without argument that Sellars's version of Kant is propitious to the transition from Kant to Hegel. On examination, Sellars's texts seem to suggest a different lesson. McDowell's gloss on Sellars's reading of Kant suggests that Sellars reads Kant in a way that does not open but rather closes the door, as it were, to any post-Kantian move toward Hegel.

Like Brandom, McDowell devotes a lot of attention to intentionality. McDowell's view of Sellars is developed in a careful study of intentionality in Kant and Sellars. McDowell, who sees intentionality as central to the critical philosophy, argues that

Sellars misreads Kant in a way that closes off the transition to Hegel for the reason that, according to Sellars, Hegel's theory is lacking an external constraint. McDowell further argues that it is Sellars, not Kant or indeed Hegel, who is lacking an external constraint in his analysis of cognition through a space of reasons. In pointing to important weaknesses in Sellars's reading of key historical figures, especially Kant, McDowell undermines the ongoing analytic effort by Rorty, Brandom, and others to direct attention to Sellars.

McDowell's interpretation of Sellars consists of four points. First, Sellars is right that for Kant we need an element of sheer receptivity, but wrong in reading Kant as a scientific realist manqué, who, had he been more sophisticated, would have cast the objects of the scientific image, as distinguished from the objects of the manifest image, in the role of things in themselves.[184] This amounts to suggesting that Sellars is wrong to read Kant as incompletely anticipating his own position, since, in the final analysis, the two positions are not only different, but in fact incompatible. Second, in adopting a metaphysical realist reading of the critical philosophy, he suggests Kant should be read as holding that perceptual objects are themselves the source of what Sellars understands as what he calls sheer receptivity.[185] This approach has two consequences. First, it commits Kant to a representational strategy for knowledge that is inconsistent with, and fails to do justice to, the constructivist side of his position. Second, it points McDowell away from Kantian constructivism, hence away from the Copernican revolution in the critical philosophy, and toward representationalism, suitably construed, as a plausible approach to the problem of knowledge. Hence, for McDowell, there is no need to appeal to a further theoretical device, such as the space of reasons to secure an empirical constraint, since it is already present in Kant. Third, in McDowell's interpretation Sellars's effort to provide an em-

pirical constraint suffers from the same weakness as efforts by Quine and Davidson, all of which supposedly withdraw from a conception of the given into equally ineffective forms of coherentism. According to McDowell, coherentism, the replacement doctrine after the rejection of any form of empiricism, fails, since, although it prevents a conceptual constraint, it lacks what McDowell regards as the necessary empirical constraint.

The problem goes back to the later Wittgenstein's critique of Moore's effort to refute idealism. In *On Certainty,* in place of the simple, commonsense claim for direct knowledge, Wittgenstein offers a complex description of knowledge claims as mediated by a frame of reference (*Bezugssystem*), such as a language-game. Wittgenstein provides a clue, but scarcely more than that, to how he understands this difficult concept in a series of rapid remarks on meaning. Words are meaningful in terms, or as a function, of their employment (*Verwendung*).[186] There is a one-to-one correspondence between rules governing the use of words, their function in language-games, and their meanings.[187] There is more than one possible language-game, and the one that prevails at any given moment depends on the facts being as they are.[188] Finally, not only language-games, but concepts designated by words, hence also their meanings, change.[189]

Wittgenstein's interpretation of the frame of reference as a language-game has at least three main weaknesses. First, there is no hint as to how language-games are formed or evolve, hence no hint about their relation to the real external world. Following Kripke, Brandom and others believe that Wittgenstein offers a social justificationist reading of language games, a reading that McDowell rejects as incompatible with the texts.[190] Second, it is unclear that, even if it were allowed, this approach would defeat the supposed idealist denial of the reality of the external world. Wittgenstein remarks that he cannot seriously question whether he is awake or dreaming.[191] Yet even for Descartes, the question

is not whether one in fact doubts, but whether doubt is at least theoretically possible. Third, the frame of reference lacks the constraint on thought that Moore obtains through his form of the traditional empiricist approach to knowledge, an approach which, in revised form, apparently still motivates McDowell.

The analogy between Wittgenstein's language-games, Sellars's space of reasons, and Quine's holism suggests why McDowell objects to the anti-empiricist cast of Sellars's space of reasons, Quine's holism, and Davidson's coherentist form of correspondence. McDowell is bothered, not by Quine's holism, but rather by Quine's behavioristic model of experience as "the stimulation of . . . sensory receptors,"[192] which allegedly cannot serve as a real restraint on thought. Davidson, according to McDowell, diagnoses the problem in Quine's position but only compounds it in his own position. McDowell points to Davidson's assertion that "nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief"[193] and argues that Davidson, who relies on beliefs, for that reason eschews experiential constraints. According to McDowell, an acceptable theory of cognition can rely neither on a vain appeal to the given, nor on a form of coherentism that simply turns on itself or revolves as it were in empty conceptual space, without a link to reality.[194]

Fourth, McDowell detects a link between Sellars's supposed misreading of Kant (as requiring but not providing an empirical constraint) and a further alleged misreading of Hegel with respect to the same point. According to McDowell, Sellars errs in representing Hegel as lacking an empirical restraint. Sellars is, hence, incorrect about the supposed need to avoid the "dialectic which leads from Hegel's *Phenomenology* to nineteenth-century idealism."[195] According to McDowell, Hegel locates the empirical constraint within reason.[196]

McDowell's remark about Hegel helps to distinguish analytic approaches to the German thinker in Brandom and Sellars as

well as in his own thought. Unlike Sellars, McDowell sees that Hegel does not fall behind, but rather goes beyond, Kant in developing an approach to knowledge that specifically preserves an empirical constraint. For McDowell, Sellars's difficulties in making sense of the relation of Kant to Hegel lie in reading both incorrectly, and Kant in any case more so than Hegel. Sellars mistakenly criticizes Kant's failure to appeal to an empirical constraint, when in fact Hegel understands that Kant relies on an empirical constraint located within sensibility. Unlike Brandom, McDowell sees that Hegel has already worked out a theory of knowledge. This shifts the task from understanding how to use insights borrowed from Hegel to construct an appropriate epistemology to one of grasping what Hegel's own theory of knowledge amounts to.

An important point in McDowell's favor is that he understands that Hegel's position develops out of his reading of Kant's. The limitation in McDowell's reading of Hegel lies in the relatively limited range of his consideration of the nature and sources of Hegel's theories. In restricting himself to issues raised, say, by Sellars, McDowell obtains no more than a foreshortened view of Hegel. In fact, Hegel was familiar with the entire range of Kant's position, and comes to grips with all its main facets as well as with the positions of all Kant's main contemporaries.

McDowell's reading of Hegel is useful in calling attention to Hegel's nonstandard empiricism. This important aspect of Hegel's position is often overlooked, even obscured, by the well-known but mistaken blanket charge that all idealists deny the existence of the external world. There are obviously different types of empiricism. Kant, for instance, is an empiricist in a different way than his British empiricist predecessors. Like Kant, but unlike the British empiricists, Hegel, who rejects Kant's transcendental approach to an analysis of the conditions of ex-

perience and knowledge, thinks knowledge necessarily begins, but does not end, with experience. In this and other ways, by reading the text with care McDowell shows, among other things, that Hegel does not, as Sellars claims, merely muddy the Kantian waters,[197] and that Hegel does not abandon but rather further elaborates intentionality.[198]

McDowell's charge that analytic criticism of empiricism (in the later Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson) leads to forms of coherence lacking an empirical constraint points in the direction of a suitably revised minimalist empiricism as a necessary condition of knowledge. In this respect, McDowell, who sees no prospect of entirely dispensing with empiricism, parts company with many other analytic thinkers. Thus, Brandom, in Sellars's wake, regards the debate concerning this theme as simply closed.

McDowell defuses the standard analytic charge that Kant, Hegel, or idealists generally lack an empirical constraint in noting that it rests on a misreading of the texts. This point simply undercuts the analytic rejection of idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century by inviting analytic thinkers to reopen the debate with continental philosophy by reading the texts. His implicit response to Moore and others who see Kant as failing to refute idealism, and Moore as himself guilty of the same failing which affects idealism across the board, is that Kant's own so-called refutation is valid against "bad" idealism. In other words, it is precisely valid against those forms of idealism which, at least on Kant's reading of his predecessors, deny the existence of the external world.

McDowell's reading of German idealism is consistent with current themes in analytic epistemology, but it is overly selective, and in what has been published so far, at least, simply too narrow to provide more than a very partial account. His insistence that the empirical constraint necessary for all theories of knowledge is already present in different ways in Kant and Hegel success-

fully redeems their forms of idealism from the persistent, but, from the point of view of what the text actually says, simply wild charge that idealism as such denies the existence of the external world. But it leaves almost everything else about their theories open to interpretation.

In his mature position, Kant rejects metaphysical realism and at least in theory combines empirical realism and transcendental idealism within a single position. In principle, these aspects of his position are coequal. This equality is not always respected in philosophical discussion. The critical philosophy is routinely read from points of view emphasizing either metaphysical realism or idealism, but not both as two sides of a single position. The difference can be stated in terms of the way that the cognitive subject is affected by distinguishing between ordinary and empirical realism. Kant, who divides modes of knowledge into intuitions and concepts, clearly says that sensible intuitions, his term for the necessary "external" cognitive input, rest on affections.[199]

The concept of affection, or the fact of being affected, can be interpreted in different ways. The result is to identify two disparate versions of the critical philosophy. In an ordinary realist reading, there is a mind-independent external world, which can be said to cause our perceptions of it. According to this reading, "to affect" is a transitive verb, since the subject is affected by something. In Kantian language, phenomena are appearances of something that appears.[200] This way of reading Kant leads to the familiar causal theory of perception. It is further consistent with the general metaphysical realist view, and very close to the Cartesian position that to know is to know the way the world is, which is widely featured in analytic philosophy at present.

The other, German idealist way to read this claim, which originates with Fichte and which is inconsistent with the causal view of perception, is to say no more than that the subject is af-

fected. In this way of reading Kant, nothing further can be said. No claim is possible about what affects the cognitive subject. In this German idealist reading, "to affect" is not a transitive, but rather an intransitive verb, and one cannot suppose that something affects the subject. A German idealist reading of Kantian affection does not deny, but also does not presuppose, a mind-independent external world. It is inconsistent with the causal theory of perception and with metaphysical realism. It features an empirical constraint combined with empirical realism, but without realism as it is ordinarily understood.

Both ways of reading the critical philosophy maintain Kant's emphasis on an empirical constraint. The metaphysical realist and transcendental idealist approaches to the critical philosophy interpret the empirical constraint differently by featuring opposing conceptions of realism. Those committed to metaphysical realism on whatever grounds tend to prefer the former, since for them the empirical constraint is the mind-independent external world; and those committed to idealism tend to prefer the latter, since for them the empirical constraint is not the mind-independent external world, but merely the sensory input as such.

McDowell and the post-Kantian German idealists part company over the proper interpretation of the empirical constraint in the critical philosophy. McDowell, who is committed to getting it right about the world, hence to realism as it is ordinarily understood, opts for a metaphysical realist reading of the empirical constraint. Without exception the great post-Kantian German idealists all provide nonmetaphysical readings of the empirical constraint, readings that do not suppose that we are in contact with, or could get it right about, the mind-independent external world.

Metaphysical and empirical realism should not be conflated. The former concerns the way the world is in itself, and the latter

concerns no more than what is given in experience and knowledge. Kant, who is unclear on the topic, seems committed in different places to metaphysical and to empirical realism, and this invites different realist readings of the critical philosophy. Both readings are problematic. The metaphysical realist reading, which McDowell favors, and which is consistent with the generally realist thrust of analytic epistemology, is as widespread as it is difficult to make out. To read Kant as an ordinary realist commits one to understanding the relation of representations to what they represent, that is the relation to the mind-independent world. This is the way he originally states the problem he is concerned to solve (or resolve). McDowell is concerned with precisely this version of the Kantian relation in his aptly named book *Mind and World*. Yet Kant's so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy can properly be taken as denying there is any way to know an independent world, more precisely any way to know we know independent objects, either as they are or even at all. For Kant, there is no way to know that we know objects we do not in some sense "construct." In other words, Kant's Copernican revolution denies metaphysical realism, the type of position he points to in his original way of posing the question of knowledge. Although many philosophers are still committed to a solution of the problem of knowledge along these lines, the steady commitment since Kant to knowing the world as it is has never produced a single argument to show that this is possible. Some two centuries after Kant, we are no closer to making out the ordinary realist approach to knowledge.

This difficulty was apparent to Kant's immediate successors. Post-Kantian German idealists, who took seriously Kant's Copernican insight that the subject must "construct" what it knows, gave up the idea that in knowing we know the real as it is. For Hegel, to know is to know what one constructs in a way constrained by the unfolding of the cognitive process within

consciousness. The process is constrained by a successive series of experiences, which need not, and cannot, be correlated with a mind-independent external world. This is a requirement which, for Hegel, reflects no more than a natural but naïve view of things. The problem central to any idealist reading of Kant is what it means to "construct" what one knows. I will come back to this problem below.

The insuperable difficulty with metaphysical realism can be put in McDowell's terminology, where the term "world" occurs frequently. What does "world" mean in an epistemological context? Following Sellars, Brandom (who in this respect is typical) seems to believe that our concepts about the world tell us the way the world is. For McDowell, on the contrary, this is simply bad Sellars. He reads Sellars as showing, to use contemporary jargon, that we cannot go from the semantic order to the real order.[201] This conclusion seems correct. Yet it would be a misinterpretation to suggest that McDowell gives up the astonishingly widespread ordinary realist approach to knowledge as in fact knowing the mind-independent real as it is.

One might object that I am attributing to McDowell a position he does not hold in claiming that he remains committed to metaphysical realism, since it is an error to see him as equating "world" and "real." It is therefore useful to identify passages in his recent writings where he makes metaphysical realist claims about the existence of a knowable, but mind-independent real.

In his account of the so-called unboundedness of the conceptual, McDowell follows a line of argument he identifies in Wittgenstein,[202] according to which there is no gap between thoughts about the world and the world.[203] On this basis, he notes, in respect to Davidson's distinction between reasons and causes, that he is trying to show that the world provides what he calls a rational influence on thought.[204] It is useful to pay attention to the force of this claim. McDowell is not saying, like Fichte,

that we are simply affected but cannot say that there is a subject responsible for affecting us. He is rather saying that we are affected by the world. The difference between these two claims is simply huge. To keep the point from being missed, McDowell stresses it even against the author of the critical philosophy. For McDowell, Kant underestimates the cognitive force of reality. "[I]n spite of his staunch denials, the effect of his philosophy is to slight the independence of the reality to which our senses give us access."[205] In other words, if Kant had rejected metaphysical realism he would have been in error.

McDowell further presupposes a view of the mind-independent real in his critique of the allegedly failed forms of coherentism he attributes to Sellars, Quine, and Davidson. I take it that that is the point of his summary remark about the difference between what Sellars calls the myth of the given and its analytic substitute: "I have been considering the tendency to oscillate between two unpalatable positions: a coherentism that loses the bearing of empirical thought on reality and a recoil into a vain appeal to the Given."[206] That is further the point of his criticism of Davidson's coherentism, which he says lacks an empirical constraint. His response is: "In the picture I recommend, although the world is not external to the space of concepts, it is external to exercises of spontaneity."[207] In other words, McDowell's solution is a qualified return to an ordinary realist reading of Kant, or, if that is not Kant's view, the ordinary realist view he ought to have held. As McDowell reads Kant, Kant holds, or ought to have held, that sensibility is restrained by and in fact cognizes the mind-independent external world.

Although McDowell objects to Sellars's scientism and to Davidson's coherentism, for him the problem is not that Sellars or Davidson presuppose, nor even that they claim to know mind-independent external reality. The problem is rather that neither has an acceptable account of how to bring the mind into

contact with the world. In a word, for McDowell, the "real" and the "world" are synonymous terms. It follows that McDowell is committed to some form of the metaphysical realism that Kant also sometimes favors.

McDowell's commitment to metaphysical realism is more directly expressed in a series of three essays specifically directed against Dummett's antirealism. McDowell casts Dummett as opposing realism on general considerations derived from the philosophy of language, which is understood as prior to epistemology and metaphysics,[208] and also as taking a verificationist line that is in itself not novel. Dummett objects to realism, McDowell says, "in the sense of the idea that someone's understanding of a language might engage the world by way of conditions that can transcend her ability to ascertain whether or not they obtain."[209] In coming to grips with Dummett, McDowell seems to shuttle back and forth between Davidson's theory of meaning, which McDowell interprets as requiring (metaphysical) realism, and Dummett's antirealism, which he regards, on certain interpretations, as opposed to Davidson's version of realism.

Dummett's view arises out of the application to Frege of the generally Wittgensteinian point that, in slogan form, meaning cannot transcend use. In an account of "Truth Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism," McDowell indicates his skepticism about the view that antirealism entails the need to defuse the strong verificationist argument, or its generalized version.[210] In general, here and elsewhere, McDowell seems to presuppose Davidson's suggestion that a theory of truth for a language, in Tarski's style, depends on specifying conditions under which a predicate is true of objects, which he takes Dummett to deny. Dummett's argument, as McDowell describes it, depends on his inability to give an account of the concepts expressed by his primitive vocabulary.

In "On the Reality of the Past,"[211] McDowell responds to Dummett's essay of the same name.[212] More precisely, McDowell understands Dummett to find it problematic not to be able to specify conditions under which a predicate is true of objects, since it becomes impossible to know if truth-conditions are in fact fulfilled.[213] McDowell opines that Dummett's way of depicting the issue as an alternative between realists committed to truth-value links and antirealists leaves antirealism as the winner by (unjustly) ignoring the Wittgensteinian response based on meaning in use, which is how individuals learn language. Yet since antirealism seems to deny claims about the reality of the past, we see that it flies in the face of common sense. McDowell's solution is to appeal to transcendental thinking to establish realism against antirealism.[214]

McDowell returns to this topic in a second essay, "Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding."[215] Here he contends that "theory of meaning for a language can give a central role to the notion of conditions under which sentences are true, conceived as conditions that we are not, in general, capable of putting ourselves in a position to recognize whenever they obtain."[216] McDowell, who points out that this claim is the target of the antirealist argument in Dummett's writings,[217] accepts the Wittgensteinian slogan that meaning cannot transcend use while still defending realism against Dummett.[218] Dummett's point is that a theory of meaning cannot be fully realist, since there is a difference in meaning determined by use and by the real.[219] McDowell does not so much argue in favor of realism as question the cogency of Dummett's argument against it.[220] McDowell's point seems to be—though it is far from clear— that speakers of a language understand each other, albeit psychologism, which Dummett seems to adopt, would seem to deny that mere linguistic competence presupposes a kind of realism without speakers knowing when such conditions obtain.[221]

According to McDowell, the demand for solid foundations for the knowledge involved in understanding, which is raised by the antirealist, cannot be satisfied.[222]

McDowell devotes still a third essay, "Mathematical Platonism and Dummettian Anti-Realism," to the question. Here he says that a Platonist does not equate what it is for something to be true with what it would be to find a proof.[223] But according to Dummett, that is precisely the Platonist's mistake.[224] For otherwise, the result would be the principle that meaning transcends use.[225] Once again, McDowell claims that someone who is competent in the language makes his meaning available to the audience which also speaks that language.[226] For McDowell, although mathematics cannot be Platonic, realism outside mathematics can model itself on Platonism.[227] He claims that (1) realism asserts that in understanding a language we understand a reality that is determinate beyond our access to it; (2) a realist need not go beyond rejecting the distinctive thesis of antirealism about decidability;[228] (3) but supposedly the realist does not follow Dummett in asserting anything about how circumstances impinge on cognitive subjects in explaining how language relates to the world.[229]

Brandom and McDowell are both committed to metaphysical realism. Brandom has not so far addressed this commitment directly in anything like the detail found in McDowell. I have outlined McDowell's view of metaphysical realism in order to bring out the basic incompatibility between this form of realism, which underlies much of the analytic effort to appropriate Hegel, and the latter's actual position.

All types of realism do not come to the same thing. They are very different and lead to very different approaches to epistemology. One must simply concede that Kant is not entirely successful in separating metaphysical realism and empirical realism. There is evidence in his writings that he also inclines to meta-

physical realism, although his Copernican insight runs counter to this view. Hegel is clearer about the situation, clearer in rejecting any commitment to metaphysical realism. For Hegel, there is no way to go from conscious experience to the way the world is, no way even to designate it in language, hence no way to know the real other than as a cognitive object within conscious experience.

<center>STEKELER-WEITHOFER, HEGEL,
AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY</center>

Neither Frege, nor Russell, nor Moore displays more than passing interest in the possible philosophical import of the history of philosophy. Even Russell's *History of Philosophy* was mainly a vehicle for him to settle old scores and to display his cranky opinions about his predecessors. As later analytic philosophers have become more interested in the philosophical tradition, however, they have provided increasingly frequent and increasingly useful discussion of various topics and figures, including Hegel. In discussing the relation of analytic philosophy to Hegel, I have limited my account to efforts to recover Hegel for analytic philosophy. I would like now to make an exception and to consider a book by Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer with the provocative title *Hegel's Analytic Philosophy: The Science of Logic as a Critical Theory of Reference*,[230] whose thesis makes it specifically relevant to the present discussion.

Stekeler-Weithofer advances a view only slightly different from McDowell's. The latter thinks Hegel has a very interesting, underappreciated view of knowledge, based on an empirical constraint intrinsic to reason, a view whose import has been occulted by Sellars's reading of Kant. His approach is diametrically opposed to Brandom's more recent Sellarsian reading of Hegel, based on appropriating selected Hegelian insights in the

course of developing a material semantics. Stekeler-Weithofer, who teaches at the University of Leipzig, but has visited at the University of Pittsburgh, advances an only slightly different thesis. If Brandom is correct, it remains to make Hegel fruitful for analytic semantics, for instance in the way he is now engaged in doing in working out his own view of inferentialism. According to Stekeler-Weithofer, however, there is no need to appropriate Hegel for analytic purposes, or to bring Hegel within the analytic discussion, since Hegel is and should be understood as an analytic philosopher.

Where others see difference or discontinuity, Stekeler-Weithofer sees seamless continuity between Hegel and analytic philosophy. He believes that both are engaged in the common task of working out a successful theory of reference (*Bedeutung*). According to Stekeler-Weithofer, who apparently identifies analytic philosophy with its Fregean origins, the only significant difference between Hegel and analytic philosophy is that analytic philosophy is much further along in the allegedly common task of working out a theory of reference than its unacknowledged German predecessor.

Naturally Stekeler-Weithofer is not suggesting that Hegel, at the time he was writing, had in mind analytic philosophy as it later arose from the late nineteenth century onward. Yet he is suggesting that analytic thinkers have been deeply mistaken to regard Hegel as an impediment to good philosophy, as someone to be left out of the discussion, someone on the wrong track whose theories should not be espoused, imitated, or further developed but rather exposed, ridiculed, and combated. Stekeler-Weithofer believes that the negative attitude toward Hegel virtually throughout analytic philosophy indicates that analytic philosophy has largely misunderstood, or misunderstands, itself. According to Stekeler-Weithofer, the consciously negative analytic relation to Hegel is subtended by an unconscious positive

relation to him, and that analytical philosophy is actually following in Hegel's footsteps. Since the theories of Hegel and analytic philosophy are continuous, no adaptation of Hegel, other than a translation of his admittedly barbarous language into current idiom, seems to be necessary. Stekeler-Weithofer puts his claim clearly, but perhaps not persuasively, in asserting that if one brackets the familiar analytic fixation on clarity and exactitude, then analytic philosophy can be understood as the most developed form of Hegel's views.[231]

Stekeler-Weithofer is insightful in pointing to difficulties in the self-understanding of analytic philosophy. The generally ahistorical self-understanding of analytic philosophy, suggested by Quine's reported joke about the difference between those interested in the history of philosophy and those interested in philosophy,[232] is now being usefully amended by Coffa, Friedman, Passmore, Hylton, Sluga, Passmore, Stroll, and others interested in the history of analytic philosophy. Yet one must wonder if the problem of reference is Hegel's central concern. One must further wonder if he has anything in his philosophical quiver that can reasonably be understood as a response to the problem of reference as it has been understood since Frege.

Stekeler-Weithofer's continuity thesis suggests three inferences. First, Hegel does not need to be transformed, or otherwise improved, in order to be made acceptable to analytic philosophy, since, on a fair interpretation, he is already an analytic philosopher. Second, Hegel and analytic philosophy share a common concern with the problem of reference, a problem to which Hegel responds in his critical view of logic. In applying the Kantian adjective "critical" to Hegel's view of reference, Stekeler-Weithofer suggests that Hegel treats this theme in a critical, as opposed to an uncritical, or perhaps dogmatic, manner. Third, we can infer that for Stekeler-Weithofer analytic philosophy is defined by the problem of reference as it emerges

in Frege and develops in later analytic figures such as Russell, Strawson, and Sellars. He rejects the view of someone like Dummett, who atypically regards the demotion of epistemology in favor of the analysis of language as central to analytic philosophy.

Stekeler-Weithofer develops his view of Hegel as an analytic philosopher in a detailed, clear, and useful commentary on Hegel's *Encyclopedia Logic.* Stekeler-Weithofer's thesis presupposes that analytic philosophy turns on the solution to the problem of reference, and that Hegel offers an early analysis of this problem. Obviously Hegel can only be an analytic philosopher in Stekeler-Weithofer's sense if he has a theory of reference and if espousing a theory of reference is sufficient to identify a thinker as an analytic philosopher. Now a theory of reference is not in fact a necessary condition to be an analytic thinker. John Rawls has no theory of reference, but no one doubts he is an analytic thinker. A theory of reference is also not a sufficient condition to be an analytic thinker. If, for instance, a plausible argument could be made that Heidegger had a theory of reference, it seems doubtful anyone would conclude he was an analytic thinker. Though concern with the semantic question arising out of Frege is a central theme running throughout later analytic philosophy, it is questionable that merely to detect an interest in reference on Hegel's part would be sufficient to make the case for him as an analytic thinker.

This leaves the question: Does Hegel have a theory of reference? Now Stekeler-Weithofer's answer contains an important nuance. He is not claiming that Hegel's *Science of Logic* constitutes a critical theory of reference. He is rather claiming that Hegel's view of logic as science, what today might be called rigorous logic, a theory expounded in closely related ways in the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the so-called *Greater Logic,* should be regarded as putting forward a critical theory of reference.

Stekeler-Weithofer helpfully counters the mythological ana-

lytic self-understanding as an unprecedented philosophical development, say through its rigor or its choice of subject matter. He usefully points out surprisingly many areas of overlap between Hegel and various analytic theories of reference. Thus Hegel anticipates Frege's claim against Kant that all arithmetical truths are analytic;[233] Hegel's distinction between the possible and the real systematically corresponds to Frege's distinction between thought as content and as the existence of this content which is asserted in speech acts;[234] Hegel anticipates Frege's truth-functional logic through his distinction between pure being and pure nothing, which can be identified with truth and falsity;[235] and Frege, Wittgenstein, and Tarski are not the first to recognize the importance of truth-functional, or fulfillment, conditions for semantics.[236]

In calling attention to these aspects of Hegel's theory of logic, Stekeler-Weithofer helpfully rehabilitates Hegel as the author of views that, even after the rise of modern logic, are still worth studying in detail. Yet Stekeler-Weithofer arguably does better in calling attention to the residual virtues of Hegel's position than in establishing a claim on behalf of Hegel to anticipate recent analytic theories of reference. In respect to Hegel's supposed anticipation of analytic theories of reference, Stekeler-Weithofer does not have formal logic in mind. He is well aware of Hegel's critique of the formal logic of his day. He depicts Hegel, not as a pioneer of a formal theory of reference, but rather as relativizing contemporary formal logic within a more inclusive theory of logic.

In claiming that Hegel's logic offers a theory of reference, Stekeler-Weithofer mainly has Frege in mind. He has almost nothing to say about such later proponents or opponents of the theory of reference as Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Sellars, Quine, Putnam, and Davidson. According to Stekeler-Weithofer, Hegel features a dialectical, or speculative, logic that is wider,

but also deeper, than Frege's formal logic. In Stekeler-Weithofer's narrative, Hegelian logic anticipates a number of Frege's basic moves, and substantially overlaps with Fregean logic considered as a special case embedded within a very different speculative logic. Certainly Hegel, who includes formal logic within logic in general, intended to present a wider view of logic than any available in his day. Stekeler-Weithofer, who accepts Hegel's view that formal logic is merely an abstract form of concrete speculative logic, supports Hegel's view in contending that ordinary formal logic leaves out of account the dialectical and rational dimensions of speculative logic.[237]

According to Stekeler-Weithofer, who follows Hegel on this point, concrete content, which cannot be omitted, is always unclear, hence can never be grasped exactly. This yields a view of speculative logic as a theory of rationality, as distinguished from ordinary formal logic which works schematically since it is never quite adequate to represent what happens in the real world.[238] In Stekeler-Weithofer's reading, Hegelian logic differs from Aristotelian and Fregean logic as a metalogic, or as metascience in general, and speculative concepts, or categorial terms, are his way of working out a general method of reflection on the possible forms of human knowledge.[239] Like Strawson,[240] who never mentions Hegel, Stekeler-Weithofer believes that formal logic cannot grasp the fuzzy edges of human experience, which is the content of Hegelian logic. For Stekeler-Weithofer as for Hegel, formal logic ignores the central difference between factual, imperfect knowledge about experience and a hypostatized, but ideal, form of knowledge, or truth. As he correctly notes, Hegel's critique of the limited application of formal logic applies to Frege and Aristotle.[241]

Stekeler-Weithofer does better in defending Hegel's nonformal, speculative, dialectical logic against Frege's (and related types of) formal logic than in attributing a specifically Fre-

gean view of reference to Hegel. Stekeler-Weithofer develops his claim by insisting that Hegel's theory of reference turns on the ability to pick out distinctions in the real in respect to perception, experience, conduct, and behavior or action.[242] Hegelian reference is truth-functional since, when a proposition is asserted, we see that the conditions of its assertion are real and are really fulfilled.[243] According to Stekeler-Weithofer, what we now call "fulfillment," Hegel calls "Trieb."[244] He further claims that the fulfillment conditions of a pure proposition as such lead to the identification of reference in Frege's sense.[245]

This part of the argument is entirely unpersuasive. Since Hegel never mentions truth-functionality or similar topics, Stekeler-Weithofer is forced to take extraordinary measures in making a case for his interpretation. He points to a passage in the *Science of Logic* where Hegel uses the ordinary German term "Trieb" with respect to the so-called subjective idea.[246] Stekeler-Weithofer reads "Trieb"—a word that such contemporaries as Schiller and Fichte use as a technical term immediately before Hegel and that Freud later makes much of, and whose ordinary dictionary definitions are, in order, "(young) shoot, sprout, impulse, drive, instinct, sex instinct"—as referring to (logical) fulfillment.

Hegel, who is a careful writer, rarely uses words in nonstandard ways. It seems reasonable to believe that, like his contemporaries Schiller and Fichte, Hegel uses the ordinary word "Trieb" in an ordinary manner, but not in the extraordinary way (that is, referring to logic) that Stekeler-Weithofer arbitrarily invokes for the specific purpose of attributing a truth-functional view of logic to him. The urge to realize oneself in concrete form in externality, which Hegel arguably has in mind in utilizing the word "Trieb," should not be conflated with the conditions of truth-functional reference, which properly belong to a formal,

nondialectical logic such as Frege's, but are irrelevant to a non-formal, dialectical logic such as Hegel's.

Stekeler-Weithofer errs in not taking the obvious difference, and Hegel's view of the difference, between his speculative logic and formal logic more seriously. Here there are two issues to address. Is Hegel's logic a Fregean theory of reference? Or is it a theory of reference of some other kind? A Fregean theory of reference is normally understood as reference within the seminal distinction between sense (or meaning) and reference.[247] According to Anthony Kenny, in Frege's view the relation between a sentence and its truth-value is the same as that between a name and its reference.[248] Now Hegel never develops anything at all like a Fregean theory of reference. In fact, he could not, since Frege's theory presupposes reference to the mind-independent real world, in other words to metaphysical realism in the ordinary philosophical sense, which Hegel denies. For this specific reason, we can conclude that Hegel does not propose a theory of reference in Frege's sense.

There is no reason, and Stekeler-Weithofer advances none, to think Hegel provides anything resembling a truth-functional theory of reference in which the conditions of application of the terms are built into their usage. On the contrary, Hegel, who as Stekeler-Weithofer observes, eschews formal logic, hence formal reference, typically elaborates a nonformal, dialectical logic.

Does Hegel propose a non-Fregean theory of reference? This question is harder to answer, since, although it is difficult to interpret Frege, it is even more difficult to know what is meant by "reference" when the realm of discourse includes any non-Fregean view of reference. To answer, we need an idea of what we mean by reference. Now there is no end of views of reference to which we might turn. Yet since the list cannot be limited other than in an arbitrary way, for, other than in arbitrary fashion, we

cannot know what is meant by attributing a theory of reference to Hegel, it seems the question cannot be decided other than by fiat.

One last point concerns Stekeler-Weithofer's general conception of logic. He suggests that, since Greek antiquity, the term "logic" has been understood to be concerned with what he calls the general concept of reference and hence with the method of analysis of every content and meaning.[249] This view, which is perfectly general, and does not link logic to Frege, suggests that logic of all kinds, Fregean and non-Fregean, is concerned with reference. Yet if we take Aristotelian logic as an example, it appears more accurate to say that it is about what are often called sound reasoning practices than, say, about reference, or indeed anything resembling reference. As ordinarily understood, a theory of reference supposes that there is something to which one refers and treats the difficulty that lies in picking it out, say, by logical means. If we take seriously Stekeler-Weithofer's observation that Hegel equates logic with sound reasoning, it does not follow that it is also about a theory of reference. For there does not seem to be any good reason to concede that all logic of whatever kind is about the problem of reference. An Aristotelian syllogism in Barbara identifies a relation which supposedly must hold, but it makes no attempt to designate, identify, or provide a definite reference to any object at all. I conclude that, despite the considerable interest of his commentary on Hegel's view of logic, Stekeler-Weithofer demonstrates neither that it is a Fregean theory of reference, nor even that is a theory of reference of any kind.

3

Hegel, Idealism, and Knowledge

The Analytic View of Hegel

I have argued, through examination of the origins and later development of the analytic reaction to idealism, that the original, very influential, reaction against (British) idealism by Moore and to a lesser extent Russell was based on an at most precarious grasp of what they intended to reject. I have further proposed that their arguments, which are still often accepted without examination or debate as the basis for continuing to reject idealism, are unconvincing. I have finally argued that the currently nascent recuperation of Hegel for analytic philosophy also often features a precarious grasp of Hegel's theories.

It would be an error to regard the limited analytic turn (or return) to Hegel as a philosophical surrender of principle, an abandonment of basic analytic commitments, an acknowledgment of philosophical error, or as conceding, even implicitly, that the turn away from idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century was incorrect. The latter topic is not a theme in the present debate. It is doubtful that more than a handful of analytic thinkers have reflected on whether Moore's (or Russell's) critique of idealism was justified. Analytic thinkers now scrutinizing Hegel from an analytic angle of vision display little or no interest in reversing, or even in acknowledging, possible past mistakes in judgment, or in reviewing the early history of analytic philosophy. Rather, they are interested in determining what, given the prior rejection of idealism as a whole, Hegel might offer for the pursuit of current analytic philosophical projects.

As might be expected, the emerging analytic account of Hegel presents a view of his position consistent with various main tenets of analytic philosophy. Analytic thinkers, who are often more interested in developing their own views than in getting it right about Hegel's, are less likely to work through his position as a whole, more likely to pick and choose among various doctrines they find attractive for their own purposes, and more than likely to ignore other Hegelian doctrines.

As the differing views of Sellars, Rorty, Brandom, McDowell, and Stekeler-Weithofer indicate, analytic readings of Hegel are very diverse, and this reflects the great diversity of present-day analytic philosophy itself. It is incorrect to think there is a single canonical analytic line, a well-defined analytical statement of belief, an indispensable doctrinal commitment or philosophical credo, or anything more than a family resemblance among currently active members of the analytic fold.

There is more than one way to define analytic philosophy, for example, as the tradition emerging from Frege, as the refusal of idealism, and as the linguistic turn.[1] The idea of a linguistic turn, which is identified with Rorty, is not sufficient to identify analytic philosophy.[2] One problem is, of course, what this means and who falls under the proposed rubric. Rorty's conception distantly echoes Dummett's idea, mentioned above, that analytic philosophy originates in Frege's suggestion that analysis of language must precede epistemology. In Rorty's formulation, the linguistic turn suggests not only an interest in language, but a Wittgensteinian view of dissolving problems that many important analytic philosophers, including Quine, Putnam, and Davidson, do not share. Others deny that the linguistic turn as such is distinctive only of analytic philosophy. According to Habermas, hermeneutic and analytic philosophies offer complementary subtypes of the linguistic turn.[3] Yet a view of analytic philosophy as centering on language is insufficient to distinguish

it from other approaches, ranging from Plato's attention to language in the *Cratylus* to Heidegger.[4]

In part because the founders of analytic philosophy, Frege, Russell, and Moore, held dissimilar views, analytic philosophy was never unified on the doctrinal plane. Despite his atypical views, Quine, the most influential analytic thinker since the Second World War, contributed strongly over many years to softening radical analytic philosophical tendencies, hence helping to preserve at least a common analytic philosophical core. It seems likely that since his recent death, analytical thinkers will not come closer to each other but will rather tend to grow further apart.

Even at its inception, the huge difference between the positions of Moore and Russell meant that analytic philosophy was at best a hybrid movement, mainly united by its opposition to British idealism as well as by a shared concern to foster forms of traditional British empiricism. At the present time, when some analytic figures are becoming interested in Hegel, further eroding whatever doctrinal unity analytic philosophy may once have had, the movement mainly takes the form of a shifting series of alliances involving participants in a debate that is largely among themselves as they jockey for position inside the analytic establishment. This is the same analytic establishment that at least some important analytic figures have at various times regarded as coextensive with the limits of rational discourse.

The usual tendency for different observers to be attracted to different aspects of a given position is only heightened in respect to Hegel's unusually complex theories. It is featured, for instance, in the difference between religious and nonreligious readings originating in the schism between his right-wing and left-wing followers after he died, a schism that continues to this day. The diversity typical of the Hegel discussion is also preserved in various analytic approaches to his theories.

It is a mark of a first-rate philosophical mind that its texts can be and often are regarded as casting light on many different issues, and can be read and reread anew and often in different ways in later generations. Like only a very few other philosophers, Hegel is read from an astonishing number of perspectives. What seems to me most interesting about the present analytic treatment of Hegel, other than the fact that analytic philosophy is now reaching out to other tendencies, problems, and movements, is its attention to Hegel's contribution to knowledge.

Analytic attention to Hegel from this perspective effectively reverses the impact of three factors already referred to, bearing on the perception of Hegel's possible contribution to this theme. One is Kant's ahistorical, even arrogant claim that any theory of knowledge worthy of the name begins and ends in the critical philosophy. Another is Gadamer's suggestion that rapidly increasing scientific progress in the middle of the nineteenth century deflected attention from philosophical systems of all kinds. A third is the effect of the widespread return behind Hegel to Kant in the middle of that century which was motivated by the effort to tighten the link between philosophy and science. The latter motivation feeds seamlessly into three related phenomena: the rise of analytic philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Vienna Circle stress on physicalism and extentionalism, and the emergence around the same time of Husserlian phenomenology.

It would be as incorrect to think one can go beyond views of the world to somehow know the world as it is as it would be to suggest one can somehow go beyond various ways of reading Hegel to capture his position as it is. No one, including the author of a position, who can report on motivations and intentions, has privileged insight into it. No interpretation can be sure of capturing more than a possible way of reading a position.

Hence, there is no way to cut off the strife of interpretations, in a word no way, other than through political means, to eliminate the need for further debate.

Despite the obvious diversity of analytic philosophy, which resembles that of Marxists since Engels, in the discussion after Frege analytic thinkers have always shared a steady commitment to metaphysical realism. In returning now to Hegel, some analytic philosophers are suggesting that it is possible to maintain the traditional analytic stress on scientific rigor while appropriating Hegel for the specifically analytic pursuit of knowledge. Analytic thinkers who focus on an ordinary realist approach to epistemology tend to read Hegel in ways supporting that commitment. I suggested above that Hegel rejects metaphysical realism in favor of empirical realism. It will not be possible to outline Hegel's overall approach to knowledge, an immense and certainly very complicated topic which surpasses the scope of this discussion. Yet it seems useful to indicate reasons that, beginning with Kant, German idealism in general, including Hegel, turned away from metaphysical realism and outlined a very different, constructivist approach to epistemology.

German Idealism and Empirical Realism

The term "realism," which has been used in a great many ways, is still often used in a single metaphysical way, to denote the widespread, uncritical claim, which serves as a normative standard for all types of cognition, to know the mind-independent world as it is. The widespread contemporary disdain for the history of philosophy, which is certainly not confined to analytic thinkers—after the mysterious turning in his thought Heidegger increasingly featured the view that philosophy had lost its way since the early Greeks—makes a virtue of ignorance in suggesting that

a grasp of prior discussion is not relevant, and certainly not indispensable, to resolving philosophical questions. For analytic thinkers now turning toward Hegel, understanding the German idealist commitment to empirical realism is rendered more difficult by the widespread, but uncritical, analytic commitment to metaphysical realism, as well as by a related antipathy toward empiricism of all kinds. Since philosophical doctrines normally arise in response to perceived problems and prior debate, it will be useful to reconstruct the problem of knowledge as it appeared to Kant and his idealist contemporaries in order to make sense of the German idealist turn from metaphysical to empirical realism.

Epistemological commitments to realism, skepticism, and constructivism are tightly related. Depending on the normative view of knowledge one holds, the demonstrable failure to make out claims for metaphysical realism can be diversely interpreted as an argument for epistemological skepticism or again as an argument for epistemological constructivism. Someone like Rorty, who buys into the metaphysical realist view that to know is to know the mind-independent real as it is, is forced into epistemological skepticism by the inability to demonstrate such knowledge.

Rorty at least exhibits the virtue of consistency. Putnam, who has always been a realist, ought, like Rorty, to have been a skeptic in his internal realist phase. It is inconsistent to hold that our theories offer different views of one and the same real if we cannot identify which theory correctly depicts it and thereby enables us to reject skepticism.

Epistemological wars have long been fought on a terrain defined by metaphysical realism. Recent analytical attention to this theme continues a lengthy infatuation with metaphysical realism, a bad habit that began very early in Western philosophy. A metaphysical realist criterion is widely accepted to justify as well

as to undermine assertions of objective cognition about a wide variety of topics, such as epistemology and morality.

Realism has a long history going all the way back to ancient Greek philosophy. Plato proclaims metaphysical realism with his suggestion that some people, on grounds of nature and nurture, can literally see the real. In his writings, Plato combines dual commitments to metaphysical realism and epistemological intuition. According to Plato, there can only be knowledge in the full sense if some among us can go beyond mere hypothesis to intuit what is as it is.[5]

Plato's influential form of realism, which is sometimes called Platonic realism, echoes through the later debate on knowledge. Modern philosophy, which abandons the theory of forms often attributed to Plato, understands as real what Plato sees as mere appearance. In modern times, at least since Descartes, the cognizable real is no longer understood as the realm of forms or ideas, but as the mind-independent world.

Metaphysical realism, which is restated by Descartes, is a staple of analytic philosophy, perhaps since Frege, but at least since the beginning of Anglo-American analytic philosophy with Russell and Moore. It is illustrated in familiar claims that the external world exists and we know it as it is. Despite Moore, no idealist denies the existence of the external world. It would indeed be absurd to do so, since there seems to be no way to argue for such a conclusion. On the contrary, in making a grasp of the mind-independent world as it is the condition of knowledge, Moore raises the bar so high that he invites the very skepticism he intends to defeat. Similarly, Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description comes down to the claim that in suitable ways we are directly acquainted with the real as it is. Since to know the world as it is makes no sense if it does not exist, and since a metaphysical realist claim for knowledge only makes sense if it does exist,

metaphysical realists are committed to affirming the existence of the external world and to rejecting the supposed idealist denial of the existence of the external world.

The nascent analytic return to Hegel combines the traditional analytic commitment to metaphysical realism with an implicit rejection of Moore's canonical criticism of idealism for allegedly rejecting the existence of the external world. Brandom and McDowell both appropriate Hegel on the basis of the standard analytic doctrinal commitment to metaphysical realism. The former reiterates the canonical normative view that to know is to know the real as it is, and the latter analyzes the concept of an empirical constraint. Both implicitly challenge Moore's rejection of idealism and hence of Hegel. Although each rehabilitates Hegel in his own way, to the best of my knowledge neither devotes more than cursory attention to making sense of Hegelian idealism, much less of idealism in general.

Hegel, who insists on the objective cognitive, does not deny the existence of the external world. His precise form of realist commitment is still not well understood.[6] Habermas, for instance, who has long preferred the very early Hegel to the mature Hegel, has recently restated his preference by contending that Hegel, unlike Fichte and Schelling, later abandoned his early interest in realism.[7] Habermas's critique, which presupposes an uncritical commitment to metaphysical realism, can be restated as follows: metaphysical realism is a necessary condition of knowledge; and, in abandoning metaphysical realism, the mature Hegel falls below the level reached by Kant and maintained by Fichte and Schelling.[8]

Habermas's reading reflects a familiar but erroneous metaphysical realist reading of Kant, whose cognitive insight is supposedly lost in Hegelian idealism. To be sure, Kant, who is not a careful writer, often has trouble making up his mind. His texts reflect his hesitations on crucial points. There are passages in his

writings that offer support both for metaphysical realist and for empirical realist readings of the critical philosophy. A passage tending to support the former interpretation is the definition of sensation as the causal impact of an object on the capacity to represent (*Vorstellungsfähigkeit*).[9] A passage tending to support the latter reading is the assertion, which sounds suspiciously like Berkeley, that any and all perceived qualities are secondary.[10] Yet Kant, whose idealism is clear in his constructivist commitment, was not, or was not only, a metaphysical realist. In fact, Kant's Copernicanism presupposes a basic distinction between empirical realism, or objects as given in experience and knowledge, and metaphysical realism, or objects as they can be thought but not known since they cannot be experienced.

The steady analytic inclination toward metaphysical realism sometimes leads to an effort to read the critical philosophy as realism without idealism. Strawson, an important analytic thinker as well as a very good analytic Kant scholar, typically stresses a metaphysical realist reading of Kant,[11] while downplaying, in fact simply rejecting, his idealism.[12] This is problematic since Kant's position is more than a mere aggregate of ideas he happens to favor. Rather, it is intended by him as constituting a system in which everything comes together under a single leading idea.[13] The systematic character of his thought, which, he insists, alone makes of it a science, prohibits picking and choosing among doctrines one might accept or reject in another thinker. To reject his idealism is in effect to reject his position. In other words, in virtue of his conception of the nature of rigorous philosophy, since one cannot refuse Kant's idealism while remaining committed to the critical philosophy as Kant understands it, one either has to have Kant whole, as it were, or not at all.

One virtue of Strawson's interpretation is that he obviously grasps the crucial difference between ordinary, or metaphysical

realism, which Kant rejects, and empirical realism, which he recommends. Strawson is clear about the basic, but crucial point that Kant is not claiming to know things as they really are apart from the cognitive subject. Yet he goes too far in claiming without qualification that Kant in effect holds that the cognitive subject is affected by a real external world.

There is a difference between what Kant may want to say and what he legitimately can say on the basis of his theory. Kant may in fact believe, as probably we all believe, that we are indeed affected by a mind-independent, real external world. Yet epistemology is not about what, or not only about what, we contingently happen to believe, but rather about what we are entitled to assert through adequate philosophical argument. For Kant, only a transcendental argument is adequate, hence only a transcendental argument could acceptably demonstrate there is a mind-independent real world that affects the subject. Kant can certainly suppose, but not, however, know through a transcendental argument, or indeed in any other way, that we are affected by a real external world. In an important passage, already referenced, Kant carefully says that the thing in itself can be thought but not known, or more precisely thought of as the cause of which appearances can be thought of as the effect. This not only denies that we know the mind-independent world as it is; it also denies that we know that it causes our perceptions.

Kant's denial of any way to know we know an independent object, in his terms the thing in itself, sounds the death knell of metaphysical realism, as such realism is usually understood, in two ways. First, it suggests we do not and cannot know we know the world as it is, an inference that Strawson acknowledges. Second, it means, despite what Strawson claims, that we cannot know that the mind-independent world affects us. Indeed, we cannot know this is the case if we cannot also know the

world as it is. We can know only that we are affected, although we cannot say by what we are affected.

Is either Kant or Hegel a metaphysical realist with respect to knowledge? As has been repeatedly pointed out, the answer must be negative if this means claiming to know the mind-independent world as it is. But it does not follow that either Kant, Hegel, or both cannot be realists in a different, arguably more interesting sense. The most interesting type of cognitive realism does not concern the unknowable mind-independent real, or the real in itself, but rather the real for us, or again the empirically real, that is, precisely that kind of realism that is excluded from consideration by the habitual appeal to binary oppositions, but which is the only realism that directly relates to human knowledge.

Analytic philosophy maintains, as part of the supposed incompatibility between idealism and realism, that at most one can subscribe to one of the two, but not both. This is a false opposition. In the German idealist tradition, Fichte, who examines this opposition in detail, shows that realism and idealism are not incompatible. In fact, according to Fichte, they are inseparable, since realism, which he understands as the standpoint of practice, or life, can only be made intelligible on the basis of idealism.[14] Whatever the success of Fichte's theory, it is at least clear that Kant intends to combine empirical realism, as opposed to metaphysical realism, and transcendental idealism within a single position. We can then safely say he is, and means to be understood as, committed to empirical realism.

Following Fichte, Hegel contends that the opposition between idealism and materialism, or realism, is without significance.[15] Like Kant, Hegel. who treats the contents of conscious experience as real, is an empirical realist. The main difference between Kant and Hegel in this regard is not the dual commit-

ment to idealism and realism, but Hegel's insight that Kant's account of noumena, or things in themselves, is superfluous in making sense of phenomena, or empirical reality. Kant, who initially formulates the problem of knowledge as a problem of representationalism calling for a representationalist solution, tries but fails to solve the problem of representation while offering an argument against representationalism in any form, as well as a replacement for it in the form of constructivism. Kant takes a contradictory stance in his commitment to representationalism, which, as part of his Copernican revolution in philosophy, he also depicts as a doctrine impossible to defend. Hegel, who agrees with Kant in rejecting any form of representationalism, accordingly makes no effort to provide a representational approach to knowledge. He sees the difficulty as insoluble and unnecessary. He simply drops the whole problem by giving up both terms: representation, understood as a relation to an external object; and the external object outside the mind, which it is our business to know as it is. Hegel simply gives up the effort, which still motivates Kant's original understanding of the problem of knowledge, of trying to know the way the world is in favor of restricting knowledge to objects as given in empirical experience, which, accordingly, exert an empirical constraint on our theories about them. A simple, but not inaccurate, way to put the point is to say that in his account of cognition Hegel retains Kant's view of empirical realism while discarding any reference to things in themselves, or mind-independent reality, hence to metaphysical realism, as the object of knowledge.

Hegel on Subjectivity

The relation between objective knowledge and subjectivity becomes problematic early in the Western tradition in the dispute between Plato, who favors knowledge of what is as it is, and Pro-

tagoras, who favors human knowledge. Plato's famous critique of Protagoras does not settle the issue, which reappears at intervals in the later debate. But it provides an extremely influential version of the canonical view of knowledge as apodictic, unrevisable, in time but not of time, and following from a grasp of the mind-independent real in ways independent of the cognitive limits of finite human beings.

The Platonic view that one can, under appropriate conditions, go beyond hypothesis and directly grasp the real,[16] which is compatible with the conception of philosophy as a form of dying, is clearly threatened by the modern stress on subjectivity as the necessary clue to objectivity. The modern debate on knowledge features ambivalent attitudes toward subjectivity, which is inconsistently regarded as indispensable for access to objectivity, but also as threatening to claims for objective cognition.

We can distinguish, for present purposes, between strong and weak views of the knowing subject. Weak views of subjectivity typically seek to protect the objectivity of cognitive claims through commitments to metaphysical realism and the rejection of psychologism in any form. Strong views of subjectivity are unconcerned with psychologism and uninterested in metaphysical realism.

Kant, who never draws the conclusions for subjectivity following from his Copernican turn, defends a hybrid, inconsistent position. He makes do with a weak, restricted view of subjectivity, the so-called original transcendental unity of apperception, central to the critical philosophy. Yet his Copernican insight calls for a strong, or at least stronger, view of the subject that he never works out. Kant's later ambivalence is already latent in the dual Cartesian conceptions of the subject as actor or spectator, or again as passive or active, that is, as necessarily relying on God for claims to know, or as able to demonstrate them solely through argument.

In Kant's wake, those influenced by him divide roughly into two camps. On the one hand, there is the concern to defend objective cognition through an appropriately weak view of the subject, widely present in analytic philosophy as well in Husserl. On the other, there is the concern to work out the strong, or at least stronger, conception of the subject called for by Kant's Copernican turn, in which the subject constructs what it knows as a condition of knowledge. After Kant, this conflict erupts in the struggle between efforts to defend claims to know what is as it is in independence of the subject, which is understood transcendentally (Husserl) or simply deconstructed (the later Heidegger), and counterclaims in which the subject is seen as crucial for knowledge claims (post-Kantian German idealism, Marx and Marxism, classical pragmatism).

Opinions divide on the crucial issue of how to understand the subject for epistemological purposes. Descartes, who is a key figure, is simultaneously committed to traditionally strong views of cognition and to taking the subject seriously. The resultant tension is dissipated, but also maintained, by later thinkers who emphasize either a form of the Cartesian strong view of knowledge, or his view of the epistemological subject, and sometimes both.

Locke simply ignores the limits placed on human knowledge by Bacon. Bacon's acknowledgment of the limits of human knowledge is reinstated by Hume and followed by Kant. In Kant, the controversy opposing those influenced by Descartes's dual commitment to subjectivity and objective knowledge peaks in conceptions of the epistemological subject as able to accompany all representations [17] and the wholly rational, moral subject as lacking all (human) desire.[18]

Kant's famous distinction between the *quaestio facti* and the *quaestio juris* suggests that, since the nature of the human subject is not a relevant consideration, questions of validity are wholly

independent of questions concerning origins.[19] This leads him in turn to such positions as a simplified view of the subject as reduced to its epistemological (and moral) capacities, famously sketched in §§ 16–17 in the *Critique of Pure Reason;* to his concern to banish psychology from metaphysics;[20] and to his repeated objections to what he refers to as Locke's "physiological" approach to knowledge.[21]

A quasi-Kantian concern to protect claims to objective cognition by weakening the role of the subject persists in such analytic thinkers as Frege and at least the early Wittgenstein. In Frege's wake, Wittgenstein resists psychologism, which he understands as failing to understand that theory of knowledge is "philosophy of psychology," hence not psychology,[22] instead adopting a view of the subject as no more than the limit of the world,[23] but not a part of it.[24]

Analytic thinkers typically but not always defend objective cognition through a commitment to metaphysical realism while adopting a weak view of the subject. Analytic interests in behaviorism (Ryle), scientism (Sellars), eliminativism (Rorty), and artificial intelligence (Paul and Patricia Churchland) are all efforts to weaken concessions to subjectivity while maintaining strong conceptions of objective cognition. Hegel disagrees with most, perhaps all, analytic thinkers in stressing the strictly human character of the cognitive subject. Yet other analytic figures, such as Quine, who understand theory of knowledge as a branch of psychology, are not frightened by, but rather embrace, the prospect of psychologism.

Post-Kantian idealists, who abandon metaphysical realism, typically adopt stronger views of subjectivity while downplaying the effect of psychologism. After Kant and beginning with Fichte, there is a strong shift to an anthropological approach to claims to know. Kant's fear of what is now routinely called psychologism led him to take an anti-anthropological approach to

knowledge which is rapidly reversed in the post-Kantian German idealist stress on the human identity of the cognitive subject. In adopting a more robust conception of the subject, later German idealists increasingly close up Kant's central distinction between the finite human being and the cognitive subject. While giving up impossible claims to know the real as it is, Kant's successors increasingly rely on the human individual or group of human individuals as the subject of human knowledge while adjusting claims to know downward.

Fichte, as noted, sees the alternative between idealism and realism as a false dichotomy. Beginning with Fichte, all post-Kantian idealists follow Kant in giving up any claim to know the world as it is. In rethinking Kantian affection as what he calls a check (*Anstoss*), Fichte typically opts for a conception of cognitive objects as the result of an interaction between an unknowable world and a cognitive subject, or self.

If one follows the Kantian distinction between the origin and the truth of claims to know, the dispute between proponents of psychologism and antipsychologism is at least theoretically symmetrical. The former deny the distinction between psychology and logic in taking claims to know as psychological, or as partly psychological, and the latter maintain the same distinction in arguing that claims to know are not psychological but logical. Yet the symmetry between psychologism and antipsychologism, which is arguably compelling in theory, simply disappears in practice. Those committed to antipsychologism cannot establish the truth of claims to know without discussing their origins. It is always possible to act as if one could in fact make out a distinction between what is true and what is only taken as true. But it is no more possible to know that what someone takes as true is true than it is to know that what appears to be real is in fact real.

Proponents of antipsychologism have had more success in

refuting psychologism than in establishing their own claims. Kant's critical philosophy depends on a well-known but extremely difficult transcendental deduction of the categories, which probably no one accepts in the form he presents and which apparently cannot even theoretically provide closure.[25] Frege's noble desire never to take the origin of an idea for a measure of its validity fails to clarify how in practice to draw the crucial distinction between the psychological and the logical, the subjective and the objective. What if, as Quine implies in claiming that epistemology belongs to psychology, all claims for logic were based in psychology? What if what we call objective were always tinged with subjectivity? Husserl's quasi-Kantian claim that logical laws can only have apodictic certainty since they are not based on empirical considerations is normative but not necessary. His warning against conflating essences with consciousness of essences supposes, but does not demonstrate, that essences are not constructed but discovered.[26]

The suspicion of psychologism, the main contemporary objection to philosophical anthropology, unites such disparate bedfellows as Heidegger and Thomas Nagel.[27] Those in favor of the misnamed naturalizing of epistemology, which is often closely allied with scientism,[28] tend to reject efforts to naturalize the subject. To avoid psychologism, Nagel rejects as inappropriate any effort to argue outside the context of logic as now conceived on the grounds that that would cause a loss of contact with what he calls true content.[29] Yet neither he nor anyone else has so far explained how contact with the object can be understood without an adequate account of the subject. In short, some minimal form of psychologism, or philosophical anthropology, seems unavoidable.

The post-Kantian defense of Kant's antipsychologism, even in such specialized realms as logic and mathematics,[30] presents no significant arguments not already known to Kant. Husserl

builds on Descartes while avoiding the residual naturalistic aspects of a nontranscendental theory. He maintains a traditional Cartesian claim to apodictic knowledge by drawing a distinction between the empirical and the transcendental subject. Yet this distinction is inadequate for its assigned task. Even if Husserl could explain how a transcendental subject can know the world,[31] he cannot explain, and indeed no one has ever explained, how the empirical and transcendental aspects of subjectivity cohere within a single subject. To put the same point in his terms, there is no way to show that a finite human being is also a transcendental ego in relation to what he calls intentional objectivities.[32] Similarly, Alfred Schütz's exploration, influenced by Husserl, of the transcendental and then only later of the social realm fails to resolve the Cartesian problem of how one can ever come back from the transcendental plane to the world.[33]

It would be a mistake to regard the appeal to an appropriately robust conception of subjectivity as incompatible with knowledge worthy of the name. Philosophical anthropology is misunderstood as marking the downfall of philosophy. Heidegger is right that taking the subject seriously leads to philosophical anthropology, but wrong to think that after Descartes philosophy disintegrates into sociology. For as Descartes already saw, without an appropriately robust conception of subjectivity there is no access to objectivity. The problem, which is always the same, is not how to guarantee the traditional strong view of knowledge. The problem is what kind of claim for knowledge is practically possible in taking finite human capacities into account.

The post-Kantian effort to complete the critical philosophy presents a detranscendentalized, richer view of subjectivity, difficult to distinguish from philosophical anthropology, while appropriately revising claims to know. Following Fichte, who immediately rethinks the subject as finite human being, Hegel makes claims to know no longer dependent on the individual but

rather on the group. In response to Kant, and distantly following Herder, he indexes cognitive claims on standards adopted by the group at a given time and place, and rejects any effort to isolate or otherwise separate the psychological and the logical aspects of knowledge.

Removing the stubborn objection to psychologism immediately removes the main contemporary objection to philosophical anthropology. Philosophical anthropology figures in different ways in such disparate figures as Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Augustine, the British empiricists, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Dilthey. Hegel's little-studied conception of the subject is overdetermined, inter alia, by his refusal of ordinary cognitive realism, his concern to make good on Kant's Copernican turn, his criticism of Kant's minimalist view of subjectivity, his interest in post-Kantian conceptions of the subject in Fichte and Schelling, and his thinking through of the conditions of knowledge not in theory but in practice after Kant.

Though Hegel takes subjectivity at least as seriously as anyone in the philosophical tradition, his conception of the subject is not well known.[34] Hegel's interest in subjectivity runs throughout his main writings. The *Phenomenology* presents a view of the cognitive subject encompassing consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, and the latter as differentiated into art—that is, theory of art as truth and not as beauty—religion as a cognitive source, and philosophy as a theory of cognition. In the *Philosophy of Spirit*, the third part of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, he presents an account of human beings as spirit in the subjective, objective, and absolute domains. In his last book, the *Philosophy of Right*, he extends his view through a fine-grained account of human beings after the Industrial Revolution in the social and historical context of the modern world.

In virtue of their preference for theory of knowledge over cognitive practice, Descartes, the British empiricists, Husserlian

phenomenologists, and numerous analytic thinkers deemphasize, or simply ignore, the practical cognitive role of the finite human subject within the knowing process. Kant typically equates the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge of objects with knowledge of them. For such thinkers, the problem of knowledge comes down to the formulation of a theory, as opposed to a description of the practice, of reliable consciousness of the object.

For Hegel, the theory of consciousness is a part, but no more than a part, of the story of knowledge. He distinguishes types of consciousness while arguing for its utter inadequacy, in theory and in practice, as a self-contained framework for knowledge. With Kant in mind, he provides a nuanced account of three models: sense-certainty, perception, and force and understanding. His distinction between sense-certainty and perception takes seriously Kant's own distinction between sensation and perception. According to Hegel, mere sensation can at most tell us that something is but not what it is. He rejects British empiricism as it is normally understood, and allied views, as providing no more than the most minimal, undifferentiated claim to know. He further anticipates (and defuses) Moore's criticism of an alleged blanket idealist denial of the existence of the external world. According to Hegel, perception, which he understands on a model very similar to Aristotelian predication, tells us what something is by enumerating qualities to which it fails to provide a conceptual unity. The analysis of force and understanding addresses the dualistic, theory-laden cognitive approaches featured in Newtonian mechanics and Kant's critical philosophy. In Hegel's view, Newton and Kant propose the most sophisticated modern theories of knowledge, which, despite their considerable interest, end in unresolved dualisms between appearance and reality.

Hegel's critique of this well-known general epistemological model based solely on consciousness is more important than his individual criticisms of various models of consciousness. If he were incorrect about the inadequacies of models he examines, or others that later emerged, he could still be right that no single model of consciousness, no matter how well constructed, and no collection of such models, could possibly suffice as an account of knowledge. His observation that such theories lead and can only lead to unresolved dualisms between subject and object, knower and known, suggests that no account of knowledge solely based on consciousness can succeed.

The inadequacy of any approach to knowledge merely through consciousness suggests we must not only know, but also know that we know, hence that a successful theory of knowledge must also include a theory of self-consciousness. In shifting his focus from the perceptual object given in consciousness to the subject that takes itself as an object, Hegel extends the theory of knowledge to include self-consciousness. For Descartes, the problem of knowledge comes down to justifying an inference from the subject's certainty about its own existence to knowledge about the external world, from ideas that are subjectively certain to what is objectively true. But, as Hegel points out, what is certain is not therefore true, since truth lies beyond certainty. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel criticizes Descartes's inability to make the transition from certainty to truth.[35]

The problem Hegel considers is Cartesian, but the solution he provides is Kantian. A theory of cognition based on consciousness is inadequate, since it requires knowledge of the independent real. The solution lies in further elaborating Kant's Copernican claim that we must "construct" what we know.

Hegel rejects Kant's representationalism but accepts his constructivism. Hegel's own version of constructivism rests on the

anthropologically explicit premise that "self-consciousness is desire [*Begierde*] in general."[36] Desire is Hegel's version of an idea anticipated in different ways by many others (e.g. Plato's *thumos,* Aristotle's *thaumazein,* Spinoza's *conatus,* Leibniz's *petites apperceptions,* Fichte's *Streben,* and so on), which he reformulates in a specifically cognitive context. The history of philosophy is replete with conceptions of the human being as capable of reasoned speech, made in God's image, understood on the model of *Dasein,* and so on. Hegel's conception of desire is closely related to Aristotle's observation that all men by nature desire to know, which he develops through a detailed theory of self-consciousness based on his reading of Kant. Hegel's thesis is that it is because people desire to know themselves that they know anything at all. If it turned out that the anthropological premise of Hegel's argument were not true, then the wider epistemological argument to which it leads would also simply fail.

Hegel develops his account of self-consciousness on three levels: a general theory of self-consciousness under the heading of the truth of self-certainty, the justly celebrated account of master and slave, and the accounts of the freedom of self-consciousness in Stoicism, skepticism, and what he enigmatically calls the unhappy consciousness. For Hegel, who is concerned with the truth of what is certain, knowledge presupposes a distinction within consciousness between the subject that knows and the object as it appears. What initially seemed to be an independent external object, or the object in itself, turns out to be only the way in which the object appears in consciousness. Since the distinction between subject and object no longer falls between a subject and an independent object, but rather within consciousness, Descartes's problem, or the relation between reality and appearance, has been resolved.

For Hegel, there are degrees of self-consciousness, hence degrees of satisfaction motivated by desire. This suggests an anal-

ogy between knowledge, consciousness, and self-consciousness. Hegel distinguishes two main types of cognitive interaction: between a subject and an object, and between a subject and another subject. The Cartesian theory of self-consciousness exemplifies the first type of cognitive interaction, which requires no reference to the social context: we become self-conscious in the vain effort to deny our own existence. According to Hegel, on the other hand, we only become aware of who we are in and through our relations to others: knowledge, including self-knowledge, which depends on the relation among individual human beings, is necessarily and inherently social. Satisfaction of desire, hence self-consciousness, requires an appropriate form of interaction with another self-consciousness.

According to Hegel, the theater for the emergence of self-consciousness is social inequality. In noting that self-consciousness is a social product derived from interpersonal relations, Hegel shifts the account of subjectivity, hence of the conditions of knowledge, away from the logical reconstruction of the conditions of knowing to analysis of the social world. Unlike Descartes (and perhaps Augustine and Montaigne as well), for Hegel self-consciousness is not all or nothing but a question of degree. Like Rousseau, he understands social life as an ongoing struggle for recognition with vastly different possible outcomes. His expositions of the master-slave relation and of free self-consciousness describe the social constitution of the cognitive subject.

Hegel's view of self-consciousness, hence subjectivity, stresses social conflict within a social context. According to Hegel, the intellectual freedom required for knowledge and provided by self-certainty, or self-consciousness, is not a simple given; nor is it reached, as Descartes and Sartre hold, through mere introspection. In his theory of prethetic consciousness Sartre maintains it is always possible for a cognitive subject, conscious of

other things, to become self-conscious. For Hegel, on the contrary, self-consciousness in the full sense of the term, or self-certainty, can only emerge through real social conflict, which is missing in Sartre's more abstract account.

Hegel and Epistemological Contextualism

The idea of context appears early in the Western philosophical tradition. Aristotle indexes types of knowledge to specific cognitive domains, but for Descartes, who denies the importance of context, there is knowledge in general without restrictions of any kind. Post-Cartesian accounts of reason are often undifferentiated, as if reason, independent of context, were always and everywhere the same. Kant tracks a single conception of what is in principle unrestricted reason, or reason independent of time and place, through epistemological, then moral, and later aesthetic domains. On the contrary, Hegel, who contextualizes reason, regards human reason, hence human knowledge, as necessarily and always indexed to the particular conceptual frameworks of different cognitive disciplines, as well as more generally to the historical moment.

The main work of the *Phenomenology* lies in distinguishing and testing the limits of successive models of cognition, nested as it were within each other like so many Chinese boxes. The accounts of levels of consciousness and self-consciousness have already been briefly described. In the remainder of the book, Hegel distinguishes a series of levels of reason, culminating in an account of so-called absolute knowing (*absolutes Wissen*), as distinguished from absolute knowledge, a term that never occurs in Hegel's texts. Absolute knowing is a thoroughly philosophical conception that is the result of thinking through the process of knowledge, as distinguished from any particular cognitive constatation.

Hegel considers art, religion, and philosophy, and in other works, notably the *Philosophy of Nature*, natural science, as main sources of knowledge, in short all the many different forms of cognition that existed when he was writing. He differentiates a series of stages culminating in a fully adequate form of objective cognition within the limits of conscious experience. For Hegel as for Aristotle, types of cognition are relative to the cognitive domain. Art and religion provide representational depictions of what, according to Hegel, they can describe but finally not know. In rejecting the cognitive claims of a representational approach to the mind-independent world as it is, hence metaphysical realism, Hegel follows Kant. Like Kant, Hegel presupposes an unbridgeable dualism in the representation of a transcendent object, which, for that reason, cannot be known, hence is simply uncognizable. It cannot be shown that a representation correctly grasps a mind-independent object as it is. It follows that cognitive representation of all kinds, hence representationalism as such, falls short of knowledge in the full sense, indeed in any meaningful sense, since it freely thinks but cannot know its object.

Representationalism fails because it begins from an ontological dualism that prevents an epistemological solution. The proper approach is to make no assumptions whatsoever about what is, such as about the world in itself. Hegel understands philosophy as alone among the sciences in presupposing nothing.[37] According to Hegel, rigorous, or scientific, philosophy rather proposes an immanent, self-developing, and self-legitimating account of knowledge based on the contents of consciousness, with no suppositions about the mind-independent external world.

Ordinary empiricism, as illustrated in English-language philosophy, which relies on directly grasping the cognitive given, is generally anticontextual. It features claims to what is as it is

that do not depend in any way whatsoever on context. The analytic critique of empiricism, which took up most of the twentieth century, resulted in a widespread shift to epistemological contextualism largely due to the later Wittgenstein. The genesis of this shift can be illustrated by Wittgenstein's enigmatic private language argument, roughly the denial of the very possibility of a private language,[38] and by his related attack on Moore's commonsense form of empiricism.

Hegel also favors epistemological contextualism, or the dependence of knowledge claims on the surrounding context. His careful differentiation of types of epistemological context leads to a very rich conception of the relation of knowledge to the surroundings in which it emerges. We can reconstruct his view as complex claim presupposing a distinction between first-order constatation and second-order conceptual frameworks. It is a view like those of Kant and the later Wittgenstein, but unlike, say, those of Russell and the early Wittgenstein, who favored a logical atomism directly concerned with the relation of words to individual facts as opposed to forms of holism favored by idealism, or of Davidson, who proscribes conceptual schemes of all kinds,[39] Hegel denies we can ascertain facts ("This is a pink elephant") or values ("Pink elephants are better") without presupposing an underlying conceptual framework. Hegel's argument in favor of conceptual schemes, or frameworks, is the now familiar one that so-called facts, in practice all constatations, are overdetermined by, hence dependent on, the way they are identified. Different frameworks provide different constatations. To take a well-known example, where on the basis of classical mechanics Newton "saw" planetary orbits, on the basis of relativity theory Einstein later "saw" geodesics.

A significant difference between the forms of contextualism featured in Wittgenstein and Hegel lies in the latter's more de-

veloped understanding of context. Wittgenstein's conception of context is very spare and undeveloped, a device he employs with very little reflection upon it. In Hegel, the cognitive subject, hence human knowledge as it arises within the group, is contextualized in at least four distinct ways: within the prevailing social context, then within a specific cognitive domain, further within a specific conceptual framework, and finally within the ongoing historical process.

Hegel treats the cognitive force of the prevailing social context under the dark, little understood concept of spirit, or what one can call "impure" reason—in contradistinction to Kantian pure reason—as it unfolds in the practice of finite human individuals. Spirit, which is his replacement concept for Kantian reason, is a secularized version of a Christian religious idea with roots in the comparatively underdeveloped—that is, if placed alongside doctrines of the Father and the Son—concept of the third person of the Trinity. Hegel follows such predecessors as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Fichte, and especially Herder in giving spirit an important conceptual dimension within his approach to philosophical knowing. In the *Phenomenology*, he discusses it inter alia with respect to ethics, legal status, culture, morality, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, morality, and other themes.

There is a profound difference between Kantian reason and Hegelian spirit, between Kant's a priori, or theoretical, ideal, atemporal deduction of immutable categorial frameworks and Hegel's practical negotiation of unstable, mutable conceptual frameworks in real time. The crucial step from reason to spirit is equivalent to rejecting Kant's effort to isolate the logical and the psychological conditions of knowledge by invoking a conception of the cognitive subject reduced to its mere epistemological capacities. The alternative lies in accepting the Hegelian thesis

that knowledge depends on finite human beings, hence is never wholly neutral. This step occurs in the post-Kantian reformulation of the subject, in the transition from the passive, theoretical attitude of the spectator described by Descartes and rampant in later philosophy, to the more active attitude of individuals who realize themselves in what they do.

Hegel's general point, which is easy to overlook in the bewildering series of topics he treats, is that specific cognitive claims are invariably relative to mutable conceptual frameworks, which are always subject to further negotiation among different observers. Hegel works out the idea that claims to know depend on spirit with respect to general forms of reason and specific categorial frameworks, for instance in his familiar view of ethics as distinguished from morality. Since knowledge and context are inseparable, ethical action is not meaningful in general, such as through a principle that makes no concessions for local circumstances. Rather, it is meaningful within particular situations.

According to Kant, the realm of practical reason is governed by specifiable universal laws applicable in the same way to any and all rational beings in all times and places, hence, without respect to specific local conditions. Hegel objects that such abstract moral laws are without content, since they apply to everyone and no one. If Hegel is right, there are finally only local principles, based on specific factors informing particular situations. Unlike Kantian morality, which ignores who is in question, what their situation is, and the prevailing views in a particular historical moment, Hegelian ethics takes into account both the particular situation of the individuals in question as well as the views prevalent in a given community in sorting out right from wrong. Actions are to be judged, not according to their adherence to immutable laws derived through a priori reason, but rather with

respect to intents and purposes to be realized within the social context.

Contextualism and Historicism

Hegel's contextualism differs from its competitors in two main ways. First, it elaborately distinguishes a number of different levels and types of context within which knowledge takes shape. Thus Hegel correctly sees that if cognitive claims depend on context at all, then they further depend on the particular type of context. Second, and unlike many other contextualists, Hegel draws absolutely no distinction between contextualism and historicism. If Hegel is correct, the commitment to contextualism already entails a commitment to a historical conception of knowledge, hence to historicism, that is to a view about the intrinsically historical character of all first-order cognitive claims. In other words, for Hegel contextualism is inseparable from historicism, more specifically from historical relativism. What this could mean is mysterious, since Hegel never clarifies a view to which he appears deeply committed. Hence the onus is on the reader to construct and evaluate arguments that support Hegel's view of the historicity of knowledge. This section will clarify the claimed relation between contextualism and historicism, and the next section will defend this claim against some obvious objections.

Hegel's implicit claim for the inseparability of contextualism and historicism is surprising. Though there are many contextualists, especially among analytic thinkers since the later Wittgenstein, there are very few historicists. McDowell, who never endorses historicism, takes Gadamer's view of tradition seriously and interprets language as a repository of tradition.[40] Yet many contextualists treat cognitive contexts as if they were in-

variant, or as if their variability had no epistemological consequences. Thus to the best of my knowledge Wittgenstein never considers that claims to know might be relative, not only to the context, or language game, in which they arise, but also to the transient historical moment, hence to history.

Historicism, particularly historical relativism, is more frequently adopted than defended among philosophers who write in English.[41] In our time, arguably the most prominent defender of historicism is the Italian idealist thinker Benedetto Croce.[42] Historicism, which is central to Hegel's view of knowledge, is rarely developed in any detail, but crucially important to making sense of Hegel's claim about cognition as linked to the historical moment, hence historicist.

After extensive discussion,[43] there is still no widespread agreement about the meaning of "historicism,"[44] hence about what historicism claims and about the possible difficulties of such claims. Forms of historicism are widely represented in such thinkers as Vico, Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schleiermacher, and others. Since there is no agreement about the meaning of the term, it is not surprising that there are many, often incompatible views of historicism. For Heidegger, a deeply unhistorical thinker, historicism suggests a humanistic reading of the past from the perspective of the autonomous Cartesian cogito.[45]

I am concerned here with epistemological historicism, or the view that claims to know are indexed to historically variable conceptual frameworks, relative in that way to the historical moment, hence to that extent dependent on a particular time and place. Part of the difficulty of coming to grips with historicism is that it is usually presented in such an unclear fashion that it is not certain what is being asserted. An approach to cognitive perspectives as historical denies transhistorical truth, a view that is often taken as the only acceptable cognitive paradigm, in index-

ing claims to know to the prevailing cognitive framework, that is, to the particular cognitive framework that prevails at a given point in time but might later be replaced by another cognitive framework.[46] Those committed to epistemological historicism interpret this and related claims in very different ways. Types of epistemological historicism include, among others, Vico's claim that human beings can only know human history,[47] Herder's suggestion that each age must be viewed in terms of its specific characteristics,[48] Wilhelm von Humboldt's idea that each language provides a different world view,[49] and Schleiermacher's claim that each language forms a self-contained system of concepts.[50] More recently Heidegger has claimed to know history through the history of being.[51] Yet no one seems to know what that means or how it relates to a historical understanding of knowledge.

Historicism is a main, but confused, theme in historiography, where it has diverse, even diametrically opposed meanings. Examples include Ranke's reconstruction of history as it actually happened,[52] Troeltsch's view—anticipated in Augustine[53] —that only theological presuppositions prevent history from dissolving into histories,[54] Meinecke's suggestion that historicism overcomes political relativism by discovering the elements of transcendent truth contained in historical life,[55] and Croce's identification of history with thought.[56]

"Historical relativism," which refers to our incapacity to escape from the limits of our own historical moment, can be taken as suggesting that claims to know are objective but also historically relative. A knowledge claim that was historically relative but not objective would be uninteresting; and a knowledge claim that was objective but transhistorical would not be historically relative.

Artists, social scientists, literary critics, theologians, and historians accept the historical character of knowledge claims. Fer-

nand Braudel understands history as the collection of views of history.[57] He belongs to the Annales School, which studies history, not from the angle of vision of an individual, nor as concerns a single event, such as a battle or even a war, but with respect to the long duration (*longue durée*).[58] For a historian like Braudel, claims about history are always relative to a context stretching through historical time. Yet the idea that knowledge claims are in any sense historically relative has always waged an uphill battle in philosophy.

Everyone knows that Hegel is knowledgeable about and committed to history, but no one seems to be very clear about what this commitment amounts to.[59] Hegel's historicism in his thought is less often mentioned, even in detailed studies.[60] Beiser comprehends historicism as emphasizing the importance of history for understanding human institutions and activities as historical products. He understands Hegel's historicism as a method of philosophy dealing with such philosophical illusions as philosophy's supposed timelessness.[61] Westphal acknowledges that for Hegel human beings think on the basis of the prior intellectual inheritance while insisting on the need to distinguish Hegel's position from historical relativism.[62] Forster identifies two forms of historicism: what he calls intellectual historicism, or the claim that human thought changes in the course of history; and the idea of a general law of historical development. Forster believes that Hegel favors the former but not the latter form of historicism. He provides a detailed reading of the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology* as a historical progression in order then to show, through an equally detailed reading of the remainder of the book, that human thought changes throughout history.[63]

Probably no one, except for those thinkers committed to an extreme form of so-called *philosophia perennis*, denies that human thought changes over time. The more important issue is

whether such changes are intrinsically linked to history. Forster distinguishes no fewer than seven kinds of intellectual historicism in the course of arguing that types of thought are explicable in terms of specific social contexts in which they arise. This includes relating forms of thought to cultural formations such as Stoicism and skepticism, to specific historical moments, and to what he calls social explanations of specific types of thought.[64] Forster follows Hegel in claiming that thought advances through the effort to overcome the discovery of real contradictions in previous views.[65] He illustrates the view he attributes to Hegel through problems historically connected with Parmenides' influential, but paradoxical views about nonbeing.[66]

Forster's approach to Hegel's historicism reflects a traditional analytic commitment to metaphysical realism. For Forster, Parmenides' view of nonbeing is "a major conceptual development which especially interests Hegel . . . the development of a sharp distinction between the medium of *thought,* on the one hand, and the *reality* that thought is about. . . ."[67] Though Hegel is clearly interested in Parmenides, it is doubtful he is concerned with the distinction between thought and reality Forster describes. If that were true, then Hegel would be concerned with some form of the Kantian problem of how representation relates to its object, hence would be committed to metaphysical realism he clearly rejects. On the contrary, Hegel, who makes no claim about a relation between thought and the world, understood as mind-independent reality, regards that approach as mistaken.

Hegel's clearest statement about the relation of cognition to history appears in a famous passage on the state in the *Philosophy of Right.* Hegel famously writes: "Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time. . . . It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes."[68] His insight seems to be that, in a sense to be deter-

mined, cognitive claims are indexed to the historical moment. This insight is already implicit in the analysis of the reciprocal interaction of theory and object within the cognitive process described in the introduction to the *Phenomenology*. And it is suggested even earlier by the claim, as early as the *Differenzschrift*, that every philosophy, by implication his own as well, can be treated historically.[69]

The missing argument leading to the suggestion that all cognitive claims are indexed to a historical moment can be reconstructed as follows. Cognition is temporal since knowledge unfolds in time. It is further historical, since knowledge unfolds in human time. According to Hegel, we grasp cognitive objects through a cognitive process resulting in theories formulated to grasp the contents of experience. Later theories correct the perceived defects of their predecessors in the process of formulating a better conception of the conceptual object.

What constitutes an adequate theory is decided on both intratheoretic and extratheoretic grounds. This point applies to all cognitive domains, including natural science and specifically modern science. It is often the case that what on inspection appear to be purely intratheoretic criteria, or criteria accepted on wholly scientific grounds, which exclude cognitive reliance on anything outside the scientific process, are in fact accepted for extrascientific, or partly extrascientific, reasons. This suggests that an extrascientific point of view, *Weltanschauung, Zeitgeist,* worldview, perspective, and so on, functions in even the most tightly controlled cognitive process.

Variations of this point are suggested by a series of thinkers including Herder, Montesquieu, Marx, Dilthey, Karl Mannheim, and many others. It is often restated by a loose grouping of historians and philosophers of science including, for example, Thomas Kuhn, Imré Lakatos, Ludwik Fleck, Paul Feyerabend, the members of the Edinburgh social science group (David

Bloor, Harry Collins, Barry Barnes), and Steven Shapin. I will not be focusing here on the relatively uncontroversial claim that different members of a group tend to think (or even act) in certain ways. I will rather be focusing on the apparent inability, not in theory, but in practice, to isolate the scientific process from its surroundings. This suggests the utter futility of maintaining any pretense of a rigid cognitive separation between the scientific process, however conceived, and shifts in the surrounding web of beliefs in which it is embedded over time.

Instances in which science depends on extrascientific beliefs are easily identified. In the *Opus Postumum*, Kant is still pursuing his lifelong project of grounding the empirical sciences on an a priori philosophical foundation. As he grew older, Kant apparently came to believe that the existence of ether was not merely a possibility, but a necessity, therefore a reality.[70] Another example is Copernicus's continued commitment to aspects of earlier astronomy, such as the sphere of the fixed stars. Unlike the planetary spheres, in which he also believed and which he needed to explain planetary motion, he did not need a sphere of fixed stars for his astronomical theory.[71]

A less anecdotal example is the gradual secularization of the cognitive process in philosophy and science. This process would be misdescribed as a transition from the premodern and still religious to the modern and no longer religious forms of cognition. In the modern period, at the time of Galileo and even much later, the development of the new science was still subordinated to, or at least dependent on, theological concerns. Hegel sees the invention of independent thought by Luther as leading to the origin of modern philosophy in Descartes through what he calls the Protestant principle of independent thought.[72] Yet the relation between philosophy and theology is more complicated.

Despite its supposed break with the past, modern philosophy has still not succeeded in expelling theology from the philo-

sophical arena. Descartes is often taken as the pioneer of the modern philosophical tradition and as constructing an analysis of knowledge that does not rely in any way on religion. He claimed not to be guilty of what has come to be called the Cartesian circle—arguing for God's existence, and then invoking it in order to justify any and all claims to know, including the very claim that God exists. Yet in fact he clearly relies on God as an epistemological principle. A similar reliance can be detected within modern science itself. The gradual separation of science from religion, as part of the increasing secularization of the modern world, simply cannot be explained through the rise of modern science. For there are no sharp breaks between historical periods. Religion continues to function within science long into the modern period.

Kant attributes to Copernicus a sharp break with the past. In reality, Copernicus remained rooted in a thoroughly medieval worldview. In returning to ancient Pythagoreanism to calculate the movement of the spheres, the Copernican astronomical revolution suggests a new method of calculating this movement.[73] Copernicus, who does not have available a new, improved set of data, constructs a new cosmology on the same data furnished by Ptolemaic astronomy. Copernican astronomy remains still strongly connected to Aristotelianism, including earlier views of the universe as perfectly spherical and finite. The later development and acceptance of the Copernican theory were linked to extrascientific factors. One example is the religious belief that functioned as an obstacle to the acceptance of the new astronomy and was specifically invoked by the Church against Galileo, a crucial later supporter of Copernicanism, that Joshua ordered the sun to stand still.[74] Another is the mixture of mysticism and skepticism involved in Kepler's discovery of his three laws. This led to the abandonment of the dogma of circular motion, which, Westfall notes, paradoxically both perfected but also destroyed

Copernicanism.[75] Galileo, a Copernican, contributed in a number of important ways to the transition to the Copernican astronomical view. One instance is his explanation of the absence of observed parallax, that is, of detectable changes in the apparent positions of stars resulting from the changing position of the observer due to the orbital motion claimed for the earth. His attitude toward scripture was complex. He rebelled against a scientific view based on scripture, but for obvious practical reasons as part of his defense against the incursion of the Church also sought support for his theories within it. Newton also depends on religion. Unlike Galileo, who also appeals to religion, but presents a secular form of physical theory, Newton's God is an integral part of Newton's physics.[76]

The uneasy relation between scientific and religious factors in modern science illustrates Hegel's conviction that claims to know develop within, depend on, hence are indexed to, and simply cannot be isolated from the historical moment. Scientific theories holding sway at any given stage of the development of knowledge depend not only on the breakdown of a prior conceptual model, but also on the adoption of particular criteria that make possible the formulation of a successor theory, hence enable the continuation of the cognitive process.

This point can be restated in terms of Hegel's conception of spirit. According to Hegel, cognitive claims of any kind belong to the wider sphere of human culture. The cognitive accomplishments of the human spirit are always doubly situated within a specific cognitive domain and within the wider social context. It is theoretically possible to draw a sharp distinction between what occurs within a single cognitive domain, such as planetary astronomy, and the wider social context. Yet the persistence of theological motifs in Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and others suggests that cognitive domains are in practice inseparable from the wider social context. Since Hegel, this point has often been

made by others, often under his influence. Thus Dewey correctly observes that the modern period is the theater of an increasing, but never completed secularization, in which cognitive legitimacy can no longer be founded on a theological basis.[77] What can be described as an increasingly secular justification of claims to know is the gradual result of an oscillation between conflicting views over centuries, leading finally, if at all, to a generalized acceptance of the idea that the world, hence claims to know it, could, should, and perhaps some day will be understood in wholly secular terms.

Some Objections to Historicism

The historicist view that knowledge is intrinsically historical conflicts with many deeply held convictions. Epistemological historicism of all kinds rests on the idea that there are no genuine conceptual universals obtaining in all times and places. This general view runs counter, not only to ordinary religious claims for timeless truth, but also to its secular reformulation as cognitive claims for unrevisable, "ultimate" knowledge, leading to the alternative suggestion that, as Quine puts it, no truth is beyond the possibility of revision.[78] Secular examples include philosophical claims to grasp first principles (Aristotle, Kant), the widespread view of science as providing knowledge of the real as it is, or the view of mathematics as certain.

Standard cognitive claims to grasp unrevisable, hence apodictic first principles, to uncover the real as it is in itself, or to reach cognitive certainty of any and all kinds are controversial. Criticism of historical relativism typically denies that historical claims are objective, relying instead on transhistorical claims to know. Page is concerned with the consequences of any historicist model, which he rightly sees as incompatible with first philosophy as usually understood.[79] Perhaps. But this is only a

reason to reject it if one is already committed to first philosophy, which, as usually understood, is a form of epistemological foundationalism, hence indefensible.

The decline of epistemological foundationalism suggests first principles cannot be identified. The familiar view that science grasps the real, though widely assumed, is indemonstrable, a mere methodological supposition. Robert Nozick's conviction that reason tells us about reality, since reality shapes reason, is neither more nor less than an expression of epistemological faith.[80]

In the West, mathematics, particularly geometry, has served as the exemplar of knowledge at least since the time of Euclid. The conception of mathematics as ahistorical is called into question by discussions of its historical character.[81] Relevant themes include, for example, the rise of non-Euclidean geometry, and, as a result, the subsequent loss of mathematical certainty,[82] and the fragmentation of mathematics into different schools in debates on the foundations of mathematics at the beginning of the twentieth century.[83]

Epistemological historicism contradicts the basic Western epistemological metaphysical commitment to an ahistorical grasp of what is as it is. This presupposes a familiar vision of the cognitive object as in time but not of time, as unchanging, as literally eternal. The vast majority of contemporary philosophers subscribe to a normative conception of knowledge as ahistorical that is deeply rooted in the Western tradition. The coincidence of knowing and being that is the basis of the Parmenidean position runs counter to any conception of knowing what changes.[84] Yet an objection to historicism based on knowing the real would only be promising if this underlying claim could be demonstrated.

Numerous objections have been, and still others could be, raised against the historicist claim that knowledge depends on a

mutable conceptual framework. According to Carl Hempel, historical knowledge requires general historical laws. In appealing to the idea of a covering law model, he suggests that historical knowledge requires history to be understood on a natural scientific model.[85] Yet the similarity does not hold, for there are no general historical laws and if there is historical knowledge it is not comparable to knowledge in the natural sciences. Hempel, who imposes a physicalist model on all cognitive domains, fails to capture the historicity of the historical discipline. It is difficult to understand what is historical about history on the positivist model of, say, physics,[86] which Danto nicely refutes implicitly by linking it to its historical background.[87]

A related critique has been formulated from a fallibilist perspective. Popper strenuously criticizes historicism, which he idiosyncratically understands as taking historical prediction as the principal aim of the social sciences. These, he holds, taking his cue from the physical sciences, which function as his normative epistemological model, center on discovering the laws, trends, or rhythms of history.[88] Popper's attack rests on misattributing a positivist view of history to historicism. His objection is irrelevant, since epistemological historicism does not pretend to predict the future.

Epistemological historicism admits that conceptual frameworks in use at any given point in time may be altered or even discarded at some future time. Beginning with Parmenides, with the prominent exception of Heraclitus, a succession of early Greek thinkers already objected to the supposed inability to know what changes. Starting with Aristotle, it is often claimed that at least some cognitive principles do not change. This point is widened in the modern concern with invariant conceptual schemes, or cognitive universals.

The ancient conviction of the inability to arrive at reliable knowledge of what changes, which is widely influential, mo-

tivates, for instance, Aristotle's distinctions between moral excellence and practical excellence, and practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom.[89] This conviction derives from a prior commitment to a specific normative conception of knowledge as the grasp of the unchanging. The same normative conception of knowledge derived from mathematics is much later called into doubt in any form by the subsequent loss of mathematical certainty.[90] This doctrinal commitment leads to the argument, according to which either the cognitive object is unchanging or knowledge is impossible. Yet it has never been shown that knowledge is impossible if the cognitive object changes. A cognitive object that changes does not prevent knowledge as such; it prevents at most some normative conceptions of knowledge. We know an increasing amount about the universe which, according to current theories denying a steady state, has been constantly changing since the so-called big bang. Other than custom, there is no reason, none at all, to accept the normative view of the cognitive object as unchanging as a necessary condition of knowledge, and also no reason to believe that a change in the cognitive object impedes or prevents knowledge of it.

The familiar claim to discern an invariant set of necessary cognitive principles is intended to bolster assertions for objective knowledge. Aristotle aims at necessary principles of all rational discourse, and Kant, perhaps with Aristotle in mind, aims at an invariant conceptual scheme. This claim to discern an invariant set of necessary cognitive principles can be formulated in strong or weak versions. In a strong formulation, it denies cognitive change, for instance change in belief from one group to another, or change in belief over time. In a weak formulation, it admits change, or at least the possibility of change, such as a time when Newton's laws did not yet hold,[91] but maintains that at least some epistemological principles, conceptual schemes, or cognitive universals do not change.

The strong formulation of this view is found in Aristotle and Kant. Well before the author of the critical philosophy, Aristotle presents an apparently transcendental argument, holding there are at least some identifiable principles, such as the law of excluded middle, which are necessary conditions of any and all rational discourse.[92] This Aristotelian argument rests on the universal applicability of bivalent logic. This applicability is called into question by forms of discourse and conceptual objects that are not amenable to bivalent logic, such as multivariable logics and intuitionist approaches to mathematics. Mathematical intuitionists oppose mathematical formalists, requiring that concepts or objects acceptable for discussion be constructible, since it could turn out that they do not exist.[93] Aristotle, who argues in favor of excluded middle as indispensable, apparently provides a counterexample to his own theory with his reference to the sea battle tomorrow.[94] Since tomorrow lies in the future, hence it cannot now be determined whether the sea battle will or will not take place, this example seems to violate bivalence.[95]

Kant, who possessed a deep grasp of contemporary natural science, holds, but does not show, there is one and only one conceptual scheme that governs all rational beings, including human beings. A generally Kantian normative view of knowledge is widely disseminated in different cognitive domains, which often presuppose without argument that they possess an invariant conceptual framework.

The obvious difficulty with this line of argument is that principles that now appear destined to stand forever may, like the French monarchy, later need to be abandoned. Kant, who was interested in history, but had an ahistorical view of knowledge, thinks that Aristotle brought logic to an end[96] and that geometry was terminated by Euclid.[97] Kant mistakenly contends that his view of causality, which was illustrated by Newtonian me-

chanics, is a necessary condition of natural science. This specific contention is at least partially undermined by the change in the view of causality to a stochastic model as a result of the discovery of quantum mechanics.

A more recent variant of the "Kantian" view is Chomsky's effort to elicit linguistic universals supposedly underlying any and all natural languages. His theory has gone through many changes in reaction to criticism since its original formulation. In its most recent avatar, Chomsky abandons nativism, which he earlier depicted as deep structure,[98] postulating instead what he describes as a switching mechanism intended to account for the ability of a potential speaker to learn different natural languages.[99] The existence of the putative switching mechanism, which seems to have no biological basis and for which none has been claimed, has not so far been demonstrated. Yet even if it could be demonstrated, we could not conclude that it was historically invariant, nor valid transhistorically, nor independent of Darwinian evolution. Suffice it to say that so far neither Chomsky nor anyone else has as of yet established this or a related claim in any known cognitive domain.

Constructivism and Kant's Copernican Revolution

There is a veritable chasm, a basic conceptual difference, between the traditional idea that knowledge grasps what is as it is and the constructivist view formulated in different ways by a long list of thinkers including Hobbes, Vico, Kant, Hegel, Marx, perhaps Dilthey, Cassirer, Dewey, and others that we only know what we in some sense construct. Michael Williams illustrates the former view, which he does not hold, writing "that if we are to have knowledge of an objective world, the truth of what we believe about the world must be independent of our be-

lieving it. . . ." [100] In other words, there is an objective, or mind-independent world and we have objective knowledge inasmuch as we grasp it objectively, where "objectively," or "an objective claim to knowledge," means grasping what is as it is as distinguished from what merely appears to be the case.

The term "Copernican revolution" has come to be associated with a wide variety of figures including Copernicus, Kant, and even Wittgenstein.[101] Kant's Copernican revolution in epistemology commits him to epistemological constructivism, in virtue of which Kant clearly denies that we ever grasp the world as it is. The post-Kantian German idealist effort to perfect the critical philosophy is an effort by many hands to work out a theory of knowledge that eschews any form of the traditional claim for metaphysical realism while elaborating the constructivist insight central to Kant's Copernican revolution. In other words, Kant's constructivist solution to the problem of knowledge provides the essential clue for a theory of knowledge after one gives up metaphysical realism.

What is constructivism? In the current discussion, constructivism, also called constructionism or simply construction, is found in a variety of cognitive domains. It is sometimes linked to the social context through "social constructivism" and "social constructionism," related terms that are applied to a startling number of concerns running from child abuse to quarks. An example taken at random is Ludwik Fleck's view of the social construction of scientific facts, which strongly influenced Kuhn. According to Fleck, the modern concept of syphilis is nothing other than a social construction.[102]

Constructivism is frequently decried in recent discussion. It is more often regarded as a failure of philosophical nerve, or as a sign that idealism is lurking somewhere nearby. It is more frequently understood as an easy way out, so to speak, than as an acceptable solution for the deep problem of how to make out

claims to know after the apparent demise of any ordinary form of realism.

"Constructivism," which is typically used imprecisely, has vastly different, unrelated, even opposing meanings to different observers. Ian Hacking surveys numerous types of so-called social construction that were identified in the course of the culture wars,[103] and which were pilloried in the recent hoax by Alan Sokal.[104] Dummett equates constructivism with idealism in mathematics.[105]

In different ways, the idea emerges in a great many thinkers that we know and can know only what we in some sense construct.[106] What does "construct" mean in an epistemological context? Different lines of analysis have been worked out in different cognitive disciplines, such as mathematics, the philosophy and/or sociology of science, ethics, and theory of knowledge.

One source of epistemological constructivism is the idea, already familiar in Euclidean geometry, of the construction of geometrical figures with a straight edge and compass. In modern mathematics, the idea of construction has been broadened in different ways, such as the appearance of rival formalist and intuitionist forms of constructivism. Formalist constructivism concerns the verification of inference through a so-called synthetic, empiricist constructive check on its validity.[107] Intuitionist constructivism, on the contrary, concerns synthetic, intuitive, nonperceptual construction.[108]

Epistemological constructivism has spread from mathematics into other cognitive disciplines, where it has been alternatively resisted and welcomed. It is sometimes regarded as an alternative to realism in philosophy of science. Karin Knorr-Cetina, who understands science as constructive, not descriptive, argues that we can understand the results of empirical science as constructions. According to this model, the products of scientific

research are contextually specific, but contingent constructions, based either on "fabrication" or on selection among different alternatives in a space predetermined by prior choices.[109]

In examining the views of Pickering, Latour, and Woolgar, Hacking argues against social constructionism (his term for social constructivism) in science. According to Hacking, a social constructionist must hold that science could have developed other than it did, that classifications are not determined by the way the world is but, to use his term, essentially made up, so that science is basically unstable. Hacking, who regards all these views as false, does not show that science must have developed as it did, nor that scientific classification could not have been otherwise, nor that science does not depend on extrascientific factors. He also does not argue for his guiding assumption, which is as common as it is indemonstrable, that is, that science knows the way the world is.[110]

Epistemological constructivism is older than the term, which seems to be of recent vintage. The doctrine does not seem to be present in ancient philosophy. But beginning in such figures as Nicholas of Cusa, it appears throughout the entire later tradition. According to Hösle, who relies on Mondolfo, a list of those who claim that a condition of knowledge is to construct the cognitive object might include Ficino, Gassendi, Nicholas of Cusa, Cardano, Galileo, Campanella, Hobbes,[111] especially Vico,[112] and others.[113] Croce argues in detail that Vico's form of the doctrine is entirely original, though he concedes there are anticipations.[114]

Three of the more important modern forms of epistemological constructivism in philosophy are identified with the names of Hobbes, Vico, and Kant. Hobbes simply equates mathematical construction and demonstration. He adapts geometrical constructivism to epistemology by claiming that we know what we can either construct or directly deduce from constructions.[115]

Vico, who was unknown to Kant and the other German idealists, famously claims against Descartes that we know only what we construct, in his slogan: *verum et factum convertuntur.*[116] According to Vico, human beings cannot know nature, which they do not construct, but can know only history.

Though Kant was familiar with Hobbes's position there is no reason to believe he was familiar with Vico's, which was only rediscovered in the German debate later on. Kantian constructivism, which does not appear to depend on the influence of other figures, apparently develops through his extension of mathematical techniques to wider epistemological themes. Kant contends that mathematics concerns objects insofar as they can be exhibited, hence constructed, in pure, or a priori, intuition.[117] Mathematics constructs concepts, which "means to exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to the concepts,"[118] and which requires a nonempirical intuition, but philosophy reasons on the basis of concepts. Through his Copernican revolution in epistemology, Kant generalizes his view of mathematics as necessarily yielding certain knowledge to all cognition, obscurely contending that the subject constructs the cognitive object as a necessary condition of knowing it.

Kant's Copernican revolution is part of his complex reaction to metaphysical realism. Constructivists react against metaphysical realists by claiming we construct cognitive objects as a condition of knowing them. Metaphysical realists provide rigorous formulations of the widespread conviction that we uncover, discover, or reveal what we know. This conviction is widespread in ordinary life as well as in the natural sciences. Thus Stephen Weinberg, the quantum physicist, insists that science would be irrational if it did not discover the structure of the mind-independent real.[119]

Attention to the epistemological implications of Kant's revolution was apparently more frequent in Kant's time than in our

own. Except for Hans Blumenberg,[120] at least in English, and perhaps in other languages as well, attention is directed more often toward the legitimacy of attributing such a view to Kant than to interpreting it.[121] Kant's contemporaries were clearer about the relevance of the Copernican revolution for the critical philosophy than we are today. In referring to the change from the Ptolemaic geocentric to the Copernican heliocentric system, Herder argues that philosophy must become philosophical anthropology.[122] Reinhold[123] and then Schelling[124] each suggest that the critical philosophy can be understood as resting on a Copernican turn separating his position from prior thought. If the little understood Copernican turn is central to the critical philosophy, then, in spite of the immense Kant discussion, few observers have more than an imprecise idea of Kant or post-Kantian German idealism.[125]

Copernicus and later Kant use the term "revolution" very differently. For Copernicus, this term refers to what he still regards as the circular orbits of the planets. In Kant, it refers to the way his own Copernican turn depends on his understanding of Copernicus.

Kant's interpretation of Copernicus depends on a conception of science that was far from standard even when he was writing. Kant's interpretation includes three main points: First, there is a discontinuity, or scientific revolution, which, he believes, separates Copernicus's theory from earlier, premodern science. Second, after Copernicus modern science literally builds on a new, Copernican foundation, which differs not only in degree but in kind from any previous form of science. Third, Copernican astronomy points to the epistemological revolution that Kant intends to carry out in philosophy. Each of these assumptions is problematic.

The idea of a Copernican revolution in astronomy, on which Kant relies and which for many years was regarded as obvious,[126]

even as the central event of modern times,[127] now appears questionable. It has been seriously suggested that there was no scientific revolution.[128] Yet if there were no scientific revolution, then Kant's claims about Copernicus's supposed revolution in astronomy would not refer to a basic conceptual insight that is the basis of the critical philosophy, but rather would betray a misunderstanding of the history of science.

Kant thinks that Copernicus's astronomical innovations were central to the emergence of modern science, which reached a high point in Newtonian mechanics. He further thinks the same innovation has similarly revolutionary implications for the future science of metaphysics, which the critical philosophy is intended to make possible.

Everyone knows that in replacing the geocentric hypothesis by a heliocentric hypothesis, Copernicus displaced not only the earth, but also human beings, from the center to the periphery of the universe by creating a new absolute center occupied by the sun. Kant is attracted to Copernicus, not by the displacement of the human subject, but rather by the counterintuitive way in which the latter relates observed motion, such as the apparent retrograde motion of the planets, to the spectator, by explaining this motion as the result of terrestrial motion, or more precisely of the movement of an observer situated on the surface of the earth.[129]

Kant's claim that Copernicus made possible the rise of modern science presupposes a link between the Copernican explanation of the kinematics and the Newtonian explanation of the dynamics of the solar system. In Kant's opinion, Newton's theory depends on the change of perspective ushered in by Copernican astronomy. This change in point of view literally rendered possible Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation, which would not otherwise have occurred. The new science emerges on the basis of Copernicus's insight. But Copernicus does not solve the

problem, which remains on the agenda, and is only finally solved by Newton. The latter, by solving the central problem of modern science, represents its high point and, Kant implies, its end.

Kant's reading of the relation of Newton to Copernicus apparently relies on an early eighteenth-century view of the former. In the preface to the second edition of Newton's *Principia* in 1713, Roger Cotes suggests, according to Hans Blumenberg for the first time,[130] that Newton's epistemological contribution lies in proving from appearances that gravity belongs to all bodies.[131] We can regard Kant as generalizing Cotes's suggestion by relating Newton to Copernicus. According to Kant, Copernicus puts forward as a hypothesis a theory that remains unproven until Newton. Newton demonstrates that this theory is true through the law of gravitation, which provides a physical explanation for the perceived phenomena.

Kant's view of the transition from Copernicus to Newton innovates in two ways: in the role assigned to Copernicus and in the idea that scientific theories can be proven, or demonstrated.[132] In the later respect, he disagrees with later fallibilists like Popper, who believe theories cannot be proven but only disproven. In privileging the role of Copernicus in the rise of the new science, Kant departs from the now standard view, according to which the main impetus in the development of modern science lies in Galileo's application of mathematical techniques to the understanding of nature.[133] Kepler, who builds on Copernicus, is now usually regarded as the first modern astronomer because his three laws of planetary motion are thought to lead directly to Newtonian mechanics. Kant contends that, on the basis of Copernicus's hypothesis, Kepler formulated the laws of planetary motion, which were then proven through Newton's "central laws of the motions of the heavenly bodies."[134] Kepler's formulation of these laws is further the basis for Hegel's preference for Kepler over Newton.

The same point can be put more generally. As Kant reads modern science, Copernicus introduced a mere hypothesis. In the form in which he introduced it, the hypothesis lacked proof, which further required a philosophical formulation. In proposing to ground Newton's scientific demonstration philosophically through a general, or a priori, demonstration of the laws of science, and thereby proposing a normative view of natural science as necessarily founded in philosophy, Kant advances a conception of natural science as only relatively autonomous. In effect, though writing at a time when science was in the process of emancipating itself from philosophy, Kant—who still retained a Platonic conception of science as resting on and requiring legitimation by philosophy, a view refuted by Hegel—demands both scientific and philosophical demonstration of scientific claims.

From the contemporary perspective, in which the sciences do not depend for their validity on philosophy, numerous aspects of Kant's project of grounding Newtonian mechanics in the critical philosophy seem questionable. It is unclear that, as Kant assumes, scientific hypotheses can ever be proven, demonstrated, or shown to be more than merely useful, much less demonstrated apodictically. It is further unclear, as we now understand science, that it depends in any essential way on any other discipline, including philosophy.

Kant's overall view that science can be proven is central to his twofold claim to ground modern science as an epistemological enterprise and to ground knowledge in general through the Copernican turn. He believes that this turn alone shows the possibility of objects of experience and knowledge. What does it mean to know? His critical philosophy features a representationalist view of the problem of knowledge, described in his famous letter to Herz, written towards the start of his critical period. Here Kant poses an epistemological question: "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representa-

tion' [Vorstellung] to the object [*Gegenstand*]?"[135] Kant's question asks how a representation relates to (mind-independent) objects.

Kant's answer to this question, which comprises his Copernican revolution in epistemology (a term he himself never employs), appears in several passages in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, particularly in the B introduction.[136] These include B vii, where he indicates his desire to transform metaphysics into a science; B xiii, where he famously claims that "reason has insight only into that which it constructs [*hervorbringt*] after a plan of its own"; and B xvi, where he proposes to test the view that "objects must conform to our knowledge," which he regards as in agreement with Copernicus's basic idea. It is also found in the famous footnote at B xxii, where he refers to a straight line running from the change in perspective as a result of which Copernicus "dared, in a manner contradictory of the senses, but yet true, to seek the observed movements, not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spectator," to Newton, who proved Copernicus's conjecture, and then to his own philosophy, where it is supposedly proven apodictically "from the nature of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding."[137] Other passages are present throughout the book, for instance in the cryptic discussion of epigenesis,[138] and in later writings.[139]

The connecting link between Copernican astronomy and Kant's critical philosophy lies in the shared concern with the conditions of objective cognition. This concern clearly guides Kant's attitudes toward the new science and his proposed new philosophy. His Copernican revolution in epistemology consists in claiming that a cognitive subject can know a cognitive object if and only if it constructs it, at the evident cost of transforming an independent cognitive object into a dependent cognitive object. Kant, who views the problem as one of representation of the mind-independent object, claims to solve (or resolve) it by

invoking the Copernican turn according to which the cognitive subject constructs its cognitive object.

In the form in which he left it, Kant's constructivist solution of the problem of knowledge is suggestive but problematic. One difficulty concerns the undefined term "representation," which suggests a relation between what represents and what is represented, and which has never been adequately clarified.[140]

A second, apparently insuperable difficulty is that Kant's proposed solution of the problem of knowledge commits him to skepticism. If knowledge necessarily begins in experience, and if things in themselves cannot be given in experience, then they are not knowable. There is simply no way to know how objects given in experience relate to what is not and cannot be given in it. The analogy with Plato, whom Kant famously claims to know better than himself,[141] is striking. Like Plato, who invokes (but cannot explain) the relation of appearances to reality, Kant invokes (but also cannot explain) the relation of objects of experience to a mind-independent reality. Since this difficulty cannot be solved within the Kantian framework, as Maimon and then Hegel clearly saw, the critical philosophy arguably ends in epistemological skepticism.

A third difficulty concerns the very idea of "construction." Kant's understanding of this key term is never clarified. He relies on the way geometry constructs its object in arguing that mathematics concerns synthetic a priori relations.[142] According to Kant, there is a basic distinction between mathematics which constructs and philosophy which analyzes concepts.[143] Though he insists that we must construct our cognitive objects as a condition of knowing them, his antipsychologism prevents him from formulating an anthropological explanation of how this occurs. He goes so far as to claim that such an explanation cannot be formulated.[144]

Kant, who seems genuinely unclear about his conception of constructivism, says different things in different places. He is a very good example of his own observation that the most original ideas are very often unclear to those who discover them.[145] Kant never quite succeeds in clarifying his brilliant Copernican insight, which lies at the epicenter of his position.

Kant, who does not help his reader, depicts epistemological constructivism as a mysterious, undescribed, and undescribable activity, something that takes place prior to and as a necessary precondition of conscious experience and knowledge of objects. His readers know neither what he thinks constructivism is nor the conditions of its success. He tells us that human beings must construct the objects they know, but not how they do so. Everything happens as if Kant's view of knowledge turned on a central insight for which he finally does not have a corresponding theory.

Kant's view of the need for constructivism is wholly theoretical, but completely unelucidated in practice. There is not the slightest hint of what it would mean to actually construct a cognitive object. The task facing someone still concerned with knowledge after Kant is to make sense of what in practice could reasonably be meant by the idea that the subject constructs what it knows.

This gap in Kant's position is hardly surprising, since with respect to knowledge, Kant is concerned with theory, not practice. He provides a theory of what must be the case in order for the experience and knowledge of objects to be possible for any and all rational beings. Unlike Kant, Hegel is not concerned with such general conditions of knowledge. The Hegelian approach lies in giving a plausible account of how in practice human beings can be said to construct what they know. He reformulates Kant's

constructivist approach to cognition within finite human practice.

As concerns epistemological constructivism, Hegel's enormous contribution lies in explaining how we meet Kant's theoretical requirement in practice. The Hegelian conception of epistemological constructivism, which emerges in his effort to rethink Kant's Copernican revolution in epistemology, is a theme running throughout Hegel's entire corpus, for instance the introduction to the *Phenomenology.* This short text is doubly crucial for an understanding of Hegel's constructivist approach to cognition. His earlier writings on knowledge point toward a model he only sketches in the introduction to the *Phenomenology;* and all of his later writings on knowledge continue to elaborate different aspects and consequences of this epistemological approach.

Beginning in his earliest philosophical writings and throughout his corpus, Hegel understands the problem of knowledge as providing a suitable categorial framework for grasping the contents of conscious experience. Human cognition consists in making cognitive claims on the basis of different cognitive frameworks, whose limits are ascertained by testing them against the contents of conscious experience. Since some conceptual frameworks are better than others, the difficulty lies in ascertaining a framework adequate to know any and all items of experience. The failure of Kant's deductive efforts to solve this problem on an a priori plane indicates that this framework cannot be deduced, but must in some way itself arise directly out of experience.

Hegel reformulates Kant's theoretical form of epistemological constructivism as a description of human cognitive practice in a series of texts. In the *Differenzschrift,* the initial version of his position, Hegel claims that an adequate approach to knowl-

edge can only result from reformulating Kant's authentic idealism according to its spirit in order to comprehend the identity of subject and object, knower and known.[146] His solution is an alternative to Fichte's and Schelling's views.

Fichte interprets Kant's epistemological requirement that the object must correspond to, or be constructed by, the cognitive subject as mandating that the subject and object form an identity, which he construes as the identity of identity and difference.[147] Schelling suggests that the epistemological identity on which Kant insists can be understood in terms of an original identity from which diversity emerges.[148] On Schelling's model, identity is prior to and the condition of difference.

Hegel follows Fichte in insisting on identity but rejects Schelling's prioritizing of identity over difference. For Hegel, an identity is not originally given, but only later constructed. According to Hegel, the need for philosophy originates in difference, and the role of philosophy, hence of all cognition of whatever kind, is not to uncover, discover, or reveal but rather to construct a structured synthesis between subject and object encompassing the unity of unity and difference.[149] This approach already expounded in Hegel's first philosophical publication amounts to a commitment to the analysis of knowledge in terms of subject and object, a rejection of epistemological foundationalism in all its forms, and a commitment to a Fichtean speculative identity of subject and object as the unrealized aim of Kant's critical philosophy.

The position Hegel outlines here signals his intention to carry forward the critical philosophy on the basis of the general interpretation proposed by Fichte. In reacting against Schelling, Hegel indicates his interest in arriving at an identity, or unity, encompassing identity and difference, that is a theoretical matrix containing perceived differences and their underlying unity. This

theme is later interpreted in the *Phenomenology* as an overall unity including cognitive objects as known through theories and as given in conscious experience.

In the *Differenzschrift*, where he issues a promissory note, Hegel announces his interest in this identity without specifying a way to achieve it. This note is later redeemed in the *Phenomenology*. In the introduction to this work, Hegel provides a dialectical analysis of the knowing process through which the identity of subject and object, or again the structured unity of identity and difference, is constructed in practice. In rejecting representationalism, Hegel depicts knowing as the result of resolving a dualism within consciousness terminating only when knower and known, subject and object, coincide. Knowledge arises through a dialectical process of determinate negation of specific theories, or particular conceptual frameworks, which are tried out in experience and successively replaced by others. The end point of the process, which need not be reached in practice, lies in the point at which theory, or conceptual framework, fully corresponds to, or coincides with, the object as experienced.

There are only two possible outcomes at any stage in the cognitive process: either the theory of the object formulated on the basis of experience corresponds to the object as given in further experience, and the cognitive process has come to an end, or the current theory must be reformulated. The novel aspect in Hegel's position is not that theory must be altered to fit our observations, something probably no one interested in testing theories against experience denies, but rather in the unusual claim that if the theory is altered, then the object as perceived is also altered.[150] In consequence, Hegel denies so-called neutral facts, since the object as experienced depends on the conceptual framework. When, in the process of knowledge, a theory is shown to be inadequate to the experienced object, it must

be replaced. Another, better theory must do all the things a previous theory did plus at least one thing the latter ought to have done but did not do. Experience is the dialectical movement consciousness exerts on itself in working out its view of the theory adequate to the experienced object.[151] The new theory, or the later attempt to construct a more adequate view of the experienced object, is a reversal of consciousness that goes further down the same road than its predecessor,[152] hence, further toward reaching the goal where a conceptual framework coincides in theory and in practice with the object as experienced within consciousness.

Epistemological constructivism of all kinds concerns the construction of a conceptual framework, an activity in which all those concerned with cognition in the many cognitive disciplines engage on a daily basis. The difference between Hegelian constructivism and its rivals lies in the description of a dialectical process of the interaction of subject and object within consciousness in the course of which one or more conceptual frameworks, or theories intended to be adequate to the cognitive object as experienced, are constructed. For Kant and many contemporary theorists, knowledge requires the construction of a representation of external reality. For Hegel, on the contrary, the object is not external to, but rather contained within, consciousness. Hegel shows that if the cognitive object refers to no more than what is given in consciousness, then we can understand the construction of cognitive frameworks as part of the process of knowing objects as they occur within, and can only finally be said to be known at the end of, the cognitive process. It is this seminal insight that separates his view of epistemological constructivism from Kant's, and which he further works out in his later writings on cognition.

The simplistic, binary opposition between analytic philosophy
and all other approaches, so popular in analytic circles during its
positivist period, has by now largely given way to a more nuanced
view. There are an increasing number of good analytic students
of Hegel. Yet there is still very little analytic dialogue with Hegel
and even less with idealism. Since the rise of analytic philoso-
phy, the analytic attitude toward Hegel has ranged widely from
uninformed but deeply critical (for example Popper), through
benign neglect, to variations on the idea that he is finally not an
important thinker.[153] The absence of significant debate between
analytic thinkers and Hegel until recently was mainly due to the
widespread analytic conviction that Hegel had no substantive
contribution to make to their concerns. That dismissive attitude
is presently changing as more analytic thinkers are becoming
better informed about Hegel's theories. From an analytic per-
spective, it now seems in principle increasingly possible to con-
duct a genuine dialogue with an exceptionally important thinker
whose views have more often been decried than discussed, more
frequently superficially refuted than considered in any depth.

In discussing the currently emerging analytic turn (or return)
to Hegel, I have been presenting a reading of Hegel's theory of
knowledge that differs in many ways from the more usual right-
wing, religious reading of Hegel's overall position that has been
widely but uncritically adopted by the vast majority of those
interested in either promoting or refuting his position. What can
we legitimately expect from dialogue with Hegel? It would be an
error to think of Hegel as offering a conceptual vade mecum, as
simply poised to remedy all unsolved philosophical concerns, or
even all analytic concerns. It would be another error to think, as
the Young Hegelians believed, that the philosophical discussion

comes to an end with Hegel, or to suggest that at present even in principle all we need to do is to make a qualified return to his position. That would not be very interesting, since it would neglect the past two hundred years of discussion for the dubious aim of being faithful to a set of theories that emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Yet it would be a further error to think that things have changed to the extent that a sufficiently updated version of Hegel's position has become irrelevant for debate on the problem of knowledge in our time.

An account of Hegel's contribution to the present stage of the discussion on knowledge goes astray in supposing that analytic and continental thinkers are engaged in the same task. Their respective views of the problems, the possible solutions, what constitutes an appropriate argument for knowledge, how to take prior views of epistemology into account, which views are worth taking seriously, even what philosophy is, in short nearly everything relevant to the philosophical enterprise, are often different, incompatible, irreducible to a single common denominator, a shared theme or point of view.

It is probably not useful even to aim at overcoming the differences between the main philosophical tendencies. Arguably the three most lively philosophical tendencies at present, American pragmatism, continental philosophy, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy, all emerged independently around the beginning of the twentieth century. In the course of that century, each developed in different ways through working a distinctive but different set of philosophical problems and approaches to them, which continue to separate each of them from the other.

Analytic thinkers became interested in pragmatism at about the same time as, or only slightly before, they became interested in, or interested again in, Hegel. It is obvious, or at least it should be obvious, that the analytic foray into pragmatism has not resulted in overcoming differences between analytic philosophy

and pragmatism. It has rather resulted in the emergence of a distinctive analytic form of neopragmatism, which cannot merely be reduced to classical American pragmatism.

Much the same thing is now happening as various analytic figures are becoming interested in Hegel, but not in idealism. In that sense, at least for the present, Moore remains a dominant influence. Though we cannot know how the debate will later develop, suffice it to say that everything is now happening as if analytic thinkers intended to appropriate Hegelian doctrines for analytic purposes while simply excluding his idealism.

If, as seems reasonable, we must conclude that analytic and continental philosophy are distinct philosophical traditions, their very differences would seem to impede their being seamlessly taken up into a single overarching conceptual structure. Such a synthesis would only seem plausible if the differences between them were more apparent than real. To put the point in another way, this would only be an interesting project if, as no one suggests, the two approaches were not different traditions at all, so that analytic concerns could be effortlessly transposed into continental concerns—for instance, if they largely overlapped through a shared, common, or core, philosophical commitment.

Though there does not seem to be anything like a common core commitment of the two traditions, there is in part a common origin. The analytic and continental traditions as usually understood overlap as two of the many reactions to Kant's critical philosophy. Continental students of Kant tend to emphasize his idealist side, hence his constructivism (and his empirical realism), whereas analytical students are attracted by his residual metaphysical realism. The differences between idealist, realist, and other readings of Kant were only accentuated through the later evolution of positions based on different readings of his work. Over time, the continental and analytic ways of reacting to Kant's critical philosophy have enormously diverged. One can

imagine two traditions, which are initially close together, but later grow further and further apart. When this happens, the differences may become more important than the similarities. English is now spoken in different parts of the world in ways that often make it difficult even for a native speaker of the language from, say, the United States to understand a native speaker of English from India.

Metaphysical realism, as distinguished from Kant's empirical realism, and epistemological constructivism are mutually incompatible alternatives. The difference can be described simply but inaccurately in terms of a basic alternative: either we uncover, discover, or find what we seek to know, as metaphysical as well as even ordinary realists believe, or, on the contrary, we construct it. Constructivism, Kant's version of the view that we construct our cognitive objects as a necessary condition of knowing them, is incompatible with metaphysical realism, but compatible with empirical realism.

The different readings of Kant favored by analytic and continental philosophers, including Hegel, influence the current analytic effort to bring Hegel within the analytic debate while giving up idealism and stressing metaphysical realism. Kant's critical philosophy officially, but precariously combines empirical realism and transcendental idealism in an uneasy synthesis. The same critical philosophy is read from the idealist perspective as constructivist and from the analytic perspective, for instance by Strawson, as realist in the ordinary sense. The post-Kantian German idealists stress Kant's constructivism while downplaying any suspicion of metaphysical realism.

The importance of dropping the metaphysical realist reading of Kant by embracing the idealism of his Copernican turn is twofold. First, it is comforting to think that, by getting rid of such annoying features of the critical philosophy as the idealist machinery, Kant turns out to be an early analytic philosopher.

Yet, for the reason he himself formulates, the metaphysical form of realism often attributed to him is indefensible. Second, it is only when Kant is read not as a metaphysical but as an empirical realist, in a word when his transcendental idealism is taken seriously, that his critical philosophy remains interesting for the present debate on knowledge.

The point is not only about reading Kant correctly, if indeed anyone can be read correctly, but also about reading him in such a way that his theories still appear relevant to the current debate. How Kant ought to be read is related to the neo-analytic turn toward pragmatism. Let us suppose that Habermas is right that analytic philosophy continues the epistemological discussion by other means,[154] and further right that it has now become a kind of Kantian pragmatism.[155] If we accept Kantian pragmatism as descriptive, then we can say that analytic neopragmatism remains realist in the metaphysical sense. Yet on good Kantian grounds, which are different from those inspiring analytic philosophy, Hegelian idealism rejects metaphysical realism in favor of constructivism and historicism.

Kant is a crucial figure, located at a conceptual crossing between two epistemological highways. One road leading up to and later away from Kant, the road on which most analytic thinkers are now located, is the concern with metaphysical realism. Several centuries after Kant, they are still overwhelmingly committed to solving (or resolving) the problem of knowledge through ordinary realist means, which precludes constructivism. The other road, also leading up to and later away from Kant, is a constructivist approach to knowledge, compatible with empirical realism but incompatible with metaphysical realism. This latter perspective was formulated by Hobbes and Vico and later developed independently by the post-Kantian German idealists, including Hegel, and remains fruitful for the problem of knowledge.

After Kant, the epistemological lines were clearly drawn. Roughly two centuries later, we are at the same point in the epistemological debate. To make a dent in the problem of knowledge, we need to go further in understanding the epistemological constructivism central to the critical philosophy. Hegel teaches us that despite Kant's hesitations, to carry out this project we need to abandon metaphysical realism while rethinking the cognitive process as the routine, constructivist practice of finite human beings. We do this every day in striving to overcome the difference between our existing conceptual frameworks, what we can legitimately expect on the basis of one or another theory, and what is given in conscious experience in the course of testing our theories. In carrying further Kant's Copernican turn, Hegel helps us to abandon the extraordinary, but extraordinarily arid reaches of transcendental philosophy for a description of how ordinary people go about their lives. For now as in Kant's day, epistemological constructivism, which divides Hegel from contemporary analytic philosophers, remains the most promising approach to the problem of knowledge.

Notes

Introduction

1. For this view, see "Hegel's Philosophy and Its Aftereffects until Today," in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science,* translated by Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996, p. 25.

2. For the relation between Heidegger and Hegel, see Karin de Boer, *Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger's Encounter with Hegel,* Albany: SUNY Press, 2000.

3. Heidegger, who was no fan of Hegel, and whose nondialectical approach lies at the antipodes of Hegel's, declares that if philosophy is to survive and prosper, it must come to grips with Hegel. See Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* translated by Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 178. His own discussion of time in *Being and Time* can be regarded as an effort to do so. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 82, pp. 480–486. In sounding the call to return to Hegel, Heidegger is faintly echoing Otto Liebmann's famous neo-Kantian rallying cry to return to Kant. See Otto Liebmann, *Kant und die Epigonen: Eine kritische Abhandlung* (1865), Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 1912. For discussion of neo-Kantianism, see Thomas E. Willey, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914,* Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978.

4. See Richard J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity,* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.

5. See Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

6. "My own philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume." Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* edited by Charles Harteshorne and Paul Weiss, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935, I, 42.

7. See Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction.*

8. Although he was acquainted with Hegel's writings, and may even have attended Kojève's famous seminar on Hegel, in a very early work (1936) Sartre significantly defines "la phénoménologie" in Husserlian terms as "une description des structures de la conscience transcendantale fondée sur l'intuition des essences de ces structures." Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'imagination,* Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969, p. 140.

9. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action,* p. 233.

10. Ibid., p. 232.

11. Ibid., p. 317.

12. Sellars's classic essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," marking a partial return toward Hegel, originally appeared in 1956. See Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* with an introduction by Richard Rorty and a study guide by Robert Brandom, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.

13. Among authors whose works might fall into this group, one could cite J. N. Findlay, Charles Taylor, and Robert Pippin, as well as perhaps Terry Pinkard, Robert Solomon, C. Allen Speight, Frederick Beiser, Michael Forster, Ivan Soll, Allen Wood, Kenneth Westphal, Peter Hylton, Michael Hardimon, and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer.

14. See Michael Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger,* Chicago: Open Court, 2000, esp. pp. 13–14.

15. "[O]ntological metaphysics is . . . meaningless gibberish." Peirce, "What Is Pragmatism?" in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings,* edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, 2 vols., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992–1998, II, p. 338.

16. For a recent statement of this view, see Michael Devitt, *Realism and Truth,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

17. See Thomas Hobbes, *Human Nature,* in Thomas Hobbes, *Human Nature and De corpore politico,* Oxford, 1994, p. 22.

18. For a recent effort to make this kind of argument, see K. R. Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit,* Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003, esp. pp. 65–71.

19. See Jürgen Habermas, "Einleitung: Realismus nach der sprachpragmatischen Wende," in *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung: Philosophische Aufsätze,* Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1999, p. 32.

20. Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. xi.

21. Hilary Putnam, *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 44.

ONE

Idealism, British Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy

1. See "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language," in *Logical Positivism,* edited by A. J. Ayer, New York: Free Press, 1959, pp. 60–81.

2. See editor's introduction in Ayer, *Logical Positivism,* p. 16.

3. "The Old and the New Logic," in Ayer, *Logical Positivism,* p. 134.

4. Ibid., p. 143.

5. "What Is Dialectic?" in Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge,* New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 324.

6. Ibid., p. 325.

7. Ibid., p. 327.

8. Ibid., p. 330.

9. See, for instance, H. B. Acton, "Idealism," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* IV, edited by Paul Edwards, New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967, pp. 110–118.

10. See John Yolton, *John Locke and The Way of Ideas,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

11. G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften,* IV, edited by C. I. Gerhardt, Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–1890, pp. 559–560.

12. See his "First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," in J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge,* edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 3–28.

13. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* New York: New American Library, 1961, p. 342.

14. Rescher has often written on idealism. See especially Nicholas Rescher, *Conceptual Idealism,* Oxford: Blackwell, 1973.

15. See Tom Rockmore, *Marx After Marxism,* Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.

16. See "Idealism" in Michael Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary,* Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992, pp. 128–131.

17. M. F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," in *Philosophical Review* 91, no. 1, January 1982, pp. 3–40.

18. See Rescher, *Conceptual Idealism.*

19. See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,* translated by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany: SUNY Press, 1977.

20. See "Experience, and Objective Idealism," in John Dewey, *The Influ-*

ence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965, pp. 198–225.

21. Allison, who objects to Strawson's interpretation, takes transcendental idealism as the sole possible alternative to psychologistic phenomenalism. Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, p. 13.

22. Letter from Schiller to Goethe of October 28, 1794, in J. C. F. Schiller, *Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe,* 2 vols., edited by H. Hauff, Stuttgart: Cott'sche Buchhandlung, 1856, I, p. 26.

23. See F. W. J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism,* translated by Peter Heath, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978.

24. See Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy.*

25. For an effort to clarify Hegel's understanding of "absolute idealism," see "Hegel's Absolute Idealism and Historical Relativism," in Tom Rockmore, *On Hegel's Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy,* Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996, pp. 44–75.

26. Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 6.

27. See, e.g., Paul Franks, "German Idealism," in *Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* London: Routledge, 2000, p. 312.

28. Adams especially emphasizes this aspect. See R. M. Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

29. "Open Letter on Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre,* August 7, 1799," in Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–1799,* edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 253–254.

30. David Hume, *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* edited by Charles W. Hendel, Indianapolis: LLA, 1955, p. 21.

31. See, in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* translated and edited by Paul Guyer and A. W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, the following passages: in the B introduction about the scandal of philosophy, B xxxix, p. 36; in the fourth paralogism concerning ideality in the A edition in regard to outer relation, pp. 400–409; and in the "Refutation of Idealism" in the B edition, pp. 288–292. In the *Prolegomena,* see Remark 2 in the section on mathematics (Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,* translated by L. W. Beck, Indianapolis: LLA, 1965), pp. 36–37 and the account of metaphysics in 49, pp. 84–86.

32. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 274–275, pp. 288–289.

33. "The dictum of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: 'All knowledge through the senses

and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason is there truth.'" Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics,* p. 123.

34. "The principle that throughout dominates and determines my idealism, is on the contrary: 'All knowledge of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth.'" Ibid., p. 123.

35. G. W. F. Hegel, *Das älteste Systemprogram des deutschen Idealismus,* in *Werke in zwanzig Bänden,* edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Rinus Michel, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971, I, pp. 234–236.

36. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie,* in *Werke,* XIX, p. 165.

37. For discussion, see Klaus Düsing, *Hegel e l'antichità classica,* translated by Salvatore Giammusso, Naples: La Città del Sole, 2001, pp. 77–96.

38. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,* pp. 79–80.

39. Ibid., p. 155.

40. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 860, p. 755.

41. See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, 19–83, pp. 45–134.

42. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* translated by A. V. Miller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 9.

43. "Der Gedanke" was published in *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus* 2, 1918–1919, pp. 58–77.

44. Michael Dummett, "Frege, Gottlob," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* IV, edited by P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan, 1967, p. 225.

45. Sluga, *Gottlob Frege,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 59–60.

46. See G. Gabriel, "Frege als Neukantianer," in *Kant-Studien* 77, 1986, pp. 84–101.

47. On the relation of Frege to analytic philosophy, see Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

48. According to Mohanty, Husserl made the turn independently. See J. N. Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege,* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

49. Michael Dummett, *The Philosophy of Frege,* London: Duckworth, 1973, p. 684.

50. This claim is denied by Sluga, who argues it is a mistake to consider psychologism as linked to idealism or Frege as opposed to idealism. Ac-

cording to Sluga, at the time Frege was writing idealism had ceased to be a force and Frege was opposed to the then dominant scientific naturalism. Sluga, *Gottlob Frege,* pp. 9, 14.

51. See Michael Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, chap. 4: "Idealism," pp. 56–73.

52. Ibid., p. 64.

53. Gottlob Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic,* translated by J. L. Austin, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, p. xxii.

54. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations,* Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1980, I, 21–24, pp. 60–77. See also Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,* translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, New York: Collier, 1962, I, 22, pp. 80–82, and 61, pp. 163–165.

55. Allison is concerned with so-called epistemic conditions. Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism,* pp. 10–13.

56. See "Illustrative Extracts from Frege's Review of Husserl's *Philosophie der Arithmetik,*" in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege,* edited by Peter Geach and Max Black, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952, pp. 79–85.

57. See, e.g., T. B. Bynum in Gottlob Frege, *Conceptual Notation and Related Articles,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 44.

58. See Dagfinn Føllesdall, *Husserl und Frege,* Oslo: Aschehoug, 1958.

59. See Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege.*

60. Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic,* p. xxii.

61. Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, p. 751.

62. Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy,* p. 56.

63. See Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* London: Routledge, 2000.

64. See Donn Welton, *The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology,* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.

65. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement,* pp. 126–128.

66. See J. Pucelle, *L'idéalisme en Angleterre de Coleridge à Bradley,* Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1955. For a more elementary discussion, also Peter Robbins, *The British Hegelians, 1875–1925,* New York: Garland, 1982.

67. Muirhead makes this point well. "The history of England of what at the present day is known as idealistic philosophy still remains to be written. When it comes to be written, it will, I believe, be found not less continuous with and not less characteristic of the English genius, than that which is commonly taken to be its main contribution to philosophy." J. H. Muirhead, *Coleridge as Philosopher,* London: Allen & Unwin, 1930, p. 262.

68. G. R. G. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, p. 163.

69. Pucelle, *Idéalisme en Angleterre,* p. 250.

70. Warnock seems to know almost nothing about British idealism, which he regards as difficult to describe. G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy since 1900,* London: Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 2–10.

71. See A. J. Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage,* New York: Macmillan, 1973.

72. See Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy.*

73. See D. F. Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy,* New York: Vintage, 1967.

74. John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy,* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966.

75. See Alberto Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

76. See Michael Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

77. See Peter Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

78. Peter Hylton, "Hegel and Analytic Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel,* edited by Frederick C. Beiser, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 445–485.

79. See Ernst Cassirer, *The Platonic Renaissance in England,* London: Nelson, 1953.

80. J. H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel,* London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865.

81. Pucelle, *Idéalisme en Angleterre,* pp. 54, 126, 191, 292.

82. Ibid., p. 25.

83. Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy,* Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1965, vol. 8, part 1, pp. 171–172.

84. For Bradley's view of his relation to Hegel and Hegelianism, see F. H. Bradley, *Principles of Logic,* London: Oxford University Press, 1922, p. x.

85. This conflation is contained in the title of Robbins's study. See Robbins, *The British Hegelians.*

86. On Coleridge's relation to Kant, see René Wellek, *Kant in England, 1793–1838,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931.

87. See his "Introduction to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature,*" in *Works of Thomas Hill Green,* edited by R. L. Nettleship, 3 vols., London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908; New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969, I, pp. 1–371.

88. Pucelle, *L'idéalisme en Angleterre,* p. 15.

89. See E. Caird, *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant,* Glasgow: J. Maclehose, 1877.

90. T. H. Green, "Introduction to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature,*" p. 3.

91. Ibid., p. 13.

92. See T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883.

93. T. H. Green, *The Works of T. H. Green,* III, p. 45.

94. Ibid., p. 146.

95. F. H. Bradley, *Essays in Philosophical Criticism,* edited by Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane, with a preface by Edward Caird, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1883.

96. Pucelle, *L'idéalisme en Angleterre,* p. 249.

97. Hiralal Haldar, *Neo-Hegelianism,* New York: Garland, 1984, p. 215.

98. H. Jones, *The Life and Philosophy of E. Caird,* Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson and Co., 1921, pp. 286–287.

99. J. H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy: Studies in the History of Idealism in Europe and America,* London: Allen & Unwin, 1931, p. 274.

100. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946, p. 1.

101. Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development,* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 38.

102. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* p. 146.

103. Ibid., pp. 315–316.

104. F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914, p. 470.

105. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* p. 29.

106. Ibid., p. 153.

107. Bradley, *Principles of Logic,* pp. 49–50.

108. According to Horstmann, Russell's arguments against Bradley do not touch Hegel at all. See Rolf-Peter Horstmann, *Ontologie und Relationen: Hegel, Bradley, Russell und die Kontroverse über interne und externe Beziehungen,* Königshausen: Athenäum, 1984, pp. 246–254.

109. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* p. 489.

110. For a description of the relation of Russell and McTaggart, see G. E. Moore, "Russell and McTaggart," *Philosophy,* 1936; for Moore on McTaggart, see G. E. Moore, "Mr McTaggart's Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 1901, pp. 177–214; and Moore, "Mr. McTaggart's Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics,* April 1903, pp. 341–370.

111. See J. M. E. McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921-1927, 2 vols.

112. See J. M. E. McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time," in *Mind* (1908), reprinted in *The Philosophy of Time,* edited by Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

113. See Bernard Bosanquet, "Logic as the Science of Knowledge," in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism,* edited by A. Seth and R. B. Haldane, London, 1883.

114. See McTaggart, *Mind,* 1912.

115. See B. Bosanquet, *Knowledge and Reality,* London: S. Sonnenschein, 1892.

116. See Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy,* p. 11.

117. For Dummett's claim, see Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy,* p. 72. For a more nuanced, historically more faithful understanding of the history of analytic philosophy that is sharply critical of Dummett's reading of Frege, see Sluga, *Gottlob Frege.*

118. Russell, *My Philosophical Development,* p. 42.

119. Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell,* London: Allen and Unwin, 1967, I, 63, 64.

120. Russell, *My Philosophical Development,* p. 42.

121. Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage,* pp. 3–4.

122. Russell, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry,* New York: Dover, 1956, p. 200.

123. Russell, *My Philosophical Development,* p. 38.

124. Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell,* I, p. 63.

125. Paul Levy, *Moore: G. E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 125, 148.

126. Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell,* I, p. 64.

127. Ibid., I, p. 218.

128. Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, 1872–1921,* New York: The Free Press, 1996, p. 117.

129. See J. H. Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophy,* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1924, 1953, Preface, p. 11.

130. Horstmann, *Ontologie und Relationen,* p. 11.

131. See ibid., pp. 239–250.

132. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. 657.

133. Ibid., p. 704.

134. Ibid., pp. 656–657.

135. Ibid., p. 658.

136. Ibid., p. 657.

137. Russell, *Foundations of Geometry,* pp. 2–4.

138. See Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz,* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1900, 1967, pp. 74, 173.

139. Russell, *Foundations of Geometry,* p. 55.

140. Russell, *Philosophy of Leibniz,* p. 14.

141. Since so much has been written on this theme, suffice it to say here that Kant's Copernican revolution can be paraphrased as the claim that knowledge is possible if and only if the subject in some sense constructs what it knows. Paton's account is still perhaps the best one in English. See H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience,* London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, 2 vols.

142. Russell, *Foundations of Geometry,* p. 128.

143. Bertrand Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics,* New York: Norton, 1964, p. 454.

144. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 566, p. 539.

145. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy,* p. 707.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid., p. ix.

149. Stekeler-Weithofer correctly lumps Russell with Popper among Hegel's most tendentious critics. See Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels Analytische Philosophie: Die Wissenschaft der Logik als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung,* Paderborn: Schöningh, 1992, p. 4.

150. See Russell, *Philosophy of Leibniz,* pp. 109–110.

151. See Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1911, 1959, pp. 140–146.

152. See Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World,* New American Library, 1914, 1956, pp. 36–37.

153. Hegel objects to all forms of transcendental philosophy, hence to apriorism. See, e.g., Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* 10, pp. 33–34.

154. See Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic,* Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1917, 1957, pp. 7, 10, 17, 93, 101.

155. For this claim, see C. D. Broad's obituary of Moore, reprinted in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers,* New York: Collier, 1962, p. 5.

156. See G. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism" (1903), in *Mind,* n.s. 12, no. 48, October 1903, pp. 433–453.

157. Cited in Hylton, "Hegel and Analytic Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel,* p. 459.

158. See G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica,* London: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 132–133.

159. See Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,* Edinburgh: J. Bell, 1795, p. 128, cited in John W. Yolton, *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p. 3.

160. Yolton argues that Reid misinterprets Berkeley. See Yolton, *Perceptual Acquaintance,* pp. 206–207.

161. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1963, 5.4731.

162. Moore, *Principia Ethica,* p. 30. See also p. 34.

163. Ibid., p. 110.

164. G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy,* New York: Collier, 1962, pp. 190–191.

165. The widespread view that Moore and Russell were mainly opposed to Hegel conflates their strong animus against British idealism, which was clear, with their feelings about Hegel, which were unclear. For this kind of approach, see Wolfgang Welsch, "Hegel und die analytische Philosophie: Über einige Kongruenzen in Grundfragen der Philosophie," in *Wissen und Begründung: Die Skeptizismus-Debatte um 1800 im Kontext neuzeit-licher Wissenskonzeptionen,* edited by Klaus Vieweg and Brady Bowman, Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2003, pp. 11–73.

166. The doctrine of relations was developed by Bradley, who holds in the first book of *Appearance and Reality* that every existential claim falls into contradictions that concern no more than mere appearance. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* chap. 3: "Relation and Quality," pp. 21–29.

167. See Russell, *Principles of Mathematics,* chap. 4, pp. 42–52. For discussion, see D. F. Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy,* chap. 1, pp. 13–25.

168. For an early analytic appraisal of Moore's refutation of idealism, see C. J. Ducasse, in "Moore's Refutation of Idealism," in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,* edited by P. A. Schilpp, LaSalle: Library of Living Philosophers, 1942, 1952, 1968, pp. 223–252.

169. "The Scope and Language of Science," in W. V. Quine, *The Ways of Para-dox and Other Essays,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 229.

170. See "The Refutation of Idealism," in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922, 1958, p. 1. Bradley makes a similar claim. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* p. 552.

171. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," p. 5. He also says he intends to re-fute idealism in the form it was recently stated by A. E. Taylor, the great

Plato scholar. See ibid., p. 8: "My paper will at least refute Mr. Taylor's idealism, if it refutes anything at all: for I shall undertake to *show* that what makes a thing real cannot be its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience." Emphasis in original.

172. Ibid., pp. 19, 22.

173. Ibid., p. 24.

174. See Moore, *Philosophical Studies,* p. 27.

175. See *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge . . . ,* in *George Berkeley: Philosophical Works,* edited by M. R. Ayers, London: J. Dent, 1975, 4, pp. 78–79.

176. Ibid., 35, p. 87.

177. Ibid., 36, p. 87.

178. See Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage,* p. 155.

179. Christian Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis,* Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1975, 36, p. 25.

180. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B xxxvi–xxxvii, pp. 34–36.

181. Any reasonably comprehensive account of Kant's view of this theme would need to consider at least his three main references to the problem in the *Critique of Pure Reason:* the remark in the B introduction about the scandal of philosophy (ibid., B xxxix, p. 36); the discussion in the Fourth Paralogism in the A edition of ideality, in regard to outer relation (ibid., A 367–380, pp. 400–409) and the famous "Refutation of Idealism" in the B edition (ibid., B 274–287, pp. 288–298).

182. "Proof of an External World," in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers,* New York: Collier Books, 1962, p. 27.

183. Moore, *Philosophical Papers,* p. 144.

184. B. Russell, "On Denoting," in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis,* edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949, pp. 103–115.

185. Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," in *Mysticism and Logic,* Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1957, pp. 202–224.

186. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty,* edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 520–521.

187. Ibid., 403, p. 52.

188. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan, 1956, 43, pp. 20–21; 197, p. p. 80; 264, p. 93; 340, p. 109; see further Wittgenstein, *On Certainty,* edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 61, p. 10; 65, p. 10; 82, p. 12; 560, p. 74.

189. See Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World,* translated by Rolf A. George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

190. In a famous paper, he decisively criticizes the very idea of protocol sentences. See Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in *Logical Positivism,* edited by A. J. Ayer, New York: Free Press, 1959, pp. 199–208.

191. See Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language," in Ayer, *Logical Positivism,* pp. 60–82.

192. See Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* 6.53, p. 150.

193. See Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.

194. See "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception, and Reality,* Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991, pp. 1–41.

TWO

Pragmatism, Analytic Neopragmatism, and Hegel

1. John E. Smith, *Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 10.

2. Nicholas Rescher, *Realistic Pragmatism: An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy,* Albany: SUNY Press, 2000.

3. William James, *A Pluralistic Universe,* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912.

4. A. O. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," in *Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays,* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963, pp. 1–29.

5. "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." C. S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," in *The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings,* edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, 2 vols., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992–1998, I, p. 31.

6. "The fundamental argument in this book is that the evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy—from Emerson to Rorty—results in a conception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of America is put forward by intellectuals in response to distinct social and cultural crises." Cornell West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism,* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, p. 5.

7. Peirce, "What Pragmatism Is," "Issues of Pragmatism," "The Basis

of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy," and "Pragmatism," in *The Essential Peirce,* II, chaps. 24–28, pp. 331–433.

8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* translated by Paul Guyer and A. W. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, B 852, p. 750.

9. See Peirce's review of *Studies in Logical Theory,* in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* 8 vols., Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, edited by Charles Harteshorne and Paul Weiss, vols. 1–6, 1938, and by A. W. Burks, vols. 7–8, 1958, VIII, pp. 188–190.

10. See, e.g., John Dewey, "The Pragmatism of Peirce," in *Journal of Philosophy* 21, no. 26, 1916, pp. 709–715; "Peirce's Theory of Quality," in *Journal of Philosophy* 32, no. 26, 1935, pp. 701–708; and "Peirce's Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought and Meaning," in *Journal of Philosophy* 43, no. 4, 1946, pp. 85–95.

11. Nicholas Rescher, *A System of Pragmatic Idealism,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992–1993, 3 vols.

12. "[T]he logical idealists . . . Hegel, Green and C. S. Peirce . . . point to the fact that as a rule our sensations are merely contributory to our *opinions* about *things.* . . ." Cited in Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James,* Boston: Little, Brown, 1935, I, p. 477.

13. James, *A Pluralist Universe,* p. 398.

14. Josiah Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, p. 85.

15. See C. S. Peirce, "Fraser's *The Works of George Berkeley,*" in *The Essential Peirce,* II, pp. 83–105.

16. According to Max Fisch, in the most detailed article I have come across, although Peirce's knowledge of Hegel improved in the course of time, it was never very detailed. See "Hegel and Peirce," in *Peirce, Semiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch,* edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, pp. 261–282.

17. For Peirce's judgment on Hegel, see "What Pragmatism Is," in *The Essential Pierce,* II, p. 435: "[T]he third category—the category of thought, representation, triadic relation, genuine thirdness as such—is an essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category (which in cosmology appears as the element of habit) can have no concrete being without actions, as a separate object on which to work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act. The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to

a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient. Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of this triune Reality, pragmaticism might have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their truth."

18. Esposito, who compares various conceptions in Hegel and Peirce, for instance the idea of logic, says there is little evidence that Peirce read Hegel before 1860, but that later, from 1897 or so onward, he came increasingly to respect Hegel. According to Esposito, Peirce's theory of categories emerges out of an effort to combine Kant's table of judgments and Hegel's concept of being. See Joseph Esposito, *Evolutionary Metaphysics: The Development of Peirce's Theory of Categories,* Athens: Ohio University Press, 1980, p. 85.

19. Shapiro points to a series of similarities, including the denial of the thing in itself, a recognition of continuity, objective idealism, and triadic structures as aspects of Hegel which were attractive to Peirce, who, he claims, fails to see how close his own position was to Hegel's. See Gary Shapiro, "Peirce as Critic of Hegel's Phenomenology and Dialectic," in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 17, no. 1, Winter 1981, pp. 269–275.

20. See Karl Popper, "On the Status of Science and Metaphysics," in *Conjectures and Refutations,* New York: Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 184–200.

21. "My own philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume." Pierce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," p. 42.

22. William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy,* New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948, p. v.

23. John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy,* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p. 51.

24. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays on Popular Philosophy,* New York: Dover, 1956, p. xiii.

25. Ibid., p. 263.

26. Ibid., p. 275.

27. Ibid., p. 275.

28. William James, *Pragmatism,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 278–280.

29. Ibid., p. 80.

30. Ibid., pp. 72–73.

31. Ibid., p. 104.

32. Ibid., p. 104.

33. Ibid., p. 129.

34. James, *Problems of Philosophy,* p. 36.

35. In the introduction to the *Phenomenology* and in other writings, Hegel depicts knowledge as emerging in an open-ended process involving the dialectical interaction between theory and experienced object. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* translated by A. V. Miller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 48–57.

36. John Dewey, "Kant and Philosophic Method," in *John Dewey: Philosophy, Psychology and Social Practice,* edited by Joseph Ratner, New York: Capricorn, 1963, pp. 35–48.

37. "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in John Dewey, *The Philosophy of John Dewey: The Structure of Experience,* edited by John J. McDermott, New York: G. P. Putnam, 1973, I, pp. 58–97.

38. Ibid., p. 96.

39. John Dewey, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," in *The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought,* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965, pp. 1–20.

40. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty,* edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, and translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, p. 422.

41. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope,* London: Penguin, 1999, p. xxvii.

42. Reference to analytic pragmatists is entirely missing in Smith, *Purpose and Thought,* but is an important component a few years later in Sleeper's and West's writings. See R. W. Sleeper, *The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986; and West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy.*

43. Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope,* p. 24.

44. See Brandom's introduction to *Rorty and His Critics,* edited by Robert Brandom, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. xii.

45. See Robert Brandom, *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

46. Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in *Logical Positivism,* edited by A. J. Ayer, New York: Free Press, 1959, pp. 199–208.

47. "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," in Alfred Tarski, *Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 152–278.

48. Other prominent examples include C. I. Lewis, Nicholas Rescher, and Joseph Margolis. Quine even includes Carnap among the pragmatists. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in W. V. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View,* New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 46.

49. McDowell claims that Rorty's view of pragmatism is "half-baked," John

McDowell, "Davidson in Context," in *Mind and World,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 155.

50. "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," and "Afterthoughts," in Donald Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, pp. 137–153.

51. This is pointed out by McDowell. See his discussion of "Davidson in Context," pp. 129–161.

52. Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in *Truth and Interpretation,* edited by Ernest LePore, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 307–319.

53. For debate between Quine and Carnap, see Quine, "Carnap and Logical Truth," in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap,* edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, LaSalle: Open Court, 1963, pp. 385–406; and Carnap, "Reply to Quine," pp. 921ff., as well as Quine's reply to Parsons, in *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine,* edited by L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp, LaSalle: Open Court, 1986, pp. 396–405.

54. Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language,* translated by Amethe Smeaton, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937, p. xiii.

55. Rescher, *Realistic Pragmatism,* pp. 33–35.

56. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," p. 20.

57. "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis," in *From a Logical Point of View,* p. 79.

58. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," p. 41.

59. Putnam has often written on James in recent years. For Putnam's view of his relation to James's pluralism, see, e.g., "James's Theory of Perception," in Hilary Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face,* edited by James Conant, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 232–252.

60. Hilary Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry Into the Powers of the Human Mind," in *Journal of Philosophy* 91, no. 9, September 1994, pp. 445–517, reprinted in Hilary Putnam, *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 3–70.

61. Hilary Putnam, "Two Philosophical Perspectives," in *Reason, Truth and History,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 49.

62. Ibid., p. 54.

63. For Rorty's attack on internal realism as leading to relativism, see "Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace," in Richard Rorty, *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers,* III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 43–67.

64. Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses."

65. Ibid., p. 469.

66. Ibid., p. 454.

67. Ibid., p. 488.

68. Ibid., p. 517.

69. Brandom has recently insisted on the link between his brand of inferentialism and pragmatism. See Brandom, *Articulating Reasons.*

70. For a different reading of Rorty, as a subjective relativist, see Rescher, *Realistic Pragmatism,* pp. 44–47.

71. "The Contingency of Language," in Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 3–22.

72. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 170.

73. W. V. O. Quine, *Word and Object,* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960, pp. 271–276.

74. Richard Rorty, *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method,* edited by Richard Rorty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 23.

75. Ibid., p. 24.

76. Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," in *Consequences of Pragmatism,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, pp. xiii–xlvii.

77. Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers,* I, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 126–150.

78. Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson,* pp. 307–319.

79. Rorty, *Truth and Progress,* pp. 124–125.

80. Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope,* p. 24.

81. See Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* p. 132.

82. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,* translated by James Ellington, Indianapolis: LLA, 1964, p. 5.

83. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* pp. 132, 139.

84. Richard Rorty, "Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin," in *Truth and Progress,* pp. 290–306.

85. Ibid., pp. 293–294.

86. Ibid., p. 294.

87. The effort to show that Fichte understands science succeeds in showing this is not the case. Reinhard Lauth, *Die transzendentale Naturlehre Fichtes nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre,* Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1984.

88. Dewey, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," pp. 1–20.

89. Rorty, "Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin," p. 300.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., p. 305.

92. Ibid., p. 306.

93. Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," p. 514.

94. James, *Pragmatism,* p. 106.

95. Ibid., p. 35.

96. Joseph Margolis, "Reconstruction in Pragmatism," in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 13, no. 4, 1999, pp. 221–239.

97. Russell B. Goodman, "Wittgenstein and Pragmatism," *Parallax* 4, no. 4, 1998, pp. 91–105. Goodman is mainly concerned with the relation between Wittgenstein and James.

98. Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck, and Thomas Uebel, *Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

99. See, e.g., W. V. Quine, *The Roots of Reference,* LaSalle: Open Court, 1973.

100. See, e.g., Michael Dummett, *Frege's Philosophy of Language,* London, 1973, p. 559.

101. This is an instance of what Rorty refers to as "the bad habit British empiricists took over from Descartes—the habit of asking whether mind ever succeeds in making unmediated contact with the world, and remaining skeptical about the status of knowledge-claims until such contact can be shown to exist." Richard Rorty, "Introduction," in Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 9.

102. David Bloor, "The Question of Linguistic Idealism Revisited," in Hans Sluga and David F. Sterne, eds., *Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 354–382.

103. Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.

104. Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* p. 45.

105. For his later critique of empiricism, see G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, 37–60, pp. 76–107.

106. Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* 6, p. 76.

107. For discussion, see Richard Rorty, "Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations," in *Truth and Progress,* pp. 122–137.

108. Sellers, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* 29, pp. 160–161.

109. Rorty, "Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations," p. 122.

110. For a long study of his inferentialism, which assumes it is Hegelian, see Jürgen Habermas, "Von Kant zu Hegel: Zu Robert Brandoms Sprachpragmatik," in *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung: Philosophische Aufsätze,* Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1999, pp. 138–185.

111. Brandom, introduction to *Articulating Reasons,* p. 1.

112. Ibid., p. 4.

113. Ibid., p. 13.

114. Charles Taylor, *Hegel,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 12–27.

115. Ibid., chap. 1, "Aims of a New Epoch," pp. 3–51.

116. Brandom, introduction to *Articulating Reasons,* p. 6; emphasis removed.

117. Brandom, "Semantic Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism," in *Articulating Reasons,* p. 56; emphasis in original.

118. See "To Marcus Herz, 21 February 1772," in Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–1799,* edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 70–76.

119. Brandom, introduction to *Articulating Reasons,* pp. 22, 34.

120. Ibid., p. 35; emphasis in original.

121. W. V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 79–90.

122. Brandom, introduction to *Articulating Reasons,* p. 27; emphasis in original.

123. According to Habermas, who apparently conflates Brandom's inferentialism with his own theory of discourse, Brandom correctly understands his own theory as Hegelian with respect to the self-reflection of human spirit. "Dieser [Brandom] versteht gut hegelisch seine Theorie als einen zeitgenössischen Versuch der Selbstreflexion des menschlichen Geistes, wie er sich in den Praktiken einer Sprachgemeinschaft ausdrückt." Jürgen Habermas, "Robert Brandom: *Making It Explicit,*" in *Zeit der Übergänge: Kleine politische Schriften,* IX, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2001, p. 167.

124. Robert Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.

125. Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in *Science, Perception, and Reality,* Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991, pp. 1–40.

126. W. V. Quine, "The Scope and Language of Science," in *Ways of Paradox and Other Essays,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 229.

127. This is an important theme in Quine. See, e.g., Quine, *The Roots of Reference.*

128. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* translated by Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971.

129. Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore, *Holism: A Shopper's Guide,* Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992.

130. Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 92.

131. The most complete study of which I am aware does not mention this relation. Fodor and Lepore, *Holism: A Shopper's Guide.*

132. Brandom, *Making It Explicit,* pp. 477–481.

133. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," p. 42.

134. Rudolf Carnap, "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft," in *Erkenntnis* 2, 1931, p. 437: "Wissenschaft ist ein System von Sätzen, das an Hand der Erfahrung aufgestellt wird. Die empirische Nachprüfung bezieht sich aber nicht auf den einzelnen Satz, sondern auf das System der Sätze oder auf ein Teilsystem. Die Nachprüfung geschieht an Hand der Protokollsätze."

135. Robert Brandom, "Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel's Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms," in *European Journal of Philosophy* 7, no. 2, August 1999, pp. 164–189. Reprinted in Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead,* pp. 210–234.

136. Brandom, "Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism," p. 176.

137. Ibid., p. 164; emphasis in original.

138. See, e.g., "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in *The Essential Peirce,* I, p. 132.

139. "What Is Pragmatism?" in *The Essential Peirce,* II, p. 338.

140. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* 235, p. 142; emphasis in original.

141. Perhaps Rorty is thinking of Peirce's identification of pragmatism as "prope-positivism." See "What Is Pragmatism?" p. 339.

142. See Rorty's introduction to Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* p. 11.

143. "What Is Pragmatism?" p. 338.

144. See Rorty's introduction to Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* p. 11.

145. Brandom, introduction to *Articulating Reasons,* pp. 33–35.

146. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* p. 268.

147. Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language,* p. xiii.

148. See, e.g., Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* 98, p. 155.

149. John Haugeland, "Heidegger on Being a Person," in *Nous* 16, 1982, pp. 16–26, cited in Brandom, introduction to *Articulating Reasons,* p. 34.

150. Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead,* p. 48.

151. Mark Okrent, *Heidegger's Pragmatism,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

152. Brandom, "Texts," in *Tales of the Mighty Dead,* p. 34.

153. Ibid., p. 46.

154. Ibid., p. 47; emphasis in original.

155. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 168.

156. Brandom, "Texts," p. 49; emphasis in original.

157. Ibid., p. 51; emphasis in original.

158. Ibid., p. 51–52; emphasis in original.

159. Brandom, "Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," in *Tales of the Mighty Dead,* p. 183.

160. Bertrand Russell, *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,* Chicago: Open Court Press, 1998.

161. Brandom, "Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," p. 178.

162. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* 26–36, pp. 65–76.

163. Brandom, "Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," in *Tales of the Mighty Dead,* p. 193.

164. Ibid., p. 193; emphasis in original.

165. Ibid., p. 201; emphasis in original.

166. Ibid., p. 203; emphasis in original.

167. See Michael Kosok, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays,* edited by Alasdair MacIntyre, Garden City: Doubleday, 1978, pp. 237–288.

168. Brandom, "Leibniz and Degrees of Perception," in *Making It Explicit,* p. 146; emphasis in original.

169. Brandom, "Contexts," in *Articulating Reasons,* p. 27; emphasis in original.

170. See Andrew Pickering, *Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

171. Brandom, "Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism," in *Rorty and His Critics,* p. 162.

172. Richard Rorty, "Response to Brandom," in *Rorty and His Critics,* pp. 183–190.

173. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Mathematics,* New York: Norton, 1964, pp. 48–52.

174. Brandom, introduction to *Articulating Reasons,* p. 34.

175. Jean Piaget, *Epistémologie des sciences de l'homme,* Paris: Gallimard, 1970.

176. Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy,* translated by C. P. Dutt, New York: International Publishers, 1941.

177. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method,* translated by Hazel Barnes, New York: Vintage, 1968.

178. Paraphrased in the introduction to Rorty, *The Linguistic Turn,* p. 3.

179. John McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.

180. McDowell, "Davidson in Context," p. 155.

181. Ibid., p. 5n. This critique indicates that the issue of empiricism is not closed but requires further examination.

182. John McDowell, "Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality," The Woodbridge Lectures 1997, *Journal of Philosophy* 95, no. 9, September 1998, p. 435.

183. Ibid., p. 491 n. 22.

184. Ibid., p. 469.

185. Ibid., p. 491.

186. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty,* 61.

187. Ibid., 62.

188. Ibid., 63.

189. Ibid., 65.

190. At the beginning of the 1990s McDowell published two papers on what he saw as the misrepresentation of intentionality in the later Wittgenstein in Kripke's and, following him, Wright's versions of the familiar social justificationist interpretations. See "Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," and "Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein," both reprinted in McDowell, *Mind, Value and Reality,* pp. 263–278, 297–324.

191. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty,* 676.

192. Quine, *Ontological Relativity,* p. 75.

193. Davidson, *Truth and Interpretation,* p. 310.

194. McDowell, *Mind and World,* p. 108.

195. Wilfrid Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes,* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York, Humanities Press, 1968, p. 16, cited in McDowell, "Having the World in View," p. 466 n. 18.

196. McDowell, "Having the World in View," pp. 466, 490.

197. Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics,* p. 29, cited in McDowell, "Having the World in View," p. 488.

198. McDowell, "Having the World in View," p. 488.

199. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 93, p. 205.

200. Ibid., B xvii, pp. 110–111.

201. McDowell, "Having the World in View," p. 491 n. 22.

202. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan, 1966, § 429.

203. McDowell, *Mind and World,* p. 27.

204. Ibid., p. 34.

205. Ibid., p. 44.

206. Ibid., p. 108.

207. McDowell, "Davidson in Context," in *Mind and World,* edited by John McDowell, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 129–161.

208. John McDowell, "Mathematical Platonism and Dummetian Anti-

Realism," in *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality,* edited by John McDowell, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 344–368.
in *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 365.

209. Ibid., p. 10.

210. Ibid., pp. 3–29.

211. McDowell, "On the Reality of the Past," in *Meaning, Knowledge and Reality,* pp. 295–313.

212. Michael Dummett, "The Reality of the Past," in *Truth and Other Enigmas,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 358–374.

213. McDowell, "On the Reality of the Past," p. 295.

214. Ibid., p. 313.

215. McDowell, "Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding," in *Meaning, Knowledge and Reality,* pp. 314–343.

216. Ibid., p. 315.

217. Dummett, "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic," in *Truth and Other Enigmas,* pp. 223–225.

218. McDowell, "Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding," p. 316.

219. Ibid., p. 317.

220. Ibid., p. 321.

221. Ibid., p. 322.

222. Ibid., pp. 338, 340.

223. McDowell, "Mathematical Platonism and Dummettian Anti-Realism," in *Meaning, Knowledge and Reality,* p. 345.

224. Ibid., p. 346.

225. Ibid., p. 348.

226. Ibid., p. 353.

227. Ibid., p. 355.

228. Ibid., p. 355.

229. Ibid., p. 356.

230. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels analytische Philosophie: Die Wissenschaft der Logik als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung,* Paderborn: Schöningh, 1992.

231. Ibid., pp. xv–xvi.

232. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism,* p. 211.

233. Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels analytische Philosophie,* p. 73.

234. Ibid., p. 288.

235. Ibid., p. 112.

236. Ibid., p. 131.

237. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* 82, pp. 131–133.

238. Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels analytische Philosophie,* pp. 92–93.

239. Ibid., p. 40.

240. P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory,* London: Methuen, 1960.

241. Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels analytische Philosophie,* p. 28.

242. Ibid., pp. 129–130.

243. Ibid., p. 130.

244. Ibid., p. 131.

245. Ibid., p. 249.

246. G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik,* in *Werke in zwanzig Bänden,* edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, VI, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971, p. 498; *Hegel's Science of Logic,* translated by A. V. Miller, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989, p. 783.

247. In providing a minimal description of Frege's view of reference, I will be following Anthony Kenny, *Frege,* London: Penguin, 1995, pp. 126–141.

248. Ibid., p. 131.

249. Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels analytische Philosophie,* p. xvi.

THREE

Hegel, Idealism, and Knowledge

1. At present, it is unclear even to the main participants that a sense can be given to the term "analytic philosophy." See "Interview: 'Kant ist der Grösste.' John McDowell im Gespräch mit Marcus Willaschek," *Information-Philosophie,* March 2000, pp. 24–32.

2. Dummett, who does not mention Rorty, insists on the linguistic turn, which he understands as the view that "a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only so be attained," as the defining characteristic of analytic philosophy. Michael Dummett, *The Origins of Analytic Philosophy,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 5. See also Michael Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 442.

3. "Hermeneutische und analytische Philosophie: Zwei komplementäre Spielarten der linguistischen Wende," In Jürgen Habermas, *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung,* Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999, pp. 65–101.

4. According to Habermas, Heidegger made a linguistic turn. Jürgen Habermas, "Einleitung: Realismus nach der sprachpragmatischen Wende," in *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung,* p. 34.

5. He makes this claim for anhypothetical thought several times in the *Republic,* for instance at 511 and at 533.

6. For discussion, see K. R. Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemological Realism: A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit,* Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, esp. chap. 10: "Hegel's Idealism and Epistemological Realism," pp. 140–149. Westphal favors a "Romantic" view of Hegel who, on his account, denies any limits to knowledge in claiming to know the mind-independent external world as it is. It is unclear why Hegel holds the position Westphal attributes to him or how it could possibly be defended.

7. For Habermas, to be a realist means among other things to understand the relation between subjects and objects, not on the basis of the subject, but rather through language, work, and interaction, which means that the young Hegel anticipated Habermas. Jürgen Habermas, "Wege der Detranszendentalisierung: Von Kant zu Hegel und zurück," in *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung,* p. 221.

8. Ibid., pp. 186–229.

9. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* translated by N. K. Smith, London: Macmillan, 1961, B 33.

10. Ibid., B 44.

11. "Kant's analysis of experience drives steadily to the conclusion that the experience of a conceptualizing and potentially self-conscious being must include awareness of objects conceived of as existing and enjoying their own states and relations independently of the occurrence of any particular states of awareness of them." P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* London: Methuen, 1966, p. 256.

12. According to Strawson, in giving up Kant's transcendental idealism we lose absolutely nothing. Ibid., p. 262.

13. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 860, pp. 755–756.

14. J. G. Fichte, "Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," in *The Science of Knowledge,* edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 31.

15. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic,* translated by A. V. Miller, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989, pp. 154–156.

16. Plato, *Republic,* 510, 533.

17. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 131, p. 152.

18. This is the basis of Kant's rationalist theory of morality, in which the rational individual acts wholly autonomously.

19. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 117, p. 142.

20. Ibid., B 876, pp. 767–768.

21. Ibid., A ix, p. 8.

22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, and with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul and The Humanities Press, 1963. 4.1121.

23. Ibid., 5.632, p. 116.

24. Ibid., 5.641, pp. 116–118.

25. Stephan Körner, *Categorial Frameworks,* New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970.

26. Tom Rockmore, "Essentialism, Phenomenology, and Historical Cognition," in *The Empirical and the Transcendental: A Fusion of Horizons,* edited by Bina Gupta, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp. 49–60.

27. For Heidegger's objection to psychologism, which he sees as beginning with Descartes, see Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,* translated and with an introduction by William Lovitt, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 140. For a similar objection from the analytic point of view, see Thomas Nagel, *The Last Word,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 67.

28. See, e.g., Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy, eds., *Naturalizing Epistemology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

29. Nagel, *The Last Word,* p. 136.

30. Stephan Körner, *Metaphysics: Its Structure and Function,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 187–189.

31. For his most developed view of the subject, see Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology,* translated by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, 30–33, pp. 65–69.

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36. Hegel, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit,* translated by A. V. Miller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, 167, p. 105.

37. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, 1, p. 24.

38. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan, 1965, 243, pp. 88–90.

39. Donald Davidson, "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 183–198.

40. John McDowell, *Mind and World,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 184.

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62. Kenneth Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit,* Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003, pp. 89–91.

63. Michael Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

64. Forster devotes a whole chapter to this point. See ibid., chap. 12, pp. 464–497.

65. Ibid., p. 430.

66. Ibid., pp. 425–430.

67. Ibid., p. 425; emphasis in original.

68. G. W. F. Hegel. *Philosophy of Right,* translated by T. M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, p. 11.

69. See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,* translated by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany: SUNY Press, 1977, pp. 85–89.

70. Immanuel Kant, *Opus Postumum,* edited, with an introduction and notes, by Eckart Förster, translated by Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 86–87.

71. Alexandre Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe,* New York: Harper, 1958, p. 31.

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73. In my discussion of Copernicus and the consequences of his astronomy, I will be closely following Rossi. See Paolo Rossi, *La nascita della scienza moderna in Europa,* Rome: Editori Laterza, 2000.

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77. John Dewey, *The Quest For Certainty,* New York: Putnam, 1960.

78. W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in *From a Logical Point of View,* New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 43.

79. Page, *Philosophical Historicism and the Betrayal of First Philosophy.*

80. Robert Nozick, *The Nature of Rationality,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 112. For sympathetic discussion, see Nagel, *The Last Word,* pp. 133–137.

81. Even mathematicians are aware of this point. For instance, Jean Dieudonné, an eminent member of the Bourbaki group, writes: "Je pense qu'il n'est pas possible de comprendre les mathématiques d'aujourd'hui si l'on n'a pas au moins une idée sommaire de leur histoire." Jean Dieudonné, *Pour l'honneur de l'esprit humain,* Paris: Hachette, 1987, p. 10.

82. See Morris Kline, *Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

83. See, e.g., Paolo Mancosu, *From Brouwer to Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics in the 1920s,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

84. Heidegger sees the Parmenidean insistence on the coincidence of knowing and being, but not that it presupposes a timeless cognitive object. Martin Heidegger, "The Principle of Identity," in *Identity and Difference,* translated by Joan Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row, 1974, pp. 23–42.

85. C. G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," in *Journal of Philosophy* 29, 1942, pp. 35–48.

86. For criticism, see Joseph Margolis, *The Flux of History and the Flux of Science,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, chap. 2, pp. 36–58, esp. pp. 40–50.

87. Arthur Danto, "The Decline and Fall of the Analytical Philosophy of History," in *A New Philosophy of History,* edited by Frank Ankersmit and Hans Kellner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 81.

88. See K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.

89. These distinctions underlie Aristotle's view of ethics. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* bk. VI, translated by Martin Ostwald, Indianapolis: LLA, 1962, pp. 146–173.

90. See Kline, *Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty.*

91. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 44c, pp. 269–273.

92. See, for discussion of excluded middle, Joseph Margolis, *The Truth About Relativism,* Cambridge: Blackwells, 1991.

93. Kline, *Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty,* pp. 239–241.

94. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione,* 9, 19a 30–33, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle,* edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 30.

95. Quine, who argues that no principles are immune from revision, contends that Aristotle's law of excluded middle ought not be abandoned since three-valued logics are "cumbersome." See W. V. Quine, *Pursuit of Truth,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, 38, pp. 90–93.

96. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B viii, p. 17.

97. Ibid., B xi, p. 19.

98. For a recent effort to make the case for deep linguistic structure, see Mark C. Baker, *The Atoms of Language: The Mind's Hidden Rules of Grammar,* New York: Basic Books, 2001.

99. See Noam Chomsky, *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

100. Michael Williams, *Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism, and the Basis of Skepticism,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 267.

101. See Ilham Dilman, *Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution: The Question of Linguistic Idealism,* London: Palgrave, 2002.

102. See Ludwik Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact,* translated by Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn, foreword by Thomas S. Kuhn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

103. See Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

104. See editors of *Lingua Franca, The Sokal Hoax: The Sham that Shook the Academy,* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. See also Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, *Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science,* New York: Picador, 1998.

105. Michael Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 66.

106. Lukács's view that we know only what we in some sense create conflates construction, for instance mathematical construction, with creation. See Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* translated by Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971, p. 112.

107. For a critical account, see Stephan Körner, *The Philosophy of Mathematics,* New York: Harper, 1960, pp. 116–118.

108. For a critical account, see ibid., pp. 119–155.

109. See Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, *The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science,* Oxford: Pergamon, 1981. See also Karin Knorr-Cetina, *Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

110. Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* pp. 32–33.

111. On Hobbes, see A. H. Child, *Making and Knowing in Hobbes, Vico, and Dewey,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1953.

112. Many observers comment on Vico's constructivism. For recent discussion, see Vittorio Hösle, *Introduzione a Vico: La scienza del mondo intersoggettivo,* translated by Giovanni Stelli, Naples: Guerini, 1997, pp. 48ff.

113. Ibid., p. 49 n. 80. Hösle relies on R. Mondolfo, *Il "verum-factum" prima di Vico,* Naples: Guida, 1969.

114. Benedetto Croce, "The sources of Vico's Theory of Knowledge" in *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico,* translated by R. G. Collingwood, New York: Russell and Russell, 1964, pp. 279–301.

115. Thomas Hobbes, *Six Lessons to the Professors of the Mathematics . . . ,* in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes,* edited by Sir William Molesworth, London: Jules Bohn, 1839 et seqq., cited in Child, *Making and Knowing,* pp. 272–273.

116. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico,* 331, pp. 52–53.

117. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 4, p. 49.

118. Ibid., B 741, pp. 668–669.

119. "If I agreed with Kuhn's judgment about the progress of science, that there is no sense in which science offers a cumulative approach to some sort of truth, then the whole enterprise would seem rather irrational to me, even if not to Kuhn." Letter in *New York Review of Books,* February 18, 1999, p. 49.

120. See Hans Blumenberg, *The Genesis of the Copernican World,* translated by R. M. Wallace, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.

121. For one of the best discussions in English, see H. J. Paton, *Kant's Meta-*

physic of Experience, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961, I, pp. 561–569.

122. *Herders sämtliche Werke,* edited by Bernhard. Suphan, IV, Berlin: Weidmann, 1893, 61.

123. In the first letter of his *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie,* which appeared in August 1786, hence before the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Reinhold refers to the relation between Kant and revolution, and then to that between Kant and Copernicus. K. L. Reinhold, "Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie," in *Teutsche Zeitschrift* 27, August 1786, pp. 124–125, 126.

124. In his obituary of Kant, Schelling suggests that Kant intended to make a Copernican turn. "Ähnlich wie sein Landsmann Copernikus, der die Bewegung aus dem Centrum in die Peripherie verlegte, kehrte er zuerst von Grund aus die Vorstellung um, nach welcher das Subjekt unthätig und rühig empfangend, der Gegenstand aber wirksam ist: eine Umkehrung, die sich in alle Zweige des Wissens wie durch eine elektrische Wirkung fortleitete." "Immanuel Kant" (1804), in *Schellings Werke,* III, edited by Manfred Schröter, Munich: Beck, 1958, p. 599.

125. See Ermano Bencivenga, *Kant's Copernican Revolution Revisited: Paradigm, Metaphor and Incommensurability in the History of Science,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. See also Hans Blumenberg, "What Is Copernican in Kant's Turning?" chap. 5 of *The Genesis of the Copernican World,* pp. 595–614; Daniel Bonevac, "Kant's Copernican Revolution," in *The Age of German Idealism,* edited by Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 40–65; S. M. Engel, "Kant's Copernican Analogy: A Re-Examination," in *Kant-Studien* 54, 1963, pp. 243–251; David Ingram, "The Copernican Revolution Revisited: Paradigm, Metaphor and Incommensurability in the History of Science—Blumenberg's Response to Kuhn and Davidson," in *History of the Human Sciences* 6, 1993, pp. 11–35; Pierre Kerszberg, "Two Senses of Kant's Copernican Revolution," *Kant-Studien* 80, 1989, pp. 63–80.

126. See Thomas Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

127. See A. N. Pavlenko, *Evropeiskaja kosmologija: Osnovanija epistemologicheskogo povorota,* Moscow: Intrada, 1997.

128. See Steven Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

129. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B xxii, p. 25.

130. Blumenberg, *The Genesis of the Copernican World,* p. 603.

131. Isaac Newton, *Opera omnia,* II, edited by S. Horsley, London: J. Nichols, 1779–1785, p. xiv.

132. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 198, p. 195.

133. See Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,* translated by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. It is known that the mathematization of nature began much earlier with the Pythagorean school, and then was later developed by the Oxford school and Oresme in the fourteenth century.

134. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B xxii, p. 20.

135. Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–1799,* translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 71.

136. I agree with Bencivenga that Kant should be understood as addressing a set of problems, but disagree that he did not offer a definite position that can be reconstructed and criticized. See Bencivenga, *Kant's Copernican Revolution Revisited.*

137. On the relation of Kant's conception of physical theory to Newton's, see Pierre Kerszberg, *Critique and Totality,* Albany: SUNY Press, 1997, pp. 63–67; and Michael Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 321.

138. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* 7, pp. 173–175.

139. Immanuel Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties,* translated by Mary J. Gregor, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992, part 2, section 4, p. 149.

140. For discussion, see Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art,* Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976.

141. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 370, p. 310.

142. Ibid., B 14–19, pp. 52–54.

143. Ibid., B 741–766, pp. 557–593.

144. Ibid., B 181, p. 183.

145. Ibid., B 862, pp. 756–757.

146. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,* p. 79.

147. This is the central point at issue in Fichte's "Deduction of Representation." See Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge,* pp. 203–218.

148. W. J. Schelling, *The System of Transcendental Idealism,* translated by Peter Heath, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1978, p. 4.

149. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,* pp. 89–94.

150. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* 85, p. 54.
151. Ibid., 86, p. 55.
152. Ibid., 87, pp. 55–56.
153. See, e.g., Frederick Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 11.
154. Habermas, "Einleitung: Realismus nach der sprachpragmatischen Wende," in *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung,* p. 12.
155. Ibid., p. 14.

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